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ABSTRACT

This
Civil

thesis

War,

railroad,
Spring

but
as

of

analyzes

a minor campaign of the American

one which illustrates the importance of the

a line of communications,

1862,
Landing,

in

south

Corinth,

Mississippi.

Mitchel,
Ohio,

Tennessee,

preparatory to an advance
General

given

left,

Confederate

the

which
threat

defensive

duty

This

action

that

from

northern

Alabama

Virginia

and

men

material

and

provided

Mitchel

of

safeguarding the

included Middle Tennessee,
Chattanooga.

advanced to and captured Huntsville,

Union

Ormsby Macknight

in command of the Third Division of the Army of the

was

Federal

In the

the Union Army in the west concentrated at

Pittsburg
on

to strategy.

several

against any

Instead,

Mitchel

Alabama.
opportunities

attempted to pursue.

for

the

His occupation of

severed the Confederate connection between

Mississippi

and forced the South to transport

via Mobile,

rather than by the expeditious

route through Chattanooga and northern Alabama.
After

securing

northern

advancing

tried

to

convince

to

and

superiors

that with more men he could advance from Tuscumbia

upon

Mobile

communications
His

advance,

of

and

Ohio

Mitchel

by

Stevenson

the

Tuscumbia,

Alabama

Railroad,

his

which was the line of

the Confederate army located at Corinth.

whether

a turning movement or raid,
v 11

would have

broken

the stalemate at Corinth and led to the Union capture

of that strategic rail
When
he

Mitchel's

junction.
superiors

did not support his proposal,

turned his attention to Chattanooga in hopes of executing

the

same

maneuver

Chattanooga's

only

planned

to

turning

Corinth,

because

of

force

use

upon

the Western and Atlantic Railroad,

link

with

the

same

this

difficulty

that

would

the deep south.

strategy

move

as he had proposed for

would not have been successful

feeding

have

Although he

been

and

supplying the enlarged

needed to disrupt Confederate

communications.
Therefore,
Memphis

and

Eventually
and
to

Charleston
the

supplies
block

Mitchel's

the

only
Railroad

success

was in holding the

for almost three months.

Federal armies used that road to tranfer men
from the Corinth area to Chattanooga in a move
same

threatening

retired from Corinth.

viii

Confederate

army that had

INTRODUCTION

In 1846, Henry Wager Halleck defined strategy as "the
art of directing masses
[spanning]
battle."

[of men]

the theater of war,

on decisive points

rather than

[on] the field of

He explained tactics as "the art of bringing

troops into action,

or of moving them in the presence of the

enemy" within the confines of the battlefield.
considered that logistics

"embrace[d]

He

the practical details

of moving and supplying a r m i e s . S i m p l y
proper

.

described,

logistics were essential to translate strategy into

successful operations.

Logistics could not alone determine

the outcome of a conflict;

however,

successful military

operations hinged upon feeding and equipping the men and
animals of the army,

whether stationary or moving.

Unlike previous wars,
railroad

2

the American Civil War used the

to move men within and between theaters of

operations.

The adaptation of the railroad to warfare meant

new variables in logistical support that required
modification of strategic thinking.

For example,

movements

in earlier wars were conditioned upon the marching rates of
men and horses,

but the railroad promoted greater mobility.

Instead of marching ten or fifteen miles per day, Civil War
soldiers often rode twenty or thirty miles per hour,

and

arrived in the proximity of the battlefield more refreshed

1

2

than after enduring a long march.

While Civil War

armies depended upon horse-drawn wagons for short distance
hauls of subsistence and supplies,
railroads released

in strategic terms the

the armies from the limitation of wagon

and water transport.

Compared to wagons,

the union of the

steam engine and freight car with their increased speed and
carrying capacity enabled larger armies to be readily
provisioned and equipped farther

from their source than ever

before.

In The Rise of Rail-Power , Edwin A. Pratt noted that
the Civil War provided the first methodical and extensive
use of the railroad

in waging war.

He summarized the

changes to logistics brought about by the railroad and its
impact on strategy.
illustrated

As a proving ground,

the Civil War

the potential of the railroad and revealed its
, which had been addressed in Europe only

theoretically prior to the 1870 Franco-Prussian
War . 4
Martin Van Creveld expanded upon Pratt's theme of the
importance of the railroad,

but provided a more fundamental

understanding of the relationship of strategy to logistics.
In Supplying W a r , he reversed the idea that logistical
planning and support were subordinate and usually subsequent
to strategic

implimentation.

maintained that historically,

Instead,

Van Creveld

strategy had been formulated

and initiated within logistical contexts.
Pratt's assertion about the impact

Contradicting

the railroad had on

3

logistics,

he discovered

that even with the advantage of

railroads,

purposely organized as a support function,

logistics in the Franco-Prussian War failed in so many
aspects of supply that the Prussian armies ultimately
reverted to subsisting on requistioned provisions.
men foraged to compensate
railroad,

Because

for the inadequacies of the

Van Creveld observed

that living off the land was

only possible as long as the men kept moving.

When the

armies halted for long periods for one reason or another,
supply difficulties were at once e xperienced.
Railroads affected the logistics of armies in the
American Civil War both by their effectiveness and their
failures,

and strategies were adopted to meet the new

contingencies created by the use of railroads.

While

providing a potential for moving larger armies,

with more

supplies,

over greater distances under steam power,

railroad also exhibited vulnerabilities.
exceedingly fragile,

Rail lines were

and transport could be interrupted

easily by removal of rails,

destruction of bridges,

simply occupation of a portion of the line.
armies

or

This made

dependent upon subsisting off the land,

from the local inhabitants,
wagon,

the

requistioning

or transporting provisions by

just as they had before railroads were invented.

Explaining How the North Won the Civil War,
Jones and Herman Hattaway

Archer

indicated that Federal armies

formulated the winning strategy based on a supply line's
susceptibility

to disruption.

The logistical relationship

4

was called,

in military parlance,

communications,

the line of

and it constituted

"the interdependence of logistics,

the underlying basis for
strategy,

the three branches of the art of war."
provisions and equipment,
the defense was a stronger

Without

armies could not fight,

entrenchments or barricades,
an alternate

and since

form of warfare than the

offensive (especially after the soldiers,

muskets),

and tactics,

fired minie

protected behind
bullets from rifled

form of strategy was needed to

replace the direct attack.

But it had to be one that still

permitted the destruction of the enemy army as the object of
operations.

The "strategy of exhaustion"

alternate form of defeating an enemy.

became that

In contrast with the

"strategy of annihilation," which destroys the enemy by
direct and costly combat,

the "strategy of exhaustion"

relied on indirect defeat of the enemy by disrupting his
line of communications,

that precarious relationship of men

and animals to food and supplies.
pointed out,

As Jones and Hattaway

the alternate strategy— that is,

the strategy

of exhaustion— may involve a turning movement in which the
enemy army nevertheless remains the objective.
be dislodged

An army can

from a position not only by engaging its main

body of troops,

a costly encounter,

but also by threatening

or severing its line of communications.

To be effective,

the turning movement had to be directed at something other
than the enemy's defensive

position,

maneuverabilty and firepower.

with its increased

The logical objective of such

5

a strategy was aimed at the disruption of the railborne
logisical system,

thereby depriving a dependent army of its

supplies .^
My study will analyze the Union army's advance to
Huntsville,

Alabama,

in the spring of 1862.

"corps d' observation"
Division,

Employed as a

for the Army of the Ohio,

the Third

under the leadership of Major General Ormsby

Macknight Mitchel,

descended upon Huntsville,

Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

severed

the

and occupied that part of

northern Alabama lying along the Tennessee River.

Mitchel's

campaign illustrates the use of the railroad to transport
men and supplies during an invasion and occupation of enemy
territory.

Mitchel

then applied his understanding of

strategy to devise a turning movement against the
Confederate army concentrated at Corinth in conjunction with
his move to Huntsville.
Alabama,
town,

Having moved on Huntsville,

and--with only minor skirmishes— occupied that

he then secured complete control of the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad between Stevenson,
and Tuscumbia,

Alabama,

on the west.

Alabama,

on the east

He thereby secured an

undamaged railroad for Union movement either east or west,
as opportunity might offer;

of course,

the same movement

denied the use of this vital railroad to Confederates,

who

were attempting to shift troops from Virginia and eastern
Tennessee to support the concentration at Corinth,
were now forced
Mobile.

and who

to go west by a round-about route through

Having denied General Pierre G. T. Beauregard the

6

use of these troops as he opposed General Halleck's move
from Shiloh to Corinth, Mitchel then grasped a golden
opportunity that his control offered him to disrupt
Beauregard's communications at Corinth.

The projected

turning movement might have ended up being a raid; Mitchel's
own lines of communications were not that secure because he
would have had to rely on water communications,

and he never

commanded a sufficient force for a turning movement.

Still,

the concept was there.
Mitchel's idea was to move on Jacinto,

Mississippi,

a

small town near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Mobile
and Corinth.

This would endanger Confederate

communications.

Merely the threat of such a movement would

presumably force the Confederates to examine hard options:
retreat west,

retreat south and get through Jacinto before

Mitchel got there,

or if Mitchel did get there first,

Beauregard would be forced to change his strategic defensive
posture to the tactical offensive,

attacking Mitchel in an

effort to recover his communications to Mobile.

None of

these alternatives was desirable for the Confederate cause.
Mitchel's commander,

General Don Carlos Buell,

even more cautious than Halleck,
officers sought
skill,

and neither of these

to seize the opportunity

initiative,

appeared

that Mitchel's

and luck had offered the Union army.

Only after Mitchel destroyed the Decatur bridge on Buell's
order,

and the Confederates retreated from Corinth,

did

Halleck seek to use the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as

7

his line of communications.
Frustrated in the west by his unimaginative superiors,
Mitchel sought to act upon the same idea once again,

this

time by moving east along the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad

through Bridgeport,

Alabama.

Apparently Mitchel

sought to turn the Confederate position at Chattanooga by
moving on Rome,

Georgia,

a railhead on a connecting line to

the vital Western and Atlantic Railroad.

Mitchel's

occupation of Rome would threaten Confederate communications
from the south to Chattanooga,

just as the movement on

Jacinto was intended to threaten Confederate communications
to Corinth.

This time,

however,

Mitchel's own

communications were even less secure because he lacked
alternative water transportation and because the
Confederates had cut both the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,

the two

lines from Nashville to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
As before,
move,

he asked for reinforcements for his proposed

but this time his plans were not practical;

manpower,

communications,

supply his own division,

lacking

and wagons he was barely able to
to say nothing of any

reinforcements he might have received.

The proposed move on

Confederate communications south of Chattanooga turned out
to be nothing more than a holding action.

With only a

division of 9,000 men, Mitchel might have changed the course
of the war in the west; at the very least,

his campaign

illustrates the strategic significance of railroads in the

/

8

Civil W a r .
My thesis is that due to logistical constraints
Mitchel's attempt to turn the Confederates in Chattanooga
was premature,

and had no chance of success.

attempt to turn the Confederates in Corinth,

His probable
however,

was

brilliantly conceived and was never executed only because
General Halleck was so obsessed with the concept of attack
on the central position that he was blinded to the indirect
approach implied in the strategy of the turning movement.
Whether turning movement or raid,

however,

the maneuver

would have posed a serious threat to Beauregard,
have had to act accordingly.

who would

At the same time, Mitchel's

holding action between Decatur and Bridgeport,

in which he

maintained control of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
was a major success,

for he provided Halleck and Buell with

viable communications over interior lines between Corinth
and the approaches

to Chattanooga.

The essential sources for this study,
could not have been undertaken,
Rebellion:

without which it

are The War of the

A_ Compilation of the Official Records of the

Union and Confederate A r m i e s , and Ormsby Macknight
M i t c h e 1, Astronomer and G e n e r a l :

A Biographical Narrative .

The latter source was compiled by Mitchel's son, and
includes a large number of letters,

otherwise

unavailable.

The Official R e c o r d s , compiled by editors in the War
Department

between

1880 and 1901,

Civil War documents.

is a 128-volume series of

Six of these volumes contain extensive

9

materials on Mitchel's campaign and several others have
additional

useful information.

The Official Records will be
g

cited frequently in the chapters to follow.
Unfortunately
Mitchel
strategy

the extensive monographic literature on

treats his Huntsville campaign and his proposed
for turning Corinth and perhaps Chattanooga in a

superficial manner.

Footnotes to Introduction

Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art
and S c i e n c e ; o r , Course o f Instruction in S t r a t e g y ,
Fortification, Tactics o f Battles, & c .; Embracing the Duties
o f S t a f f , Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery , and Engineers (New
York: D. Appleton and Co., 1846), pp. 37-8, 88, 114.
2
John G. Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the
Civil War," Military Affairs 24 (Summer 1960):106-114.
3
Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the
Civil War, 1861-1865 (New York:
King's Crown Press, 1952),
p . 12 .
4
Edwin A. Pratt, Th_e R_i_se_ o_f Rail-power in War
and Conquest, 1833-1914 (London: P . S. King & Son, 1915), p.
2 5.'
^Martin Van Creveld, Supplying W a r : Logistics
from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977), pp. 107-108.
^Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the
North Won: A_ Military History o f the Civil War (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 718.
Also related
to me by Archer Jones on 26 January, 1984.
^Hattaway and Jones,
705-720.
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pp.

U. S., War Department, The War of the
Rebellion:
A_ Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate A r m i e s , 4 series, 70 vols. in 128
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1910); F. A.
M i t c h e 1, Orms by Macknight M i t c h e 1, Astronomer and G e n e r a l :
A Biographical Narrative (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and
C o m p a n y , 1887).

CHAPTER I

THE RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGY TO THE RAILROAD

Antoine Henri Jomini is often considered

the primary

influence on American strategic thought before and during
the Civil War.

His study of war blended historical analysis

and theoretical postulates in an attempt to reduce warfare
to fundamental principles.
of Napoleonic warfare,
Napoleonic warfare,

Renowned for his interpretation

his influence encouraged the study of

including Napoleonic strategy.'*’

Jomini's major work was The Art of W a r ; in it he sought to
explain warfare as a science
executions.

founded on geometric plans and

Strategy was systematically described and

supported in analytical terms.
While alluding to the possible annihilation of the
army,

Jomini emphasized moving upon "decisive strategic

points" to force the enemy into a position where he must
retire or surrender.

The army's line of operation "must be

directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities" of
the enemy.
weakness,

Giving credence to attacking the enemy's
a Napoleonic trait,

Jomini claimed that if the

enemy divided his army over an extended front,

"the best

direction of the maneuver-line will be upon his center."
However,

a concentrated enemy required a direction of attack
11

12

on his flank or "upon the rear of his line of defense or
front of operations,
reverse."

2

. . . taking the line of defense in

Jomini thus formulated the strategy of

movement needed to dislodge the enemy by cutting his line of
supply.
Alternatively,

Jomini aimed the march of columns toward

"geographical objective points" and established maxims that,
by encouraging maneuver around the enemy,
force him to retreat.

would supposedly

The first rule governed the

principles of concentration and of the objective:
strategic movements

[throw]

the mass of an army

the decisive points of a theater of war, and
communications of the enemy
own" line of communications.
untenable position,

"by

. . . upon

. . . the

. . . without compromising one's
To place the enemy in an

Jomini proposed that the strategic

maneuver ought to be directed on the flank of the enemy,
which could "more easily cut
base and supporting forces"

[the opponent]

off from his

than an attack on his center.

Jomini provided these instructions for the purpose of
denying the enemy provisions

from the country or threatening

his line of communications and forcing him to retire or
fight on the offensive.

Finally,

Jomini pointed out that

"strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of
communications

. . . and attack him in rear,

more likely to be successful and effectual."
While strategy

. . . are much
3

invoked "the art of making war upon the

map," by directing proper movement over the whole "theater

13

of operations,"

the troops executed that strategy by means

of tactics on the field of battle.

Join ini defined logistics

as the "means and arrangements which work out the plans of
strategy and tactics," and thus stated a fundamental
relationship between logistics and the art of war,
relegated logistics to a tertiary position.
this diminished importance

He illustrated

by praising the strategic marches

of Napoleon as "decisive operations,
relation to Logistics,

but he

not because of their

but on account of their strategic

relations ." ^
American military thinkers learned about Napoleon's
methods of war by studying on the continent and transferring
the lessons learned there to the United States.
Mahan,

Dennis Hart

an instructor at West Point from 1830 to 1870,

transplanted continental ideas that influenced many future
Civil War generals.

Mahan used Napoleonic campaigns as

examples to clarify his points.

Henry Wager Halleck was one

of Mahan's students at West Point from 1835 to 1839.

He

also spent time in Europe studying the prevalent form of
warfare.

On his return,

Art and Science
Jomini's writings.^

j_>

he wrote the Elements of Military

almost a literal translation of

Halleck wrote that the

fundamental rule in offensive war was to maintain one's
forces as concentrated as possible,
"interior lines of operations,
success."

carefully noting that

have almost invariably led to

Instead of duplicating Jomini's emphasis on

attacking the rear of the enemy and forcing a decision,

14

Halleek gave only cursory mention to the disruption of an
enemy's line of communications.

In fact,

he de-emphasized

the strategic alternative of attacking communications while
stressing the attack on a central position.

He believed

that "it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear
of the enemy,

for in that case it may be possible

for him to

throw himself on our communications and place us in the very
dilemma."

6

Halleck thought an attack upon the enemy's

central position "strikes the enemy at the heart,
all his military energies,
resources."^

Ha H e c k ' s

paralyzes

and deprives him of his military

influence spread after West

Point accepted his book as a text,

and it was later

distributed widely to amateur soldiers during the Civil War.
Besides defining the
w a r - s t r a t e g y , tactics,
interrelated
connected."

8

fundamental aspects of

and logistics — Halleck adroitly

these basic concepts as "most intimately
While strategy directed armies upon

decisive points,

usually extending over the theater of war,

and tactics moved troops within the presence of the enemy,
the "armies would be of little use without the requisite
means

[i. e.,

subsistence."

logistics]

of locomotion and of

He considered concentration of force as

a requisite to successful strategy,
dependency of strategy on logistics,

but due to the intrinsic
Halleck pardoned an

exception to this underlying principle.
dividing an army developed

The necessity of

from the difficulty of supplying

a concentrated army with adequate food and forage in a
4

15

limited geographical area.

Halleck felt that when required

the army could resort to requisitioning

(forced

contributions demanded from enemy civilians with promise of
reimbursement)
animals
rail,

or to foraging for the subsistence of the

(living off the land),

rather than depend on river,

or wagon transport to forward provisions and

supplies.^

He noted that each method of feeding an

army contained inherent difficulties in enemy territory.
The insurrectionary

state of the local authorities wouid

impede the requisition process while the lack of navigable
rivers,

good roads,

and suitable transport would hinder an

efficient line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . ^
Halleck also regarded the capability of the land to
support both an indigenous population and an invading army
as a limiting factor.

Living off the land or requisitioning

supplies were temporary measures,
rich country,

one unravaged

and possible only in a

by previous armies,

and then

only if invasion occurred during the harvest season.

He

indicated that such favorable subsistence was temporarily
limited to an army moving through the countryside,
.

.

opposed to a stationary army of occupation.

as

12

Halleck addressed a political necessity for dispersing
an army in enemy territory.

Military force must aid an

"insurrection in your favor," which provided a positive
reason for dividing the army;
necessity to "support
strong detachments,"

however,

[such rebellious]
he misjudged

in prescribing the
inclination by

the converse situation of
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having to march through or occupy a hostile area.
The rebellion in the South presented a situation
corresponding to an army operating in unfriendly country.
The Federal army encountered a hostile citizenry,

with

consequent difficulty in obtaining requisitions without
opposition.

Crops could be destroyed purposely to prevent

Union consumption.

Any belligerent

populace could impede or obstruct

part of the local

Lhe Federal armies'

attempt to solve their supply problem by disrupting the
armies'

line of communications.

As a result,

the Union army

depleted its numerical strength by having to string pockets
of guards along its line of communications to protect it
from local inhabitants and raiding enemy cavalry.
Well organized logistics permitted extended operations
in enemy territory,
in war.

but alone could not defeat an opponent

In the Civil War,

logistical considerations

influenced strategy and affected the chances of victory.
Victory depended on feeding and supplying men either moving
or stationary,

or conversely,

preventing the enemy from

receiving its food or supplies.

The objective of occupying

enemy territory received much consideration in strategic
planning in order to deny the enemy the resources of the
territory and to gain that resource for supplying one's own
invading and occupying army.
Before the Civil War,
animal power.

supplies moved on wagons drawn by

This combination had not changed since the

earliest armies had been organized to wage war.

During the
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Civil War,

the normal capacity of the six mule U. S. Army

wagon was approximately

2,000 pounds.

The transport's

deficiency was not in its hauling capacity,
cargo to range.

but its ratio of

Its inefficiency resulted from feeding the

draft animals from the cargo's net weight or payload.
forage consumed
forage,

subtracted

The

from the total amount of food,

or supplies that could be delivered to the front,

unless supplemental forage could be found en route— but this
had the drawback of taking precious time.

Thus,

the farther

the distance the wagon traveled to deliver supplies the more
forage requirements were needed
that pulled it.
however,
wagon.

overcame

to feed the horses or mules

Railroads used to transport supplies,
the range limitation of the
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The railroads revolutionized

the conduct of war by

reversing the priorities in strategic movement.

Strategy

was no longer restricted to the slow movement or limited
capacity of the wagon;

railroads eased the adaptation for

new approaches to strategy.

The railroad,

allowed a larger army to concentrate

unhindered,

for longer periods of

time by the implementation and maintenance of supply.

It

not only mitigated the need to disperse the army over large
areas to subsist off the land;

more importantly,

it

permitted the size of an army in the field to be increased.
The railroad likewise allowed campaigning to be conducted in
any kind of weather.

It was no longer necessary to wait for

muddy roads to dry out to bear the weight of loaded wagons,
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thereby losing the advantage of momentum;
the offensive progressing.

the railroads kept

An intact and secured railroad

permitted armies to maneuver

detached from river

communications and to move through countrysides deficient in
subsistence.

However,

to disruption,

due to the railroad's vulnerability

an army had to ensure it could find

alternative means to subsist.
The railroad shortened the time to move supplies and
equipment between manufacturing and agricultural centers and
the battlefields;
transportation,

it also facilitated lateral

allowing provisions or reinforcements from

one theater of operations to be rapidly shifted to another.
These adjustments to strategy,

based on the railroad,

fit

perfectly into Jomini's and Halleck's concept of war.
Because of its geographic and logistical consequences,
railroad

junction of any magnitude,

any size,

a

or railroad bridge of

became a strategic objective.

The use of railroads to shift forces or to resupply
threatened positions neutralized
"interior lines."
advantage;

the geographic concept of

An army capable of concentration had an

before the railroad,

normally the army with

closer,

supportive units held the position of interior

lines.

Now the iron rail shrank the extremities of an army

to the extent of allowing the transfer of men between them
before an adversary enjoying central position could move his
troops in a conventional manner by marching to support the
outnumbered wing.

The advantage also applied to strategic
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transfer between theaters.

These advantages,

gained by the

use of the railroads in the Civil war,

according to Edwin A.

Pratt,

First,

changed warfare in three ways.

armies using

railroads increased their strategic fighting capability due
to increased

logistical support.

a strategic advantage
points,

Second,

by moving reinforcements

permitting rapid concentration.

concluded,

railways provided
to threatened

Third,

he

expeditions undertaken for unprecedented

distances were made feasible
the railroad,

by the speed and capacity of

which influenced the relationship between

strategy and logistics in w a r f a r e . ^
Martin Van Creveld emphasized

that in past wars

strategy was first planned and then executed according to
logistical considerations and constraints.

Past military

leaders intentionally kept strategy closely tied to their
logistics.

Van Creveld's study marked a change in this

historic priority.

Prior to his discovery,

historians had

armies moving about the countryside unconcerned and
unhindered by supply;
by Napoleon,

however,

as was succinctly paraphrased

an army moved on its stomach.

elaborate words,
or giving battle,

In more

Van Creveld noted that before "manoeuvring
of marching this way and that,

penetrating,

enveloping,

wearing down

[an enemy]

encircling,

of

of annihilating or

. . . [the commander]

has

...

to

make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those
3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease
to be any use as soldiers."

Strategy guarantees little
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success without the means to carry it out.
provisions,

equipment,

ammunition,

The means were

and forage

for animals.

Strategy was accountable to logistics to ensure "that roads
to carry

[supplies and men]

time are available,

to the right place at the right

and that movement along these roads will

not be impeded by either a shortage or a superabundance of
transport."

Railroads provided the potential for more

efficient and rapid logistics,

which allowed concentration

of large armies upon certain points.

But,

because of

disruption to or mismanagement of railroads,

often those

armies still subsisted and supplied themselves in the
traditional manner

by requisitioning and living off the

land . ^
Because the railroad was a physical connection,

a

vulnerable link was formed between rear echelon depots and
forward camps and battlefields.

A successful break in the

supply line forced the army to revert back to subsisting off
the land in a country sometimes not capable of sustaining
it,

or else to depend upon wagon transportation for

resupply.
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Without an intact line of communications,

the army confronted alternatives of either retreating,
counterattacking,

or surrendering,

because a large army

could not subsist off the land for a prolonged period.
Railroads not only contributed

the strategic ability of

rapidly moving larger armies in warfare,

but also embodied a

counter strategy— the turning movement.

In the Civil War

situation,

this meant that because of the South's scanty
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resources invading armies became more dependent on supply
lines and therefore more vulnerable to being turned.
An army can be dislodged from a position by engaging
its main body of troops;

alternatively,

it could also be

dislodged by threatening or severing its line of
communications.
noted,

As Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones have

in most cases,

turning movements can only be employed

against an army dependent upon a line of communications.
The dependence of supply along railroad routes provided the
opportunity for a counter stroke by a turning movement,

a

strategic objective that many Civil War generals maneuvered
their armies in order to obtain.
the line of communications
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A disruption of

by a strategic turning movement

allowed the strategic offensive to employ the tactical
defensive,

forcing the defender to extricate himself by

resorting to an attack to open his line of
communications.^
All American railroads of the period were similarly
engineered in locomotive
Engines

power and cargo carrying capacity.

fueled by wood steamed along averaging twenty to

twenty-five miles per hour and pulling between ten to
fifteen cars of various types.
approximately

Wooden boxcars each carried

16,000-20,000 pounds of cargo or transported

about forty men each (excluding those carried on
top).
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However,

even though the trains were

similar in construction and utility they were not
operationally compatible.

Developed under local auspices
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with constraints in capital and control,

small railroad

companies at first were disjointed enterprises,

each

experimenting with its own track gauge without forethought
or plans for expansion.

Many widths were considered

standard and only after consolidation did lines interconnect
to form railroad networks.
moved south,

2 1

As the Union army

it found no universal gauge,

but one company

established a uniform system of roads in Kentucky and
Tennessee.

The Louisville and Nashville Railroad replaced

the overland passenger and goods trade between the Ohio and
Cumberland Rivers and competed with the Ohio River trade.
At Nashville,

its line joined the Nashville and Chattanooga

Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,
completing the only trunk line
South.
gauge,
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The three railroads,

thus

between the North and
all of the same

were extremely important as lines of communications

through the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee to the
deep s o u t h .
The Confederacy likewise had access to railroads,
one,

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

but

provided a vital

east-west military supply line by connecting the seceded
eastern states with those in the west.
operated across Virginia,
and Mississippi,

the northern portions of Alabama

and the southeastern part of Tennessee,

was originally constructed
peacetime.

The railroad

and

to enhance the flow of goods in

It became an indispensable logistic and

strategic communications link at the outbreak of war.

Union
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leaders realized the importance of the railroad to the
Confederacy,

for it was a vital means of concentrating the

enemy's armies by moving troops within a theater or from one
theater to another.

This link,

although exposed,

compensated for the Confederacy's disadvantage in manpower.
When operating normally it was an equalizer,

and the

Confederate military used it to shift men rapidly from one
front to another to offset Union forces and gain strategic
udvanlage.

While Union department commanders and the Union
leadership discussed the value to the Confederates of the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
against it.

they delayed taking action

General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel,

however,

planned for over six months beginning in the fall of 1861,
to sever that road,

and eventually he succeeded,

in April,

1862.
In October,

1861,

General Mitchel was given command of

an expedition to invade East Tennessee and cut the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad around Knoxville,

but due to

departmental conflicts the mission was cancelled and Mitchel
was reassigned.

Then in the spring of 1862,

as Confederate

generals used the Memphis and Charleston to concentrate
their armies at Corinth,

Mississippi,

Union forces under

General Ulysses S. Grant and General Don Carlos Buell
advanced to meet the enemy,
railroad

aiming to take control of the

junction at Corinth,

which became Ilalleck's

strategic and geographic objective.

As a subordinate of
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Buell, Mitchel was assigned the duty of using his Third
Division as a "corps d' observation."

He was to protect

Nashville and central Tennessee from invasion by way of the
Cumberland Mountains,

and to guard Buell's left flank as the

Army of the Ohio marched

southwest in support of Grant's

forces at Pittsburg Landing.
This sLudy will analyze and interpret Ormsby Mitchel's
advance as part of the Army of the Ohio in the winter and
spring of 1862,
April

11th,

his invasion of Huntsville,

Alabama,

on

and his occupation until July of Confederate

territory north of the Tennessee River,

where the Memphis

and Charleston Railroad paralleled the river's course in
northern Alabama.

The object is to discover whether Mitchel

understood the effective strategic use of the railroad,

and

whether he understood that by threatening or severing his
adversary's

line of communications he could put that

adversary in an untenable position and force him to revert
to the tactical offensive to recover his lines of
communication.

This analysis will also trace Mitchel's

growing comprehension of the importance of the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad to the Confederacy,

and will then

examine the generalship he displayed in his successful
attempt to sever the Confederate east-west link,
threaten a turning movement,

even a raid,

and to

upon the

Confederate army's line of communications to Corinth.
Unsupported in that endeavor

by higher command,

Mitchel

launched an expedition upon Chattanooga prior to the

then
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disengagement of the Union and Confederates armies at
Corinth.

As this study will demonstrate,

however,

Mitchel

soon found his division in unfriendly country without a
completed line of communications.
transportation

for supply,

provide abundant support,
line of communications

Because of lack of

the inability of the country to
the enemy interdiction of his own

(while at the same time he did not

command the troops guarding those lines),

and the

unwillingness of his superiors to send reinforcements,
Mitchel's Chattanooga campaign was too ambitious,
and impractical.

Nevertheless,

supported by reinforcements,

if Mitchel had been

his proposed turning movement

below Corinth could have succeeded
in northern Mississippi.

premature,

in breaking the stalemate

Even so, Mitchel's success at

holding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and adjacent
territory in northern Alabama gave the armies under Halleck
and Buell an intact line of communications as they advanced
east towards Chattanooga after the Confederates withdrew
from Corinth on May 30th,

1862.
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CHAPTER II

MITCHEL'S PREEMPTED EXPEDITION:
THE GERMINATION OF AN IDEA

As a result of the political decision to keep the Union
together,

the North had to rely on military force and carry

the war to the Confederate states.

The Federal government

could not passively persuade the southern states to rejoin
the Union.

If they had not acted forcefully to retain or

coerce those seceding states back into the Union,
Confederate independence would have gone unchallenged and
thus g a i n e d .^

In pursuit of Union policy, Union

forces followed invasion routes created by the geographical
features of the theaters of war.

In the West,

advanced through the Kentucky and Tennessee
bottleneck"

between the Mississippi

Smokey Mountains.

Union columns

"geographical

River and the Great

This was the middle prong of a concerted

attack demanded by Lincoln.

2

As the war progressed,

possession of this avenue became critical to the strategy of
invasion and victory,

for the Confederate

government had

relocated some of its important production centers of iron,
small arms,

gunpowder and other war materials from central

Tennessee to the deep south.
the embers of secession,

To reach that area and quench

the Union armies in the west had to
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channel their efforts through the Nashville-ChattanoogaAtlanta corridor.

As historian Thomas L. Connelly

put it,

"A Union army could scarcely reach the lower South without
marching through the State[s]" of Kentucky and
3
Tennessee.
Besides the topography funnelling movement towards the
South through Kentucky,

the Union had other reasons for

invading and occupying Tennessee.

In the eastern counties

of that state non-cotton growers had fought hard against
secession and needed the support of the Union.

To

supplement

the spirit of the pro-Union eastern Tennessee
4
population, Lincoln favored direct intervention.

Other regions of Tennessee contributed agricultural and
mineral resources to the Confederacy.
salt,

saltpeter,

In East Tennessee,

and lead ore deposits were available in the

Appalachian Valley.

Ninety percent of the copper that the

Confederacy required for percussion caps and artillery
castings was mined near Cleveland.

The lower central

part

of Tennessee was the Confederacy's richest agricultural
area,

based on limestone

farmlands;

crops and livestock were

a b u n d a n t .J
Communication links,

consisting of railroads operating

in a north and south direction and navigable rivers flowing
east to west,

crisscrossed Tennessee

(see map

of the South's important rail centers,

1).

Chattanooga,

At one
two

vital lines connected,

one from Richmond and the other

Charleston.

they formed the Memphis and

Combined,

from
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(New York:

Praeger Publishers,

1972),

l:Map 25.
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Charleston Railroad,

which continued west to Memphis.

The

Cumberland River reached central Tennessee at Nashville,
while the Tennessee River dipped below the border into
Alabama and then flowed past Chattanooga.
River near Paducah,

Each fed the Ohio

but the Muscle Shoals restricted travel

below Florence on the Tennessee.
Nashville was the communications center of Tennessee.
In addition

to river access,

the Nashville and Chattanooga

Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad split from
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and radiated
southward,

connecting the Ohio River to the Tennessee River.

Nashville was also the "leading war production center in the
West," manufacturing such war necessities as armaments and
cartridges.

It also served as a Confederate storehouse

"tons of equipment.

. . .

for

Warehouses bulged with hundreds

of thousands of pounds of foodstuffs collected from the
fertile Middle Tennessee region."^

To capture or

prevent the Confederates from using the riches of Tennessee,
the Federal armies had to move through neutral Kentucky.
But Kentucky maintained neutrality until the end of the
summer of 1861, and formed a buffer

between the two

antagonists in the West.
In the early months of the Civil War, Kentucky
on the brink of secession.

Kentucky's main concern was

maintaining the slave system,

for tobacco farms produced

cash crops and required intensive labor.
was torn;

teetered

loyalties lay on both sides,

However,

the state

and commercial
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interests tied Kentucky

to the South.

All of the Union's

perplexities were manifested in Kentucky as a border state.
Beyond

this, Kentucky had strategic importance

in the west.

for the war

While Kentucky attempted to remain neutral,

internal and external forces were acting to upset its
neutrality.^
On April

15,

1861,

President Lincoln called on

Kentucky to raise four infantry regiments for the Union
cause.

However,

so as not to push Kentucky into the

secessionist's camp,

Lincoln did not insist that Kentucky

fill the quotas placed upon it.
officials,

Nevertheless,

Federal

taking extreme care not to alarm Kentucky,

began

actively recruiting men across the Ohio River at Camps Clay
g

and Joholt.

William Nelson,

a naval officer,

was

empowered to raise three regiments in southeastern Kentucky,
where he established camps at Crab Orchard and Dick
9
Robinson.
On May 28th, the Federal government
formally

organized "all of the state within

100 miles of the

Ohio River" into the Military Department of
K e n t u c k y .^
neutrality,
mutual

While Kentucky struggled with its
people in Ohio became concerned about their

border with Kentucky and rallied to the President's

call for troops.

One such man left his civilian profession

of astronomy to return to military service,

where he

distinguished himself in the invasion of the Southern States
through Kentucky,

the state of his birth.

That man was Ormsby Mitchel,

who returned to the army
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on August 9,
September,

1861, almost thirty years after he resigned in

1832.

He accepted a commission as a Brigadier

General of Volunteers and resumed his military career in the
defense of his adopted home state of O h i o . ^
Mitchel was born in 1809 and raised through adolescence
in Lebanon,

Kentucky.

Almost sixteen,

young Mitchel

traveled alone to West Point Military Academy and took
admittance exams in 1825.

Accepted for the Class of 1829,

Mitchel had the privilege of being a classmate of such
distinguished military
E. Johnston.
classmates,

figures as Robert E. Lee and Joseph

Overshadowed

by the military endeavors of his

Mitchel still distinguished himself,

a respectable

fifteenth out of forty-six.

his commission as a second lieutenant,
the Second Artillery Regiment,

graduating

After receiving

he was assigned

to

but two months later was

appointed acting assistant professor of mathematics at West
Point.

He taught for two years before reassignment to Fort

Marion,

St. Augustine,

resignation.
September,

Florida where he tendered his

He resigned his commission on the 30th

1832,

and began studying law in Cincinnati.

Instead of attaining admittance to the Ohio bar,
taught mathematics,

civil engineering,

in 1834,

mechanics,

and machinery at Cincinnati College for ten years.
addition,

from 1836 to 1837,

Little Miami Railroad,
at operating a railroad
In 1841,

he

French,
In

he was chief engineer of the

complementing his previous experience
in Pennsylvania while in the Army.

he was a member of the Board of Visitors to West
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Point.

He was founder and director of the Cincinnati

Observatory in 1845,

where he became renowned for his

astonomical studies,

writings,

and publications.

In 1847,

Mitchel was appointed Adjutant-General of the Ohio Militia,
and a year later became chief engineer of the Ohio and
Mississippi Railroad.

1 2

The innovation of railroad transportation in warfare
demanded comprehension of every facet of railroading for its
successful integration into strategy.
capacities,

repairs,

Timetables,

bridge construction,

car

wood for fuel, and

spare parts all affected the smooth operation of a railroad.
The movement of supplies and troops to sustain strategy
depended on locomotive maintenance,
repair.

car upkeep, and track

To function as a line of communications,

railroad required its own logistical
commanders had to anticipate.

support,

the

which the

13

Mitchel's experience in engineering and managing
railroads

played a very important role in his strategic move

to Alabama.

His cadet studies in mathematics and

engineering,

his teaching of mechanics,

and mathematics,

civil engineering,

and his working on railroads provided

practical knowledge
the Third Division's

for the establishment and maintenance of
line of communications.

He knew the

potential of the railroad as a supply line and,

conversely,

he understood the limitations and vulnerabilities of the new
transportation.

With this knowledge and experience, Mitchel

returned at the age of fifty-two to military duty perfectly
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suited to the new form of strategic mobility.
Volunteering for duty in August, Mitchel immediately
went to the field as a brigade commander.

His first post

stationed him in the Army of the Potomac under General
William B. Franklin.

But,

combat on the Peninsula,
him to Cincinnati,

before Mitchel could see any

General Winfield Scott reassigned

where he assumed command of a newly

organized camp of rendezvous.

The reassignment was in

response to the alarmed citizenry in Ohio,
Confederate invasion of Kentucky

who witnessed the

in September and felt they

were left defenseless after the removal of General William
S. Rosecrans.
When Mitchel arrived in Cincinnati,
it was reported that a large Confederate

on September 2nd,
force under General

Simon Bolivar Buckner had approached Muldraugh Hill,

that

General Felix K. Zollicoffer had entered Kentucky through
the Cumberland Gap, and that General John C. Breckinridge
and General Humphrey Marshall were assembling forces in the
eastern counties of K e n t u c k y .^
the Confederates entered Kentucky

On September

2nd,

in opposition to Union

recruiting practices within the state,
Kentuckians to join the Confederacy,

to put pressure upon

to capture some of the

weapons kept by the Home Guard Armories,

and to capture

strategic locations before Union forces could do so.
Mitchel shared the concerns of the people of Ohio when he
found "that no preparation had been made to defend the city
[Cincinnati]

. . . that neither men nor guns were here,

and
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there was no military h e a d . " ^

He also found

Kentucky in the same defenseless condition,
preparation,

no arms,

no troops,

having "no

no artillery,

rebels are prepared with everything."

while the
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Mitchel arrived in Cincinnati and diligently prepared
the city's defenses.
Fort Dennison,

However,

even with the construction of

he felt inadequate to meet the enemy because

his authority was limited to the north side of the Ohio
within the existing Department of the Ohio.
Kentucky,

at one time a separate Military Department,

been transferred
General

19

had

to the Department of the Cumberland under

Robert Anderson.

20

Therefore,

an enemy

advance would come through an area commanded by someone
else.

Mitchel expressed his concern that an adequate

defense of Cincinnati could not be made while the approaches
to the city were controlled by another commander.
With the help of Ohio Governor William Dennison,

2 1
he

convinced General Winfield Scott to redefine the military
departments and allow preparation for a proper defense of
Cincinnati.

On 19 September,

issued General Order No.

1861,

the War Department

80, which reorganized the Military

Department of the Ohio to consist of the states of Ohio,
Indiana,

and "so much of Kentucky as lies within

Cincinnati."

2 2

15 miles of

The department was placed under

General Mitchel effective September
requested approval

19th.

Mitchel then

from the Kentucky legislature

for him to

act in that state within fifteen miles of Cincinnati.

The

37

legislature not only granted "full authority"
but replied with "an earnest appeal to send
their aid, and drive back Z o 11icoffer ."

to Mitchel,

5,000 troops to

23

Besides constructing defenses around Cincinnati,
Mitchel recruited men , obtained funds for his quartermaster,
and,

as rendezvous camp commander,

organized,

trained,

and

equipped regiments and sent them forward as necessary to
camps in Kentucky.

To meet his quota,

regiments in Ohio more than half filled
Cincinnati.

24

he directed all
to gather at

He also ordered 10,000 men from his

department to be concentrated at Camp Dennison with the
intention of being prepared "to meet any emergency,"
including moving forward to possess and hold strong points
in Kentucky.

25

Mitchel intended that troops

deployed in a forward position would provide a temporary
defensive cordon extending from Maysville,
and Frankfort,

to Louisville.

through Lexington

26

Due to a serious lack of cavalry,
to deploy infantry in a cordon system,
guards of major avenues of march,

the Union forces had
as observers,

and as reserves.

as
Besides

the four regiments sent to guard the Kentucky Central
Railroad and the Louisville and Lexington Railroad,
forwarded,

with Anderson's permission,

Mitchel

six regiments to Camp

Dick Robinson located at Lexington and one regiment to
Olympian Springs about twenty miles east of Mount Sterling,
"a strategic
advance

point of great importance in the contemplated

towards Cumberland Gap."
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Mitchel regarded

38

this period of preparation as transitory,

and after creating

a defensive position around Cincinnati and sending troops
forward in support of units in the fields of Kentucky,
Mitchel wanted to take the war to the enemy.
As a railroad man,
understood

both engineer and manager,

Mitchel

the important part rail transportation could

contribute to offensive as well as defensive operations in
warfare.

Intuitively,

Mitchel knew the consequences of

striking at the line of communications of the enemy even
with limited means.

Mitchel's concern for his own line of

communications indicated his understanding the effect of a
severed railroad would have on logistics.
Rebuffed by General Anderson for permission to take and
hold the Kentucky Central Railroad,

over which was conveyed

reinforcements and equipment from Cincinnati to Lexington
and Camp Dick Robinson,

Mitchel took "possession of the

Kentucky Central Railroad in the name of the
Government."
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According to orders,

he was only

authorized to act fifteen miles into Kentucky,
nevertheless ordered

but he

the Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry Regiment

to protect the railroad from Covington to Lexington and to
guard all the bridges on the line,

and thereby secure

communications with Camp Dick Robinson.
sent

Another regiment

by Mitchel guarded the rest of the Kentucky Central

Railroad at Cynthiana and Paris.
ordered a regiment
Nashville Railroad"

29

He further

"to occupy a point on the Louisville and
in an effort to "secure

.

39

communications between Camp Dick Robinson and
Louisville.

30

It was only after those precautions

were taken and "with secure lines of communication by rail
with Cincinnati and Louisville
a powerful

thought]

force may be moved from the region near Lexington

and Frankfort,
Gap,

. . . [that Mitchel

and may operate either towards the Cumberland

or, after shutting up that pass,

concentrate a powerful

column and drive the enemy back from Muldraugh's Hill,
secure Louisville,

and threaten Nashville."
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Mitchel regarded the control of the railroad as
fundamental

to any strategy,

either for concentration of

troops for a defensive position such as the one between
Lexington and the Cumberland Gap,
support wherever needed.

or for the transfer of

He understood how the railroad

could aid a defensive position

by shuttling reinforcements

and supplies between the distant extremities of an army.
Using the railroad,

an army forced to operate on exterior

lines could equalize the enemy's advantage of an interior
position,

providing the enemy did not have similar railroad

communications.

Knowing that the railroad could aid in

offensive operations through the rapid concentration of
force, Mitchel

felt that a secure railroad link must be

established and maintained from the base of supplies to
forward locations before any operations could be successful.
During this transitional

period,

Mitchel still desired

to make war on the enemy rather than just to prepare.

He

proposed to General Robert Anderson "to concentrate near

40

Nicholasville , to move,

when strong enough,

force under Zollicoffer,
Tennessee railroad,

to threaten Knoxville and the

and to secure the Cumberland Gap and

effectually bar it against the enemy."
to use

against the

3 2

He planned

10,000 newly recruited Ohio troops for the advance,

and he would have been required to live off the land,
wagon transport would have been inadequate,
conditions,

weather,

first and most vital was "to seize

near Knoxville,"

due to road

and the limited capacity of the wagons.

His ambitious plan had four objectives

Virginia Railroad]

for

and

(see map 2).

The

[the Tennessee and

. . . to burn two long bridges at and

but because of the shortage of required

wagon transportation and the lack of a railroad to the
Cumberland Gap, Mitchel reasoned that the attacking force
could be only somewhat larger than a raiding party and that
the railroad

bridges could only be put out of commission

temporarily.

A larger

force of infantry supported by a

secure line of communications,
the bridges,
permanently

was required not only to cut

but to occupy the area around the bridges and
sever the Confederate railroad.

destroy the bridges,

Cavalry could

but a sufficient force of infantry

would be required to hold them and prevent the enemy from
either recapturing the bridges or reconstructing them after
the cavalry departed.

Mitchel called the seizure of the

Tennessee and Virginia Railroad near Knoxville
opportunity,"

"a grand

because it would sever the Confederacy's main

east-west supply lines.

33
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Map 2 . Mitchel s planned expedition to the Cumberland Gap
S o u r c e . Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas, 2 vols.
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Map 25.
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Mitchel's second objective was directed at rallying the
population of Tennessee and North Carolina,

by "10,000

troops entering Tennessee in the rear of Cumberland Gap."
This would have a two-fold effect.

It would provide relief

for the inhabitants of East Tennessee as requested by
Lincoln,

and envelop,

perhaps even turn,

the rear of the

Cumberland Gap instead of attempting to attack that strong
position from the front.

Mitchel realized that the enemy

could be dislodged at the Cumberland Gap more easily by
threatening his line of communications than by a frontal
assault.

Mitchel pointed out that "From London,

. . it is but two days'

Kentucky,

march over fair roads to points

beyond the Tennessee line in rear of Cumberland Gap,
from there only about
Virginia]

.

thirty miles to the

and

[Tennessee and

railroad .

The third objective,

to be carried out in unison with

Anderson's troops at Camp Dick Robinson,

was aimed at

driving "Zollicoffer out through the Cumberland Gap,
capture him with

[General John C.] Breckinridge."

or to

3 5

Fourth and last, Mitchel hoped that by holding the various
mountain passes near Cumberland Gap and by concentrating the
troops in Kentucky,

his forces would "assume the offensive

and drive the enemy back towards Nashville,
strike a decisive blow in Tennessee."
Trying to get his plan adopted,

and possibly

3 6
Mitchel

quarreled with

Anderson over confiscation and control of the Kentucky
Central

Railroad

and over which direction

the Union effort

43

was to be made in Kentucky.

Mitchel realized at that time

there could not be a concerted Union effort in the Kentucky
region "with so many different commanders,— General
Anderson,

General Thomas,

myself,--all

General Rosecrans,

pulling in different directions.

and
. . .

The

want of system and a plan of operations is very
embarrassing;

and 1 am now confident that the Department of

the Cumberland and that of the Ohio must be placed under one
military head."

3 7

Considering the immediate

occupancy of Kentucky

"as a matter of the greatest

importance," Mitchel urged
ranking officer

the government

to send a high

for "supreme command of this expedition to

Kentucky and to Tennessee,"

one who would command the entire

region and control troops in the states of Ohio,
Kentucky,

and Tennessee.

3 8

Indiana,

The conflicts between

department commanders continued to prevent any worthwhile
direction for the Union forces during the fall of 1861,
which inhibited any major offensive in the region.

This

inter-departmenta1 conflict would not be resolved until
Halleck took command of the newly organized Department of
the Mississippi

in March,

1862,

which incorporated the

contending departments and subordinated their generals under
a unified command.
In preparation

for a move towards eastern Tennessee,

Mitchel had been sending newly organized regiments,
hurriedly
Kentucky.

trained and partially equipped,

to camps within

At first, Mitchel had sent forward regiments
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lacking transportation at the request of commanders in the
field to expedite their reinforcements.

However,

weeks Mitchel received the required wagons,

within

horses,

and

harness from depots to supply all the regiments advanced
without transportation.

But it was still necessary for him

to hire and organize a force of civilian teamsters to drive
the wagons forward,
resolved. 39
orders,

a complication which Mitchel never

The teamsters were not under military

could not be counted as reliable

punished if they abandoned

under

fire,

nor

their wagons.

One of the commanders requesting reinforcements from
Mitchel,

General George H. Thomas,

had ideas of his own for

a pincer movement upon Cumberland Gap through Barboursvi11e .
From Camp Robinson,

Thomas would move his men west and with

the cooperation of Mitchel,
south up the Big Sandy,
Virginia]

who was to send four regiments

"seize the

[East Tennessee and

railroad and cut off all communications between

Virginia and the south through T e n n e s s e e . " ^
While Mitchel contemplated using a force of 10,000 men
to drive back Zollicoffer,

capture the Cumberland Gap,

sever the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad,
approximately

the same number of troops

Thomas required

for his plan.

Taking over command of the Department of the Cumberland
an ailing Robert Anderson,
that the "real

and

from

General William T. Sherman felt

struggle in Kentucky is to be between

[LouisvilleJ and Nashville," and disrupted Mitchel's designs
for severing the key Confederate railway between Virginia

45

and the Mississippi.
materialize,

Therefore,

before his plans could

Sherman reduced Thomas'

regiments.^

force to two

Sherman's readjustment of the strength

of the force made Thomas's Gap expedition limited in scope,
nothing more than a delaying action instead of a strategic
move with the objective of driving the enemy from the Gap by
moving upon the Confederate rear.
Another departmental conflict ensued over which
direction the expedition would take,
or south towards Green River.

either towards the Gap

Sherman insisted that an

expedition in the southerly direction would not suffer from
the lack of transportation and inadequate lines of
communications that would hinder any movement in East
Tennessee.

However,

Lincoln and General George B. McClellan

desired to relieve the pressure in eastern Tennessee and "to
seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting Virginia
and Tennessee;
Gap."

near the mountain pass called Cumberland

Accordingly,

Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas ordered

Sherman to aid Mitchel in carrying out "an outward movement
. . . to seize the Cumberland Gap and afford protection to
our friends in East Tennessee."

With a movement already

planned to occupy the Port Royal-Hilton Head area,

a

simultaneous advance on the Cumberland Gap was bound to
succeed.

Therefore,

Sherman was to stand firm "while all at

Cincinnati and all at Louisville,
concentrate rapidly at Lexington,"

with all on the line,
join the force at Camp

Robinson and then move under Mitchel's command to turn

46

Cumberland Gap.

Sherman responded

that he

required 65,000 men just to remain on the defensive,
"for offense,
men.

43

would need two hundred thousand"

While Sherman hesitated,

initiative

and

for the offensive,

future operations

Mitchel displayed

an attribute conducive to

under the Lincoln administration.

Mitchel had already presented a more sweeping plan
about coming to the aid of the Union sympathizers in East
Tennessee,
10th,

a point noted by the Administration.

1861,

On October

Secretary of War Simon Cameron and Lorenzo

Thomas visited Cincinnati and Mitchel's command.

Impressed

with Mitchel's plan to dislodge the enemy from the Gap, to
bar "this entrance to Kentucky with a strong fort well
garrisoned," and to sever the East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad,

and with the energy Mitchel had spent in

organizing and reinforcing the camps in Kentucky,

Cameron

and Lorenzo Thomas believed that his "efforts here in the
past few weeks had effected a revolution in this
region.

As a result,

Adjutant General Lorenzo

Thomas ordered Mitchel that same day to duty in the
Department of the Cumberland,
Robinson,

to proceed to Camp Dick

and to replace George H. Thomas as commander.

There, Mitchel was to "prepare the troops for an outward
movement,

the object being to take possession of Cumberland

Ford and Cumberland Gap,

and ultimately seize the East

Tennessee and Virginia Railroad and attack and drive the
rebels from that region of the country.

Challenged by the assignment and eager to take the war to
the enemy,

Mitchel

felt "he was in a position to exert a

power in behalf of our country which

. . . will work a

revolution in the management of a f f a i r s .
Mitchel

telegraphed Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson and

indicated his desire
advance.

for preparation of the forthcoming

In so doing, Mitchel transgressed military customs

by "ordering" a fellow officer whom he ranked by only four
days to comply with his wishes,

especially one with the same

ambitions of leading an expedition to the Gap.

Thomas

assured Mitchel

power to

that he was "doing all in [his]

prepare the troops," but expressed disappointment at being
"superseded" in the expedition.

As Thomas explained,

"Justice to myself requires that I ask to be relieved from
duty with these troops," since the Secretary of War had
replaced me "without
doing.Mitchel

. . . any just cause for so

also made the mistake of crossing

the boundary between departments in issuing those orders to
Thomas.

As ordered,

Mitchel was to report to Sherman,

of the Department of Cumberland,
further orders as he may give."^®
expedite the plans,
11th,

head

and "be governed by such
By attempting to

Mitchel angered Sherman,

who on October

authorized George Thomas to "make an advance movement

in the direction of the Cumberland Gap," despite earlier
concerns about the direction of movement and the lack of
49
transportation.
Sherman later telegraphed Thomas
that "General Mitchel is subject to my orders,

and I will,

48

if possible,

give you the opportunity of completing what you

have begun. "
Unlike Thomas,
preparations

Mitchel did not have to begin

for the advance on Cumberland Gap,

"already ordered

for he had

forward some of the Ohio regiments beyond

Camp Dick Robinson."

He organized his "army of 10-12,000

men with all speed," while making up baggage trains,
sending forward "from one to two hundred horses,
their wagons each day."~^

and

harness and

To ensure that the men

remained healthy and able to march, Mitchel requested Thomas
"to move the three Ohio regiments now in Camp Dick Robinson
to some convenient point beyond

[the] Camp,

escape the epidemic now prevailing among

. . . [to]

[the] men."

He

demanded that Thomas "order the regiments at Nicholasvi1 le
to remain there until their transportation"
indicated

arrived.

Thomas

that he had sent one regiment forward and would

send others as soon as they had transportation.

Thomas had

sought to secure "the road to Barboursville and to protect a
large tract of country abounding in forage."

Mitchel

indicated that he would leave Cincinnati for Camp Robinson
when he was "assured that supplies,
ammunition,

transportation,

and other necessaries" were sent forward.

Not

neglecting the administrative detail of the expedition,
Mitchel requested the liberty to appoint a divisional staff
for the advance towards the Gap.
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Before Mitchel began the anticipated expedition,
however,

Sherman dispersed

the forces at Camp Robinson.
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Once Sherman had lost the departmental dispute and was
ordered to support Mitchel,
to Mitchel's movement.

he detained the forces necessary

Without

the cooperation of Sherman,

the leaders in Washington postponed the expedition.

(It was

eventually undertaken by General George W. Morgan in
October,

1862.

On October

26th, Mitchel

Department of the Ohio,
to Buell.

was reassigned to the

not as commander,

but as subordinate

Dejected at his removal from command and his

inability to complete the expedition,
remain longer inactive

[was]

forwarded his resignation.

Mitchel felt that "to

to submit to degradation" and
"I had assumed command by

issuing an order and directing what should be done previous
$

to my taking the field;
for the campaign;
drivers,

when,

I had assembled around me a staff

I had even my baggage wagons and my

lo! my column is divided and its fragments

given to other persons,

my inferiors in rank.

advances towards the Gap and meets the enemy,
compelled

to remain here

Kentucky.

Mitchel again equipped and

for other commanders in the field in

He also continued recruiting for the Union and

"in thirty days ten thousand have volunteered
years,

while I am

[at C i n c i n n a t i ] . " ^

In his new assignment,
prepared regiments

One portion

or the war."

for three

Even though Mitchel was removed from an

active role in Kentucky,

he vowed to "make no trouble of any

kind" and again placed his services at the discretion of the
government.

He was "ready

to do and to suffer anything for

50

the only object now dear to [him] on earth,

the rescue of

[the] unhappy country from threatened
destruction."^

Mitchel was persuaded by President

Lincoln and Simon Cameron to withdraw his resignation with
the prospect of future command in the western theater as
part of the Army of the Ohio.
promised,

On November

21st, Mitchel,

as

was ordered to Camp Jenkins in Louisville to

continue organizing regiments for the contemplated move
56
south.
Although Mitchel's expedition was at first preempted
and then cancelled due to disputes over departmental
authority and confusion as to its commander and its
objective,

he learned many useful lessons and gained

practical experience that would serve him in the necessary
invasion of the southern states.

He experienced the

difficulties and problems of organizing and managing the
required men,
However,

animals,

Mitchel

and equipment for an expedition.

demonstrated

that he knew the importance of

a line of communications by controlling and protecting the
Kentucky Central Railroad,

and he realized

that to guard the

railroad consumed a large number of men who could be used
either as an attacking force or as an occupying army.

The

value of a railroad to shift men between strategic points
became apparent to him when regiments were moved between
Cincinnati and Muldraugh's Hill.

Later in northern Alabama,

Mitchel would again have use of the railroad as a defensive
multiplier of an inferior

force to shuttle troops between

51

threatened points over an extended front.
While at Louisville and before he commenced his
movement south as the "corps d' observation"

for the Army of

the Ohio, Mitchel became appreciative of the strategic
importance of the railroad bridges crossing the Tennessee
River,

for they linked the heartland of the Confederacy to

the border states.

In connection with his plan to sever the

bridge at Knoxville,

Mitchel learned the advantage the

railroad gave the Confederates,
September,
front.

1861,

who had used it in

to distribute their forces along their

He understood

that their lines of communications

existed because of the railroad network in Kentucky and
Tennessee and that the only permanent way to deny the
Confederacy

that advantage was to sever the bridges and to

occupy the surrounding territory.
The Confederates were deployed in front of Buell in a
defensive arrangement,
possibilities.
Columbus,

but one with threatening

Their left extremity was anchored at

Kentucky,

on the Mississippi River.

east through Kentucky,

forming a vulnerable salient at

Bowling Green on the Big Barren River where
strongly entrenched.

The line ran

the center was

This important railroad junction

linked the southwest with the trunk line of the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad,

by way of the Memphis Branch.

It

was also the best position from which to cover Nashville,
the Confederate supply depot.
Railroad was also considered

The Louisville and Nashville
a potential invasion route to
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the Ohio River.

The eastern end of this defensive line

rested at the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains at Mill
Springs,

an entrenched

Cumberland Gap.

rebel camp,

that guarded the

This lengthy position was cut naturally in

the west by the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers;
Forts Donelson and Henry,

however,

prevented access up the Cumberland

and Tennessee Rivers and protected the village of Dover and
the nearby railroad bridge at Clarksville.
Branch operated across that bridge,
between Bowling Green,
Along this front,
by November,

1861,

Columbus,

Donelson,
Green,

forming the connection

and Memphis.

the Confederate

5 7

forces were deployed

to allow concentration at any point.

Leonidas Polk maintained
Tilghman controlled

The Memphis

12,000 men at Columbus while Lloyd

5,000 men at Fort Henry and Fort

and Buckner commanded 8,100 troops at Bowling

which as the center could be easily supported by the

Confederate railroad network.
8-12,000 troops

In addition,

Zollicoffer had

defending the Cumberland Gap.
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The

Confederate railroad radiated south from Bowling Green and
Nashville,

enabling the Confederates to concentrate their

,
1
59
entire strength at M u n f ordsville.
The bridges over the Tennessee

gave the Confederates

the advantage of concentration and mutual support throughout
the western theater and between the eastern and western
armies.

Mitchel's earlier idea of severing the Tennessee

and Virginia Railroad at Knoxville would have been a
temporary measure to hinder the flow of east-west traffic,
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forcing them to send troops by way of Mobile,
the Union developed
appeared

its western strategy,

Alabama.

As

a better solution

that involved the Tennessee River bridges and the

Memphis and Charleston Railroad in northern Alabama.

The

result would be more permanent than Mitchel's expedition to
the Cumberland Gap, which was limited because it lacked a
railroad as a line of communications.
Dispatches between the War Department and the
department commanders provided Mitchel with information on
the importance of the bridges.

In all probability Buell

conferred with Mitchel,

who arrived in Louisville on the

22nd of November,

to command the troops rendezvousing

at Camp Jenkins,
there.
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Mitchel,

1861,

one day after Mitchel arrived

Buell undoubtedly
who,

sought consultation with

because of his date of rank,

command of the Army of the Ohio,
division c o m m a n d e r s . ^

was second in

and became one of Buell's

In that capacity,

Mitchel

most likely provided advice to Buell about the planned
advance and shared the information exchanged between
headqu a r t e r s .
While the Army of the Ohio was organizing and preparing
for the winter offensive,

the Federal Navy,

uncontested control of the waterways,
disruption of the Confederates'

which had

was planning the

lines of communications.

The aim of numerous proposed and actual water expeditions
was to cut off middle Tennessee
bridges across the Cumberland

by destroying the railroad

river and to keep the
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Confederates from reinforcing their defensive positions.
With the water level high in the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers,

Union gunboats "Lexington and Conestoga could run up

in the backwater to the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad,

near Tuscumbia,

and destroy it."

Another plan

called for a transport with five hundred men accompanied by
two gunboats to steam up the river to Tuscumbia,

land the

troops,

Armed with

and destroy the bridges near the river.

"two or three bomb barges,"

this raid was to float the

charges over the Muscle Shoals obstruction and to "destroy
the long bridges at Decatur and Bridgeport,
Alabama."

6 2

These plans were similar to Mitchel's

move to sever communications at Knoxville,
complicated.

However,

by using boats,

but less

the expeditions were

meant to operate only as raids, with the limited objectives
of cutting the Confederates'

lines of communications and

disrupting their ability to concentrate in middle Tennessee
and Kentucky.

These plans illustrate how vulnerable the

railroads were to disruption.
Smith's proposals

Buell accepted General C. F.

for the use of gunboats because the

destruction or even temporary damage of the bridges was so
important that the expeditions were "well worth the risk of
losing more

than one or two gunboats."

Initially,
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the Federal leaders attempted to prevent

Confederate concentration by destroying the bridge at
Clarksville,

threatening the Bowling Green salient,

separating the troops there from those at Columbus.

and
This
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was Halleck's idea of attacking the central position of an
enemy in order to divide his forces while creating a base
from which to make an advance on either of the separated
forces.
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Halleck agreed with the concept of

employing gunboats to "proceed up the
destroy all bridges,"

[Tennessee] River to

but only after reducing Fort Henry.

He allowed boats to transport cavalry and men "to sustain
the gunboats,"

but even gunboats supported by a few men

could only cause temporary disruption of the Confederate
ability to c o n c e n t r a t e . ^

When the Federal armies

went on the strategic offensive,
acceptable

any action would be

that could weaken the, enemy and permit the Union

to gather a superior

force against

forts Henry and Donelson fell,
river route was opened

the Confederates.

in early February,

After

1862,

the

into the interior of Tennessee and to

the rear of Confederate strongholds at both Columbus and
Bowling Green.
forces retreated

And once flanked at Bowling Green,

the rebel

to Nashville.

Union leaders then discussed obtaining similar results
by turning Nashville in a wider move.
of the rear of the Confederate line,
strove

After a penetration
the Union generals

for more permanent results than mere raids by boat.

McClellan suggested to Halleck that he "better devote
everything towards turning" Columbus and let Buell "take the
line of Tennessee and operate on Nashville."
McClellan wrote,

Moreover,

"The bridges at Tuscumbia and Decatur

should at all hazards be destroyed at o n c e . " ^

By
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destroying the bridges at Tuscumbia,
Bridgeport,

Decatur,

and

he proposed to cut the Confederates'

lines of

communications and force them out of Nashville back towards
Chattanooga.

Thus,

in the winter and spring of

Federal strategy had developed
Confederates
Kentucky,

from merely keeping the

from reinforcing central Tennessee and

to an attempt to turn the major strongholds of

Bowling Green,
least

1862,

Columbus,

threatening

their

and Nashville

by cutting or at

I ines of communications.

McClellan

even thought that Memphis "would easily fall if [the]
at Decatur

[was ] destroyed."

07

McClellan considered

"the Decatur movement and one on Memphis
steps"

bridge

. . . the next

in his offensive p r o g r a m . ^

Now that Grant had taken the forts and was free for
other tasks, Halleck wanted Buell to give up the land
invasion route and join forces with Grant.

They would move

up the Tennessee River and cut the bridges at Florence and
Decatur,

Alabama.

Halleck predicted that Nashville would

then fall by maneuver,
fallen.
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Therefore,

precisely as Bowling Green had
Halleck ordered Grant and

Admiral Andrew H. Foote to "push the gunboats up the
[Tennessee] River to cut the railroad bridges," and to
transport the troops onboard

following riverboats.^

The gunboats "destroyed everything on the Tennessee to
Florence,

in Alabama,"

bridges beyond

but were unable to destroy the

there because "they could not get past the

Muscle S h o a l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,

when Halleck heard
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that the bridge at Decatur was destroyed,

he concluded that

"communication between Columbus and Nashville
„

cut.

[was] thus

,i 7 2

But none of the bridges on the Tennessee River above
the forts were actually destroyed.
Confederates

Although the

still maintained the advantage of concentration

with their intact lines of communications to their rear,
they nevertheless began a wholesale retreat,
Tennessee line.

With their extended front penetrated by the

fall of the two forts,
communications,

giving up the

the river route opened up their rear

which had sustained their forward defensive

positions in Kentucky.

Any advance by the Confederates

along those same railroads in order to block the Federal
armies only placed them in a more precarious situation.
Therefore,

instead of being trapped by losing their avenues

of retreat over railways whose bridges were threatened,

the

Confederates used their railroad network to initate a
concentration at Corinth, Mississippi.
armies came together,
east.

Widely separated

supported by reinforcements from the

Gathered at the junction of the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,

they

quietly rallied to defend that important railroad junction
by attacking and perhaps destroying Grant's force,

which was

moving south to Pittsburg Landing in an attempt to exploit
the Federal penetration into the border states.
in another river borne expedition,

Part of

Grant's

force,

tried but

failed,

to prevent the Confederate armies from uniting by
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destroying the Memphis and Charleston Railroad bridge over
Bear Creek,

near Eastport,

Mississippi.
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Thus the

opposing armies gathered for the bloody Battle of Shiloh,
April 6-7,

1862.

The Confederates withdrew behind the Tennessee River,
using the delaying tactic of destroying bridges over
numerous rivers.

Those

bridges would have to be rebuilt

before a Union advance could take place;

however,

the

Confederates did not destroy the Tennessee River bridges
because they hoped to keep their lines along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad between Virginia and the Mississippi
River open.

The Tennessee

advancing Federal armies,

bridges became important to the
but instead of destroying them to

prevent the Confederates from reinforcing their positions in
Kentucky or Tennessee,
destroy

the Army of the Ohio sought rather to

them in order to sever the east-west communications

link provided by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
Returning from retirement after twenty-nine

years,

during which the nature of military operations had undergone
notable changes,

Mitchel compacted those many years of

changes into two months of practical learning.
background of railroading,

With his

he immediately adapted to the new

dynamics of the railroad as applied

to strategy.

While

updating and refining his military skill in Kentucky,
Mitchel developed an acute awareness of the importance of
the railroad as a line of communications and specifically
how vital the east-west rail link was to the Confederacy.
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The lessons learned from his preempted expedition to sever
the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad remained with him
throughout the coming winter campaign,

for the East

Tennessee and Virginia Railroad connected at Chattanooga
with the Western and Atlantic Railroad and formed the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
northern Alabama.

which passed through

The opportunity to sever the major supply

artery of the Confederacy would again present itself;
Mitchel would not again be deterred from his mission by
departmental conflicts or apprehensive generals.

Photos
1 and
2.
Mitchel's objective:
the important Howe
Turn
Bridge at Bridgeport, Alabama, over the Tennessee River
(top
view
shows
bridge
from
the
north
bank to the Long
Island
in
the
middle of the river, the bottom view is from
the Long Island looking northwest to the north bank).

Photo
3.
Again
the
Howe
Turn Bridge at Bridgeport (view
looking
northwest
from the south bank to the Long Island in
the middle of the Tennessee River).
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CHAPTER III

ON TO NASHVILLE:

A LIMITED OBJECTIVE

Before the Union Army could penetrate the deep South,
or even ensure the safety of Kentucky,

it had to drive the

Confederates out of their Columbus-Bowling Green-Mill
Springs defensive line;

Grant's capture of Fort Henry and

Fort Donelson would be a necessary

prerequisite,

and Union

soldiers expected hard fighting before Confederates would
give up any of Tennessee.
When Union troops of the newly organized Third Division
rendezvoused
1861,

at Elizabethtown,

Kentucky,

on December

1,

they arrived in anticipation that battle would not

long be delayed.
Kentucky,

Elizabethtown was located in northern

about forty miles south of the Ohio River,

and it

was here that the Third Division of the Army of the Ohio
joined its unproved commander,
Macknight Mitchel.^
experienced

Brigadier General Ormsby

Elizabethtown only recently

the "Iron Horse" when the first train of the

Louisville and Nashville Railroad operated through it on
June

15,

1858.

However,

the town became more than merely a

station stop for the two north-south passenger
trains.
cleared

2

Prior to December,

General Sherman had

the track of rebel raiders only as far as
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Elizabethtown,

limiting operation of the Louisville and

Nashville Railroad to forty-two miles between Louisville and
Elizabethtown.

3

However,

the juncture of a spirited

general and twelve three-year

volunteer infantry regiments

transformed the quaint Kentucky town into an armed camp,
where officers drilled,

trained,

and disciplined

the men in

the rigors of w a r /
Just prior to leading the Third Division,

Mitchel had

commanded Camp Jenkins at Louisville,^ and since
August of

1861 he had been grooming other

for battle.

general's troops

But now he molded men from Ohio,

Illinois,

Indiana,

Michigan,

and Wisconsin into his own fighting

unit/

He finally had the opportunity to march at

the head of his troops,

bearing the crusading banner

for the

Union and to rally his inexperienced men with the battle-cry
"Come,

and I will lead you !

Organized December
Brigade,
Tenth,

15,

1861,

into the Seventeenth

the Fifteenth Kentucky regiment and the Third,

and Thirteenth Ohio regiments,

Elizabethtown after
transportation.

8

assembled at

being equipped and given wagon

Mitchel's other brigades were

similarly organized with four regiments.

The Eighth Brigade

consisted of the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Illinois,
Thirty-seventh Indiana,

and the Eighteenth Ohio,

Ninth Brigade contained the Second,

while the

Twenty-first and

Thirty-third Ohio, in addition to the Tenth
9
Wisconsin.
Thus Mitchel, the champion of Ohio,
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commanded an aggregate of 12,000 troops mostly recruited
from his adopted state— seven out of twelve regiments.
support,

three batteries of field artillery

engineer companies,

In

(18 pieces),

and a regiment of cavalry later

two

joined

the infantry division during its march s o u t h . ^
Mitchel knew the importance of having a staff to
relieve him of the burdensome administrative
division,

but he did not use it efficiently.

the preempted expedition to Cumberland Gap,
a staff consisting of a medical director,
general,

a division quartermaster,

each with the rank of colonel.
staff were filled by captains:
engineer,

and

detail of the
Preparing for
he had requested

an adjutant

and an inspector-general,

The other positions on his
a commissary

several a i d e s . ^

officer,

a chief

Mitchel understood

the importance of transportation in keeping an army fed,
equipped,

and moving,

the divisional

so he insisted upon a colonel to fill

quartermaster

position.

1 2

He did not

lend as much importance to his commissariat,
only a captain to that post.

designating

Mitchel did not use a chief of

staff nor his adjutant;

instead,

charge of the division,

oversaw camp inspections

to regulations),

he maintained personal
(according

wrote telegrams, to his superiors,

reconnaissance missions and supervised

led

the reconstruction of

destroyed b r i d g e s . ^
The General commanded his regiments through the brigade
commanders,

although his visits to the various camps allowed

him to develop a personal bond with his men.

Joshua Sill
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led the Ninth Brigade from its establishment as an
independent brigade in November,
Pointer,

class of

Point until

1853,

1861.

1861.

Sill was a West

graduated third and taught at West

He was granted a colonelcy of the

Thirty-third Ohio in August of the same year,

and gained

experience in West Virginia before coming under the command
14
of Buell in Kentucky.
The senior officer from
among the regimental commanders,

Ebenezer Dumont,

command of the Seventeenth Brigade.
brigadier
1861,

general,

Commissioned a

United States Volunteers on 3 September,

he took command and replaced the temporary commander,

William Lytle.
1862.

Dumont commanded the Seventeenth until March

He fought in the Mexican War,

lieutenant colonel.
was a lawyer,

Before

legislator,

rising to the rank of

gaining his war experience he

and banker.

Lytle resumed command

in March and was promoted to brigadier general,
States Volunteers,
commanded
the

assumed

on November

29th,

1862,

United

and only

the Seventeenth Brigade from the 21st of March to

19th of August,

1862.

Lytle also fought in the Mexican

War and then served as a Democrat in the Ohio state
legislature. 15

The last of Mitchel's brigade

commanders was the flamboyant John Basil Turchin.

Turc'nin

received his military education and experience in Europe.
He was born Ivan Turchininoff in Russia,
St. Petersburg Artillery School,
Hungarian campaign in

graduated from the

participated in the

1849, and fought in the Crimean War.

His laurels also included attending the academy for general
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staff officers and serving on the staff of the Imperial
Guards in the Crimean War.
Chicago and worked

Turchin finally settled in

in railroading before being commissioned

colonel of the Ninteenth Illinois Regiment on June
He commanded

17,

1861.

the independent Nineteenth Brigade prior to its

formal incorporation into the Third Division on the 2nd of
December.

He was promoted to brigadier general,

States Volunteers,

on July

17th,

1862.

United

16

The division had a regiment of artillery assigned to
its organization which included A Battery of the First
Michigan Artillery Regiment,
Battery,

the Fifth Indiana Artillery

and E Battery of the First Ohio Artillery Regiment.

Also attached were two companies of Michigan Engineers and
the Fourth Ohio Regiment of c a v a l r y . ^
From his new headquarters at Louisville,

Buell,

who

assumed command of the Department of the Ohio on November
9th,

1861,

reorganized the sixteen independent brigades into

five divisions.
department,

18

While Buell prepared his

General McClellan confined the operation of the

Army of the Ohio to Kentucky east of the Cumberland River.
McClellan felt the war effort in Kentucky "second only to
that occupied by the army"
Washington.
"the issue

under his command in front of

Discussing strategy with Buell,
[of the war]

he indicated

is the preservation of the Union and

the restoration of the full authority of the General
Government over all portions of our territory."

McClellan

correlated the political objective of relieving East
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Tennessee with Buell's strategic movements.
Buell

He suggested

"remain on the defensive line from Louisville to

Nashville,"

while sending the mass of his force "by rapid

marches" on Knoxville
With objectives

by way of Cumberland or Walker's Gaps.

similar to Mitchel's preempted expedition,

the maneuver would have a two-fold effect:

it would provide

morale to the loyal citizens of East Tennessee,
occupy the railroad around Knoxville.
the strategic

McClellan realized

value of invading East Tennessee;

rallying the citizens,

and it would

while

it would "at the same time cut off

the railway communications between East Virginia and the
Mississippi,"
Railroad,

that is,

sever the East Tennessee and Virginia

which linked Richmond to Chattanooga then

connected with Memphis on the Mississippi River by the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

Even though Buell's

advance into East Tennessee was to be more permanent in
nature by holding the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad
with a larger

force,

the South would still be able to shift

men and supplies between theaters by way of Atlanta,
via Chattanooga,
Railroad

then

again utilizing the Memphis and Charleston

to Memphis.

Even though McClellan implored Buell to make a "prompt
movement in force on East Tennessee," Buell conjured up his
own movement.

While putting off McClellan,

President Lincoln,
preparations,

and indirectly,

with excuses of time-consuming

Buell detailed a new plan of campaign,

that

satisfied the demands from Washington for a move to East
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Tennessee.

He pointed out that geographically Louisville

"affords the best base"

from which the North could operate

"upon any part of Tennessee."
objective,
Kentucky,

Making Nashville the intended*

Buell nevertheless indicated

that Lebanon,

afforded the shortest route for a column to

liberate East Tennessee.

While he placated his superiors,

he thus shifted importance from East Tennessee to Middle
Tennessee on a line running southwest,
Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
towards Knoxville.

parallel with the

instead of southeast,

The Army of the Ohio's line of

communications consisted of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and three good pike roads,
Glasgow,

which converged on

twenty-five miles east of Bowling Green and

afforded good communication

for a continued move

s o u t h . 19
Buell wanted a sufficient

force to hold Buckner at

Bowling Green while sending a column into East Tennessee
way of Somerset,
Then,

by

the route that McClellan had been urging.

maintaining pressure on Bowling Green,

a column would

move rapidly past Buckner on the turnpike by way of
Gallatin.

Once beyond Buckner's

Bowling Green,

force,

now pinned at

Buell would direct additional columns from

the Lebanon branch of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
on both the Somerset and Nashville routes.
Bowling Green with forty-thousand men,

By turning

the strategic

maneuver would threaten the enemy's line of communications
and force him to attack or withdraw.

Buell planned to move
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two flotillas simultaneously up the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers to attack the railroad bridges and to cut
communications between Bowling Green and Columbus.
Destruction of the bridges would divide the Confederate
forces and would sever the Memphis Branch of the Louisville
and Nashville R a i l r o a d . ^

Therefore,

Buell

anticipated attacking Bowling Green indirectly by a double
turning movement:

one by turnpike intersecting the

Louisville and Nashville Railroad at Gallatin,

and the other

advancing upon Buckner's rear by the Cumberland River route.
Under orders from Buell, Mitchel and the Third Division
began the march south on the Louisville Pike.
at Elizabethtown on the

Breaking camp

16th of December, Mitchel

prematurely wrote "we move again at an early hour for the
banks of the Green River."

2 1

The Third division

only marched twenty-three and a half miles farther south,
stopping at the intersection of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and Bacon Creek.

The single spanned,

wooden

trestled bridge had been rebuilt after a retreating
Confederate army had destroyed it.

Instead of merely a rest

stop,

the banks of this creek became the Union army's winter

camp;

Green River and the South would have to

wait.

22

The

1,800-foot Green River railroad bridge

had been destroyed by the Confederates on October
forestall

14th,

the movement of Federal troops and to guard

Bowling Green.

The resulting delay in front of

Munfordsville would continue

until the defeat of the

to
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Confederates at the Battle of Mill Springs on the
January,

and the fall of forts Henry and Donelson in the

first two weeks of February.
Confederate
right;

19th of

left was matched by the turning of the rebel

the exposed salient,

Green River,

This penetration of the

extending from Nashville to the

was forced to retire

from Bowling Green or be

cut off from its communications through Nashville.
Mitchel constantly drilled the men for the coming war
he was anxious to wage.

He oversaw his regimental

commanders pacing their units through marches and formation
changes,

while brigadiers attempted to manipulate larger

formations in the fields near Bacon Creek.

He daily rode

through the camps of the regiments and around their
perimeter making unexpected

personal inspections of the

troops sometimes even in sleet or snow.

23

This

respite at Bacon Creek enabled General Mitchel to cultivate
a fatherly relationship with his men.
author Reverend P. C. Headley,
crusader

Writing in 1865,

who considered Mitchel a

for the Unionist cause,

said that Mitchel basked

"in the admiration and growing confidence" felt toward him
by men,

who "loved and trusted him."

However,

Mitchel was a

strict disciplinarian and the men knew the only way to
endure his strong will was "to faithfully perform every part
of military duty."

Thus,

the General and "his trained

legions were ready and impatient for the smoke of
battle."
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Despite initial readiness,

the enthusiasm of the troops
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lessened as weeks of repetitive preparation turned a new
adventure into the drudgery of camp duty,
military hardship.

loneliness,

and

Disease and sickness infected the Third

Division's camp just as it did in as most camps of the Civil
War.

The weather "rains,

then snows a little,

then freezes

a little then thaws a good deal," helping to inflict camp
fever,

small pox, measles,

officers and men.
damp and cold,
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and camp diarrhea on both

As the winter weather continued

laudatory proclamations

from the men about

saving the Union sank to camp grumblings.

One soldier

remarked,

"A life so devoid of incident and thrilling

adventure

fell immeasurably short of our ideal of glorious

war."

The crusading spirit waned as the troops endured two

months winter quarters at Bacon Creek,

and a feeling of

doubt swept the regimental camps as to "whether such
condemned,

disagreeable country

saving at all."
mutinous."
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. . . was really worth

The boys soon became "dissatisfied and

The fighting edge of the division was

blunted by the monotony and sickness of camp life.

Before

Mitchel allowed the martial spirit of his men to be sapped,
he approached Buell with an appeal to resume the march
southward.

"We must now either be permitted to go into the

field and meet
backwards.

the foe,

or we must degenerate and go

It is utterly impossible

for me to carry my

division any further in my drill or discipline.
men have learned every

thing they can learn,

. . . The

and from this

moment we must commence to decline unless we are sent into
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actual service."
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Buell delayed granting the

request because the rebels had occupied Bowling Green with a
very large force,

to counter the Army of the Ohio's forward

movement.
On January

16th, while Mitchel waited at Bacon Creek,

he sent a reconnaissance mission southward to test road
conditions and to report any enemy positions.

Mitchel

reported to Buell that "all roads are now equally impassable
for

[wagon]

trains," and he would have to make a corduroy

road to facilitate transportation.
roads were impassable

28

Although dirt

for wagon transport,

the railroads

could still sustain the advancing army and allow the
campaign to resume.

While not susceptible

railroad could be disrupted
track,

to mud,

the

by a downed bridge or torn up

but it still could function as a line of

communications as far as the break in the line.
Buell
move.

finally relented,

however,

and gave the order to

He selected Mitchel's division to lead the advance on

Bowling Green instead of General Alexander McDowell McCook's
division,

which had preceded Mitchel's move to Munfordsville

and was already camped on the south side of Green River.
When Buell had inquired as to when the Second Division could
move,

McCook indicated that "in a week's time he would be

ready."

Even though his division was ten miles in the rear,

Mitchel responded to the same question with "tomorrow
morning."
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After lengthy consultation with Buell

at Louisville and with some agreement in mind about the
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coming operations,

Mitchel returned to camp on February 9th,

and relayed Buell's instructions
the next morning at six a.m.

for the advance to begin

The night was filled with

anticipation as the troops broke camp,

striking their tents,

packing their knapsacks and getting the horses
„

.
, „30
caparisoned .
After fifty-six days of inactivity around Bacon Creek,

the Third Division again started south,
Louisville Pike (see map 3).
his friends to "look out

again using the

In exhaltation Mitchel warned

. . . for moves on the theatre of

war that will wake this nation from its long slumber and
send a thrill of joy throughout the land."
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The

Third Division passed McCook's camp and pitched camp a mile
beyond the Green River because of a delay in constructing a
pontoon bridge to replace the partially destroyed stone
structure.

Mitchel

led the advance of the Army of the

Ohio into the "Land of Dixie."
rekindled the troops'

spirit,

While the position of honor
Mitchel received personal

inspiration from his friend Salmon P. Chase,
the Treasury.

Secretary of

"We are looking for great things from the

Army of Kentucky," Chase wrote.

"It is deplorable that you

were ever recalled from your movements in East Tennessee.
But that mistake

. . . must be made good by future

achievements ."
At 7 a.m.,

on the 13th of February,

of the Third Division,

the advance guard

consisting of Turchin's Brigade,

Kennett's cavalry and Loomis'

artillery,

recommenced its
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Map 3.
M i t c h e l 's move to Nashville.
Source. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas,
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Map 30.

2 vols
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march.

3 A

The division marched along the Bowling

Green Pike through country containing little or no water
sources,

"except in occassional

basins,

in which the rebels

had thrown dead horses and mules killed for the purpose" of
denying water to the Union forces.
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Confederates

had also hindered the Union column by trees cut across the
line of advance,
who were attached

and these were cleared by thirty pioneers,
to the division

36

Mitchel decided to rest his division in a field next to
the burned remains of Bell's Tavern's station,
been fired by the rebels the night before.
Tavern,

which had

At Bell's

the Louisville and Nashville Railroad trunk line

joined the Glasgow Railroad,
southeast to Glasgow,

which ran nine miles to the

Kentucky.
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The march of

nineteen miles from Bacon Creek in under seven hours pleased
Mitchel,

who felt "everything has moved thus far to my

entire satisfaction," except for the weather,

which had

turned from rain to snow on the night of the 13th,
caused great discomfort

to the soldiers.

the soldiers were not hungry,
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and

However,

even though the bridge over

the Green River behind him was destroyed and Mitchel had
railroad communications only as far as Munfordsvi1 l e .
the morning of the 14th,

On

he reverted to the conventional

means of logistics and sent wagons to the damaged bridge to
relay supplies between his advanced

position and the Green

d
•
River
.39

As it moved forward,

the Army of the Ohio had to repair
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the Louisville and Nashville Railroad,

or else the inability

of the country to support it in winter would cause it to
collapse

from a deficiency of provisions and forage.

amount of wagon transportation that Mitchel's

The

quartermaster

had was enough to transport the division's supplies "five
day's march from its depot of s u p p l i e s . A s

the Third

Division captured more of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad,

and the distance

from the head of the column to

the rear supply depots increased,

the limitation of marching

approximately five days (forty to fifty miles)
source of supplies remained constant.
properly managed railway,

from the

With an intact and

the distance that wagon

transportation could support a column of troops would be
measured from the railhead and not from the base depot,
thereby explaining the railroad's contribution to strategic
maneuver— an extension in range that an army could be
sustained

from its permanent base of operations.

introduction of the railroad

to warfare,

Before the

when wagons were

the means of transporting provisions to the battlefield,

the

farthest an army could advance or maneuver to engage the
enemy was the distance that its wagons could transport

the

required amount of supplies from its resources to the
battlefield or encampment.

Whether its source be an

established depot with accumulated

stores,

a river deep

enough to float continuous shipments of supplies,
country with abundant grain and fodder,

or a

an army moved more

with regard to its future supplies than to the location of
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the enemy.

The first alternative meant establishing

garrisoned depots near or in the enemy country,
them vulnerable to capture;

which made

the second normally depended on

adequate rainfall to swell the rivers,
shoals meant a disruption of supply;

for droughts and

the third choice

required starting an offensive at harvest time or when
sufficient supplies might be found in storage.
event,

In any

the army's operations were limited to agriculturally

rich areas.
On February

13,

1862,

Buell advised McClellan

Mitchel advanced beyond Dripping Springs,
enemy's resistence and intentions,

reconnoitering the

and would soon be within

fifteen miles or less of Bowling Green.
stop short of Dripping Springs,

that

Mitchel did not

but continued to pursue a

retreating enemy and fill the void it left behind.41
Buell used the intelligence

gained by Mitchel's advance to

support his plan of invasion into Tennessee
Nashville,

by railroad to

thus countering Halleck's insistance that the

route was up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers,

by way of

forts Henry and Donelson.
Buell had intended Mitchel to advance to Dripping
Springs,

about eight miles further south from Bell's Tavern,

for the purpose of "discovering the movements of the enemy."
Reaching Dripping Springs was not "obligatory," and a point
nearer would be satisfactory;

nevertheless,

he warned

against being "greatly exposed in the present stage of the
operations.

. . .

[Be] watchful,

and be sure what is ahead
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and on your flanks.
cavalry."

42

Make good use of your

However, Mitchel knew from his scouts

that the Confederates were retreating from Bowling Green and
realized that his advance could not be delayed if he
intended to capture intact the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad

bridge over the Barren River.

Mitchel had halted

his troops early in the evening at Bell's Tavern,
miles from Bowling Green "in order to

. . . resume the march

before two o'clock in the morning" and,
rebel supplies,

twenty-two

perhaps,

capture the

which might be abandoned before they could

be d e s t r o y e d . ^
Mitchel aroused the troops at midnight to continue the
advance with hopes of surprising the Confederate
Bowling Green.

Turchin's Brigade,

departed at 2 a.m.,

February

garrison at

again in the lead,

14, while Colonel Harris'

Second Ohio Regiment was ordered to remain at Bell's Tavern
as a reserve to cover Mitchel's left flank in case of attack
from Glasgow Junction.
coldness in the air,

44

With snow on the ground,

and a wind piercing through the

soldiers'

overcoats like "needles of ice," the column

proceeded

by the Bowling Green Pike,

with Mitchel trying to

catch the rebels off guard before they fired the Barren
River bridge.
more rapidly,
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To make the twenty-two mile march

General Mitchel ordered "all wagons and horses

found on farms and plantations along the road

[to be]

pressed into service to carry the knapsacks and lighten the
burdens of the advancing c o l u m n . " ^

In spite of all
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the celerity of movement,

however,

the rebels had already

fired the Barren River bridge at one o'clock in the
47
morning.
Even though the railroad bridge had been fired,
Mitchel's scouts
intact.

found that the turnpike bridge was still

Resorting to a forced march, Mitchel attempted to

capture that bridge,
before he reached it.

but it too was burned at daylight,
48

When the column reached

north side of the Barren River,
destroyed railroad bridge,
depot set ablaze.

the

it looked upon not only a

but also storehouses and the

The fortifications surrounding Bowling

Green were evacuated,

and the inhabitants were "hastening

over the hills toward Nashville."

49

Nevertheless,

Mitchel exceeded Buell's cautious expectations by reaching
Oakland on the outskirts of Bowling Green around 4 p.m.
Despite the destruction of both bridges and the Barren
River obstructing his rapid advance,
note of optimism to Buell
will soon enable

[them]

enemy are driven out.

Mitchel wrote with a

that his "engineers and mechanics

to cross the river

...

...

as the

We will then commence work on

the railroad and telegraph line."'*^

The engineers

improvised a crossing by clearing out timber that obstructed
a ford,

then used a flat boat as a f e r r y .^

a more permanent structure,
Eighteenth Ohio regiment
bridge.
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Seeking

the engineers and men of the

then constructed a floating

Overcoming an obstacle that might have

taken a week to pass, Mitchel had Turchin's Brigade floated
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across the river to arrive in town at five o'clock in the
morning of February
Mitchel
column,

15,

1862.

53

did not cross the river with the head of his

but remained to supervise the building of two

ferries,

which enabled his baggage wagons and artillery to

pass over into Bowling Green.

By the afternoon of the 16th,

Mitchel had five infantry regiments and the cavalry regiment
ferried across the Barren River.

At 0800 February

entered the "Gibralter of Kentucky,"

18th he

important because it

guarded the middle of Kentucky and Tennessee and provided
railroad connections south to Nashville and Clarksville

by

way of the Memphis Junction of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad.
The pressure on the Confederates at the Bowling Green
salient,

created by Grant's victories at Fort Henry and Fort

Donelson,

and by Buell's advance from the northeast,

persuaded Albert Sidney Johnston to withdraw toward
Nashville.

Because Admiral Foote's gunboats had cut the

Mobile and Ohio Railroad,

a strategic link between General

Leonidas Polk's force at Columbus and General Johnston's
force at Bowling Green,

these two withdrawing forces were

separated by the Tennessee River.
the bridges in northern Alabama,

They were linked only by
until they were united at

Corinth Junction where the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

Mitchel rapidly

advanced into an area that the Confederates were already
evacuating,

but he prevented them from doing extensive
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destruction,

and by maintaining constant pressure in

conjunction with the threat of Union gunboats and Grant's
army,

he denied the Confederates an opportunity to

consolidate their position.
Amid burning mansions,

storehouses,

Mitchel's men confiscated corn,
beef, and other provisions,
Division for a month.

sugar,

and train depot,

coffee,

enough to supply

pork,

salt

the Third

By forced marches and initiative,

Third Division had achieved tactical surprise,

the

forcing the

enemy to abandon one-half million dollars worth of valuable
stores and valuable railroad rolling stock,

while destroying

another one million dollars worth of supplies including arms
and locomotives.
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But,

even with the immense

quantity of captured stores,

Mitchel requested Buell to send

forward forage and subsistence.^

He indicated

that

Bowling Green and Munfordsville lacked enough hay to meet
requirements,

although corn in sufficient supply could be

obtained from the country .^
Mitchel wanted these supplies because his line of
communications

depended on a ferry over the Barren River in

his immediate rear and a pontoon bridge (miles away) over
the Green River,
five days before.

which his army constructed and crossed

just

He also requested subsistence in order to

maintain pressure on the retreating Confederates,
consolidation of Bowling Green.

not for

He hoped to establish a

base of supply for another departure point from which to
make "a strong and immediate demonstration upon
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Nashville."
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Because gaps in the railroad hindered

the line of communications

for his 10,000 man force,

he

wanted an advanced depot from which to draw supplies until
the railroad could be completed.
entire division,

with baggage,

the 18th of February,

He intended to have his

across the Barren River by

1862, and "to throw forward a brigade

on the Russelville road,

one on the turnpike and one on the

Nashville road some

10 miles from Bowling Green
59
supporting distance of each other."

. . . within

Mitchel did not delay in obtaining information about
the enemy.
River,

While still on the north bank of the Barren

he had ordered a detached company from Colonel John

Kennett's Fourth Ohio Regiment of cavalry to advance upon
the turnpike two and one-half miles beyond Woodburn in the
direction of Nashville.
departing Franklin,

After his scouts detected the enemy

a town twenty miles south of Bowling

Green on the Tennessee and Kentucky border,
towards Nashville,
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withdrawing

he sent "a reconnaissance on

the road leading to Nashville and extended

[his] examination

some twelve miles to the village of Woodburn."
remnants of the retreating Confederate army,

He found

including the

house where Generals Hardee and General Thomas C. Hindman
stayed the night of the 14th,

just four days earlier.

The

rebel army of approximately 8-10,000 men had pitched camp
for two miles along the turnpike and hurriedly defended
their position with a double rail fence thrown across the
road.

61

Realizing he was on the heels of a
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retreating force equal in strength,
regiment

Mitchel ordered Harris's

forward from Bell's Tavern to reinforce the

division.

To fill the void left by the rebels,

forward two infantry regiments,

he sent

which transported its

baggage upon platform cars captured at Bowling
Green.
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Besides relinquishing the column from the

burden of the baggage train,
maintained

the captured rolling stock also

the forward flow of provisions and forage

necessary to permit further progress into the vacuum left by
the Confederates.

Capturing the locomotives and cars at

Bowling Green gave the Third Division a rapid means of
moving men and supplies as it advanced.

However,

Mitchel

was forced to provide means of covering the gaps in his line
of communications.

Some temporary river crossings required

ingenious measures,

while others needed constant attention

until they could be made permanent,

but in both cases the

newly reconstructed bridges needed to be guarded to be kept
intact,

a factor that depleted the strength of the advancing

army .
The newly constructed "floating bridge" was one of
those crossings.

It was a temporary structure that yielded

to the water pressure of the rising Barren River,
carried downstream.

At Mitchel's insistence,

and was

the turnpike

bridge was to be rebuilt "at the earliest possible moment
. . [for the]

ferry boats

the passage of an army."

[were] not to be relied upon for
Striving to move south, Mitchel

had neither time nor material

for constructing a better

.
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crossing.

6 3

The temporary link in Mitchel's line of

communications would have to be replaced permanently

to

withstand such natural disasters and to eliminate any delay
in forwarding supplies,

ammunition and forage.

He hoped

to

use "two steamers from the Green River" in order to become
"quite independent of all ropes and f e r r i e s .
With such detail, Mitchel continually demonstrated
for his army's line of communications,

concern

which determined the

success or failure of the march south through Tennessee and
occupation of northern Alabama.
Mitchel insured proper preparations were made for his
furture line of communications,
division,

still located ahead of his

as well as for the support of the division's rear.

On the 19th,

he ventured six miles south along the Nashville

Pike to oversee his mechanics and engineers repairing a
bridge the rebels had b u r n e d .^
meanwhile,

In Bowling Green,

repairs of the division's transportation were

also being completed.

On the knowledge that the railroad

from Bowling Green to Nashville was still intact, Mitchel
judged that Nashville could be taken as readily as Bowling
Green and in three days he would be addressing his letters
from the capital of Tennessee.
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His concern was

not the enemy on his flank at Clarksville,

for he knew the

enemy had fallen back and concentrated at Nashville,

but the

capture and protection of the undamaged railroad in his
front.
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He worried that the important and

vulnerable South Tunnel,

forty miles south of Bowling Green,
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would be "destroyed by fire in an hour by a single
hand."
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damaged,

The road over which he had advanced was
but "by the middle of March,

1862,

service of a

sort had been re-established between Louisville and
Nashville.

...

A through train between Louisville and

Nashville was operated again as early as April 8 ,
1862."69
Confederate hinderances and natural disasters were not
the only impediment to the Third Division's advance.

Buell,

hesitant in assisting Grant's siege of forts Henry and
Donelson,

grew cautious in executing his own plan for

attacking Nashville.

Mitchel hoped to continue his advance

on Nashville every day,
undecided,

but Buell held back and remained

as he had in Louisville.

Mitchel had little

doubt that with an immediate advance Nashville would fall,
especially after Kennett's reconnaissance on the
February.

16th of

If he could persuade Buell to permit the Third

Division to advance at once,

then Mitchel's prediction of

being in Nashville in three days might become
f a c t .^

While Mitchel impatiently awaited orders

for the resumption of march,
Assistant Secretary of War,

Buell and Thomas A. Scott,
arrived in Bowling Green on the

20th of February for consultation.
case to his superiors,

7 1

Presenting his

Mitchel countered Buell's cautious

approach and with the Assistant Secretary of War's
assistance convinced Buell "it was entirely safe to advance
on N a s h v i l l e . " ^
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Mitchel ordered the men to march on the 22nd of
February,

1862,

haversacks.
rain,

with three days'

rations in their

On Saturday morning,

at 7 a.m.

in a drenching

the troops departed Bowling Green "without wagons,

tents or camp e q u i p a g e .

The small amount of

rations carried indicated that Mitchel had an adequate
supply of provisions at Bowling Green,

with the ability to

move them forward by rail to feed his men.

The captured

trains enabled supplies to be transported from Bowling Green
to the rapidly advancing column,

without being handicapped

by the slowpaced wagon train.
The main body of troops marched on Nashville by the
road,

while General Buell and aides,

Scott,

General Mitchel

and staff rode the train along with the detached part of the
division.

With a repaired locomotive,

renamed "General

Mitchel," Mitchel transported a section of artillery and a
thousand riflemen of the Thirteenth Ohio in fifteen railroad
cars,

which moved approximately twenty-five miles down the

Louisville and Nashville Railroad.
a number of cavalrymen,
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Accompanied by

he would scout ahead for signs of

sabotage along the tracks,

in order to keep the train moving

and prevent a derailment.

In mid-afternoon,

for example,

the train halted when it reached a damaged part of the road
where a rail had been removed.
continued

After repairs,

the movement

to about thirty-seven miles from Nashville,

around

Fountainhead,

Tennessee and five miles north of the crucial

South Tunnel,

where Mitchel found that floodwaters had
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washed out the road and destroyed a bridge,
track off the piers and abutments.
more downed bridges,

carrying the

Blocked by this and two

the Union advance was halted and

"compelled either to return or rebuild the bridges and
repair the road."
February 23,

Mitchel chose the latter and on Sunday,

set about to repair the bridges.

Putting the

thousand rail-borne men to work under his personal
supervision,

by the evening Mitchel

was able to send two

locomotives over all but one of the bridges.
bridge,

with its foundation destroyed,

required

of two carloads of stone into the river bed,
foundation on which

to build a pier

The last
the deposit

forming a

for c r i b - w o r k . ^

Although Mitchel was delayed overnight by the bridgework,

he

had a stroke of luck when he found the South Tunnel intact.
To keep supply lines open,

this key point had to be

protected from Confederate mischief to ensure the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad would remain open to Nashville.
Meanwhile,

the rest of the division marched along the

Nashville pike and reached twenty miles south of Bowling
Green,

near Franklin,

on Saturday night.

The troops walked

in the rain and met the same natural obstructions to their
route that the men riding the train had experienced.

The

heavy rains washed away several bridges and flooded the dirt
roads around
march,

the a r e a . ^

After the first day's

the column found shelter "in tobacco houses,

and straw piles."

On Sunday,

barns

the men limped with

blistered feet only fifteen miles further along the pike and

92

reached the still open South Tunnel.
February,

On the 24th of

the troops awoke at daylight and continued

Nashville,

thirty-two miles away.

7 8

towards

Mitchel left

the train and on horseback met the head of his marching
column on its way south.

Together,

following behind the

Fourth Ohio Cavalry Regiment and Loomis'

artillery battery,

they arrived in the evening on the north bank of the
Cumberland River,

which flowed around the north side of

Nashville and emptied into the Ohio River,
west.
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200 miles further

They found the suspension bridge across the

river destroyed,

requiring it to be rebuilt before providing

means for a continuous

flow of supplies to the advancing

Union army campaigning in enemy territory.
Before Mitchel and his troops crossed the Cumberland,
the mayor surrendered the city to one of General Buell's
division commanders,
Cumberland River
Nashville,

William Nelson,

by boat.

who had come up the

As General Mitchel entered

riding at the head of his staff,

he first

encountered confusion among the population at the prospect
of another military occupation of their town, and then met
General Grant and his staff from Fort Donelson.
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With the joint acceptance of the surrender of the city,
Mitchel

joined in the capture of Buell's military objective,

eliminating the Confederate hold over the neutral state of
Kentucky and divided Tennessee.
summarized

In a letter home, Mitchel

the campaign of the past two weeks.

are," he wrote,

"the campaign ended,

"Here we

Bowling Green and
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Nashville ours,

and nobody hurt."

82

He had penned

upon his stationary a feeling of relief,

but disappointingly

noted how incomplete the endeavor really was.

While Buell's

objective had been reached, Mitchel still desired to disrupt
the enemy's only direct inter-theater railroad,
and Charleston,

the Memphis

but he had to bide his time and endure more

delays.
The enemy had been able to retreat unscathed
Nashville,

from

and as before at Green River and Barren River,

had been allowed to destroy another strategically
railroad bridge over the Cumberland River.
the logistical

important

This complicated

problems of supplying an army over a

disjointed line of communications.
to the supply depot at Louisville,
rely on wagons,

ferries,

Instead of a direct link
Mitchel had intended to

and make-shift

the intact sections of the railroad,

bridges to connect

but at Nashville,

Louisville and Nashville crossed the Cumberland River,
was navigable

up to that point.

be used as an alternate
being.

the
which

The river could therefore

form of communications

for the time

With normal spring run-off to insure adequate

depth,

boats could transport supplies up the Cumberland River from
the Ohio River.

It was not necessary,

after all,

that the

Louisville and Nashville Railroad be entirely repaired
before communications could be restored and Mitchel's
division resupplied for their advance south.
Mitchel was lucky.

He advanced into an area that was

evacuted so rapidly the Union army had little opportunity to
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encounter

the enemy.

at maneuver,

Although he had proven himself adept

he was still an untried battlefield

commander.

Because of Buell's caution in filling the vacuum left by the
retreating Confederates,

Mitchel would get no opportunity to

prove himself in combat until or unless he had the
opportunity to operate on his own,
supervision.

without Buell's frequent
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CHAPTER IV

CAPTURE OF HUNTSVILLE:
SEVERING THE MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD

In addition to the supplies that could be received from
the Cumberland River route,

the Union troops confiscated

least a half million pounds of bacon,
beans,

etc.,"

Nashville.

the rebels were

unable to remove

M i t c h e l ’s troops,

without tents,

discovered

previously

supply,

became an advance

and enabled Mitchel

continuing his advance.

from

ordered to march

. . . use."'*'

depot,

with two avenues of

to turn his attention to

In preparation,

troops at Camp Andrew Jackson,

he positioned his

five miles south towards

Murfreesborough , and maintained advance
outposts

flour,

"a full supply of new tents of the

best pattern in store ready for
Nashville

. . . bread,

"at

guards and cavalry

facing the direction of the enemy.

2

Mitchel was about to get the freedom of action that he
needed to display his talents.

Halleck was pressuring Buell

to send troops to Grant as he approached Pittsburg Landing.
Although a part of Buell's army, Mitchel's division was
never engaged on the bloody field at Shiloh;
its presence would be felt on both sides,

nevertheless,

as Union and

Confederate commanders evaluated their situations.
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During the march to Nashville the division suffered few
casualties,

but Buell still suggested that Mitchel be

"cautious and watchful."

Buell was not prepared

for a

forward movement and he did not wish Mitchel to commence
one.

3

Once again Buell was indecisive in the

implementation of his own plan,

and did not display any

aggressiveness in the pursuit of a retreating enemy.
Mitchel wrote that the enemy was similarly confused,

not

knowing where to retreat nor at what point to make a stand,
but he chastised General Buell

for waiting for the army of

fifty thousand effective troops to concentrate at Nashville
instead of making a strategic pursuit of a retreating
4
enemy.
Therefore, Mitchel stretched his authority and sent a
"reconnaissance in force" to the village of Lavergne.
Dumont's Seventeenth Brigade departed down the
Murfreesborough Pike to flush out a body of Confederate
c a v a l r y ,^ "a gang of freebooters commanded

by a real

Dick Turpin of a fellow known as Captain Morgan," who had
been instrumental in burning the bridge across Bacon
Creek.

The brigade returned empty handed after

missing its elusive enemy.^
But Buell's caution was warranted after all,

for on the

9th of March Morgan's cavalry struck four miles inside of
Mitchel's advanced

line,

Division's main camp.

only one mile

from the Third

Near the Washington Institute Insane

Asylum, Morgan's raiders intercepted one of Mitchel's wagon

trains and captured wagons,
ninety horses,
pursuit.

8

advance.

twenty teamsters,

and eighty to

which were later recaptured after a tactical

Morgan's cavalry forestalled the federal
Acting as a screen,

Confederate infantry,
to Corinth.

they hid the movements of

covering their retreat from Nashville

Using "hit and run" tactics,

the enemy cavalry

placed the Army of the Ohio on the tactical defensive.
Reacting to Morgan's presence,
desire to concentrate at Nashville

Buell's hesitation and
delayed the offensive

almost a month from the 24th of February
March.

With a force of 71,000 "effectives,"

the Ohio,
Ford;

to the 18th of
in the Army of

Buell positioned five regiments at Cumberland

five regiments operated in the valley of the Big

Sandy;

one regiment was at Somerset;

and four infantry

regiments and one cavalry regiment secured the line from
Louisville to Nashville.

The remaining units,

organized

into six divisions or about 55,000 men, were concentrated at
9
Nashville.
Contemplating the next strategic objective,
indicated to Halleck on March

Buell

13th that the enemy was

concentrating along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at
the "great bend of the Tennessee."
occupied Huntsville,
points,

Corinth,

but Decatur appeared

On the 14th of March,

Confederates also

and several

intermediate

to be the main p o i n t . ^

Buell proposed to use his concentrated

force at Nashville "to strike at the points occupied by the
enemy on the Memphis and Charleston road."

It would be

accomplished

in two phases,

first an "advance in two columns

one through M u r freesborough, Shelbyville,
the other through Columbia."

and Fayetteville,

The second phase intended to

divide the enemy's line along the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad between Decatur and Corinth.
"Florence is the most desirable,

Buell suggested

that

if we can secure the

bridge," and also hinted that "the line east of Decatur must
. . . be looked t o . " ^

Answering Buell,

Halleck

responded that the "enemy's present line of defense
extendfed]

from Decatur to Island No.

10.

We must attack it

in the center;

say at Corinth or Jackson.

your available

force not required to defend Nashville should

be sent up the Tennessee.
operations,

I think all

This seems to be the best line of

as it leads directly

is easily supplied."

...

to the enemy's center,

and

12

Buell understated the difference between himself and
Halleck on the question of strategic mobility in the Western
theater.

Turning down Halleck's proposal to use the rivers

as lines of movement and supply,
route

Buell emphasized

the land

following the established railroad lines as his army's

line of march and line of communications.
the river to get supplies,
that my force should
move in less time,

strike

"We should use

but I am decidedly of opinion
[Savannah]

in better condition,

by marching.

It can

and with more

security to our operations than by the river.

It will have

also the advantage of driving out the scattered force of the
enemy this side of the river,

and operate powerfully on the
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minds of the people."

He emphasized

the point that the

union of the two armies must "he safe, and yet not too far
from the enemy;"
at Florence,

he hoped to "effect it by surprise

. . .

getting in between Decatur and Corinth," in

order to draw an enemy attack.
told Halleck,

"Whenever that may be," he

"[we] will be fully sure to meet the principal

force of the enemy.

. . ."

13

Buell formed his

strategy in terms of interior lines similar to Halleck's
strategy,

seeking to get between the enemy and gain central

position.

But he stressed use of the railroad for his

communications.
The two plans originated from Halleck's and Buell's
respective lines of communications.

Both focused their line

of operations towards the enemy's receding front along
parallel directions.

Halleck's line of communications

rested solely on the Tennessee River,

while Buell's depended

on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland
River.

Based on the existing departmental organization,

their divergent objectives ensured

that cooperation between

Halleck and Buell would be difficult,
Until March

11,

if not impossible.

1862, when departments reorganized,

generals commanded separate

departments.

the Department of the Ohio,

which consisted of Ohio,

Michigan,

Indiana,

Tennessee,

the two

Buell commanded

and that part of Kentucky east

of the Cumberland River, while Halleck commanded the
Department of the Missouri,
Missouri,

Iowa,

Minnesota,

which contained
Wisconsin,

the states of

Illinois,

Arkansas,
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and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.
The current operations

following the retreating Confederates

towards Corinth bordered on the two departments,

which

raised debate between the two commanders as to whose plan to
implement.

The matter was settled on March

13th,

1862, when

Halleck took command of the newly organized Department of
the Mississippi,

which joined the two departments.

14

Halleck immediately began making the decisions for the
juncture of the two former armies in time for the
forthcoming battles at Shiloh and Corinth.
On the

16th of March, Halleck closed the debate over

the strategic objective of the joint forces of the
Department of the Mississippi
[his]

by ordering Buell to "move

forces by land to the Tennessee River as rapidly as

possible

. . . Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah.

You must direct your march on that point,
cannot get between u s . ^

On the

so that the enemy

17th, Halleck

brushed aside Buell's concern about Beauregard's movement
from Corinth "to some other point" on the Tennessee River
and urged Buell on to Savannah.

"Push forward your troops

as rapidly as possible," Halleck wrote,
their railroad communication

"so that we can cut

[at Corinth].

16

Halleck was concerned that the Confederates would close on
the two armies,

attempting to divide and conquer each

separate part before they were joined,
feared.

To prevent that situation,

Buell to move.

just as Buell had

he adamantly ordered

"Savannah is now the strategic point.

Don't
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fail to carry out my instructions.
right.Buell

accordingly

I know that I am

sent his divisions in

motion to the southwest from Nashville in support of C. F.
Smith's expeditionary force at Savannah.
division arrived at Columbia on the 18th.

His advanced
On the same day

Buell sent Mitchel's division marching southeast to
Murfreesborough.
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With Morgan no longer an interference in front of
Murfreesborough,
advance;

Buell ordered

once again,

move rapidly forward

the Third Division to

an opportunity arose for Mitchel
(see map 4 ) .

This time they inarched in

conjunction with the remainder of Buell's army,
the southwest,

but not to

as Halleck intended for all forces not

required for the defense of Nashville.
juncture,

to
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At this

as the Third Division departed the outskirts of

Nashville for Murfreesborough,

and while Buell accompanied

three divisions to join Grant's army at Savannah,

Mitchel's

command became semi-independent and no longer susceptible to
Buell's cautious time-table.

The Third Division commenced

its southerly march along the Murfreesborough Pike on the
18th of M a r c h .^
The Third Division's
Lavergne,

first night of march ended at

where the earlier attempt to capture Morgan had

taken place.
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On the

19th of March,

still prepared forces at Columbia

while Buell

for Savannah,

Mitchel,

hindered once again by the bridges burned by retreating
Confederates,

circumvented

these obstructions by marching on
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Map 4.
Mitchel's advance to Hun tsville.
Source. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas,
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1972), 1:Map 31.

2 vols.

Ill

the Liberty Pike,

which joined the Murfreesborough-Nashville

Pike just south of Lavergne.

The next morning,

after

turning south at an intersection of the Liberty-Lebanon
Pikes,

the division took three hours to rumble along the

pike road,

which illustrated the immense length of a

division of 10,000 men and eighteen cannon. 2 2

The

march ended in the afternoon as Mitchel's columns entered
Murfreesborough, "a beautiful town on the banks of Stones
River,

surrounded by a noble forest."

Nashville Pike,

Lebanon Pike,
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Here the

Shelbyville Pike,

and the

Franklin road intersected,

which provided a crossroad

wagon and horse.

it was the crossing of the

However,

for

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad over the west fork of
Stones River that made Murfreesborough a point of strategic
importance.

The low ground between the heights on each bank

was normally spanned by three different bridges,
railroad and two pike,

a total length of 1 2 0 0

required considerable trestle work.
Division easily entered the town,

2A

one

feet,

which

The Third

due to its circuitous

route around the destroyed bridges,

but found that the

retreating enemy had removed or destroyed all stocks of food
and e q u i p m e n t .
However quickly

the men marched forward,

destruction and delays.

they met with

Cautious delays at Nashville had

allowed the enemy time to fall back unopposed behind manmade
structures that were now destroyed,

so that only natural

obstacles still interposed between the armies.

Mitchel
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addressed this reoccurrance of overcaution with severe
criticism of his commander.

Normally,

hindsight

provides to

those weak in spirit the needed courage for criticism,

but

Mitchel was strong in his conviction that delay only favored
the enemy.

His reconnaisance and intelligence confirmed his

suspicions that the rebels were streaming southward through
Tullahoma and Stevenson,

endeavoring to concentrate at

Corinth and hoping to strike the Union force advancing on
Savannah.
Chafing at the situation at Murfrees b o r o u g h , Mitchel
wrote that "on reaching Nashville the rebels were on the
march to [Murfrees b o r o u g h ], and were in great disorder.

An

advance then by our own troops would have scattered them
like chaff,

and we would have captured all their stores;

General Buell determined
thousand men."

but

to wait the coming up of fifty-two

That required

twenty-two days and rendered

the advance to Murfreesborough less successful than it would
otherwise have been,

since the rebels were able to retire

with all their supplies and left both the turnpike and
railroad bridges in wreckage.

The Third Division was

compelled to halt and rebuild these bridges before it could
move into A l a b a m a . ^
Mitchel realized his advance could not be continued,
not because of obstructions in his path nor because a strong
enemy awaited south of Murfreesborough,
of communication was not intact.

but because his line

The destroyed

railroad

bridge over the Stones River and the one being rebuilt at
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Nashville severed the Third Division's link with its supply
depots at Louisville and Nashville.

Mitchel was a soldier,

optimistic about the forthcoming opportunities,

but still

realistic concerning the prerequisite of establishing and of
maintaining the continuity of one's line of communication.
He did not want to take the time to forage away from his
line of communications,

especially

in an area already

stripped by the retreating Confederates.

It therefore

became necessary that "these formidable bridges must be
rebuilt

...

as without the railroad we could not feed the

army for lack of [wagon]
Therefore,

on March 21,

transportation."
1862,
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forced to halt and repair the

bridges behind him, Mitchel immediately

set his two engineer

companies to work that proceeded at a fevered pace;
days,

in ten

the three bridges were erected and rail traffic

crossed Stones River.
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On the 20th of March,

Buell assigned Brigadier General

Dumont from Mitchel's division to command the troops posted
to Nashville and on the lines of communication of the army.
His orders were to see "that the lines of communication of
the army are kept open;
suitable escorts,

. . . that trains are provided with

. . . that the bridges and roads are

properly guarded and kept in good order."
After being ordered to Savannah,
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Buell explained to

Halleck what defensive arrangements were made to protect
middle Tennessee.

There were three routes from which an

enemy could have advanced upon Nashville:

first,

by the

direct route across from Knoxville;
Chattanooga Railroad;

and third,

Each route provided advantages

second,

by the Decatur Railroad.

to the enemy that Buell felt

"prudent to take precautions against";
detrimental

by the

however,

they were

to the planned combined move on Savannah.

The

protection of Tennessee would have to occupy troops from the
Army of the Ohio and thus divert men from Halleck's aim of
concentrating all troops at Savannah.

Buell's defensive

strategy included Mitchel's division as a "corps d'
observation,"

placed southeast from Nashville.

forwarded Mitchel's division to Fayetteville,
brigade at Murfreesborough if necessary
communications,

to "keep open its

Another

brigade was kept at

where it could be conveniently diverted to support

Murfrees b o r o u g h , Fayetteville,
Columbia.

or to cover the route through

Another division was situated in front of

Columbia,

either to act with Mitchel's division or to move

toward Savannah,

following Buell's army.

Buell figured that

with the necessary bridge and depot guards,
were required

to protect middle Tennessee,

divisions or about
Savannah.

supported by a

and at the same time observe Nashville and

the approach from Knoxville."
Franklin,

Buell

about

25,000 men

which left four

35,000 men to join forces at
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Supplied by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
Nashville would be used as a depot for the armies defending
middle Tennessee.
organized,

drilled,

Recruits and stragglers would
and supplied,

be

then moved as needed to

the front units.
camp equipment,
Nashville.

30

Likewise,

rations,

forage,

supplies and ammunition,

medical and

would move through

Since the city provided a terminal for

both Mitchel's

line of communications

Chattanooga Railroad)

(the Nashville and

and Buell's line of communications

(the Nashville and Decatur Railroad)

Dumont's

judgement

would have great impact on the conduct of future operations,
for he could prioritize the amount and direction of supplies
moving forward through Nashville.
Mitchel's record reconstruction of the bridges over
Stones River did not eliminate the obstruction to his line
of communications at the bridges near Nashville,

which were

being rebuilt by Dumont's men and were not under Mitchel's
command or leadership.

The railroad supply line required

continuity for successful operation and those "small bridges
. . . on which the work [had]

been progressing some six

weeks,

[the] entire division

[were]

held back."
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unfinished,

and

Mitchel tried to remedy his lack of

command over his line of communications,
Buell that the entire railroad
under his command.
supply line,

[was]
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Mitchel

by requesting of

to Chattanooga be placed
felt that command of his

in this case control of troops rebuilding the

bridges of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and troops
guarding the line,

would alleviate

future supply
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prob l e m s .
If the integrity and security of his rear lines was
established and the lines brought under his control,

Mitchel

predicted a quick and unrestricted advance to the Tennessee
River.

It was his link with Nashville that Mitchel

primarily concerned about,

not his front.

was

"I care little or

nothing for the destruction of the railroad bridges.

I can

rebuild them and move my army faster than others usually
march.

The moment the Nashville

is clear to Shelbyville,
Fayetteville;
communication,

bridges are finished my way

and thence I will soon open it to

and once there,

I will laugh at railway

as I can advance upon Decatur even without a

halt and supply my army with my regimental teams."
to forage on the country,

Planning

at least for the time being,

Mitchel only complained of "one trouble,

and that is my

dependence on others,

The entire war has

who are too slow.

been moved too slowly."

In full knowledge of the risks

involved in moving without secure rail communication,

he was

willing to take the chance of having to subsist off the land
if that gave him the opportunity to occupy
Charleston line.

He believed that "with a clear

plenty of room in which to operate,
on," he could be in Decatur,
Chattanooga.

the Memphis and
field and

and no one to depend

or possibly
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The request for control of the railroad went
unanswered;

however,

to his feelings.

in utter frustration,

Mitchel gave vent

"Buell is the slowest person I ever had

the misfortune to be associated with,

and tries my patience

in the severest manner almost daily.

I wish I had the

management of this war

for just thirty days!

Here now I
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shall

be compelled

Lo wait!

wait!!

wait!!!"

An advance to Decatur or Chattanooga
communications was a bold risk,
bordered on insubordination,

35

untangled by

and while his accusations

Mitchel based them on previous

experience and on current information gained while waiting
at M u r freesborough.

General Mitchel dispatched a

reconnaissance expedition consisting of the Twenty-fourth
Illinois Regiment,

Fourth Cavalry Regiment,

Thirty-seventh Indiana Regiment,
Simonson's

part of the

plus two six-pounders of

battery to search for the enemy and report their

strength and disposition.
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On the 24th of March,

expedition departed Murfreesborough,

the

the day before Buell

finally crossed the Duck River on his way to Savannah.
went by Shelbyville,

Tullahoma,

Manchester,

It

and McMinnville

to search for the whereabouts of Morgan's cavalry and to
determine whether it was a threat to the Third Division's
flank or a threat to its communications.
reconnaissance

bore fruit,

The

for the enemy cavalry were

engaged on the evening of the 27th;
discovered
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however,

it was

that the enemy cavalry was just a screen and the

only enemy between the Third Division at Murfreesborough and
the Tennessee River.
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The column returned

to

Murfreesborough on the 28th of March bearing the vital
information to Mitchel.
Armed with this revealing information,

General Mitchel

knew his front lacked any sufficient enemy to pose a threat
or to prevent an advance,

but his progress was still
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hampered by the incomplete line of communications.
having the railroad to supply food and forage,
necessary for Mitchel

it became

to relay regimental and divisional

wagons to and from Nashville.
ninty wagons

Not

On the 31st of March,

he sent

guarded by 400 men to Nashville to assist with

the repair of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and to
return with provisions.
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Buell did not doubt Mitchel's capabilities as a
general;

he just did not grasp the opportunities which lay

before Mitchel.
over-caution.

This shortsightedness explained Buell's
Halleck,

in agreement with the basic plan

Buell proposed for the defense of central Kentucky and
Tennessee,

likewise doubted the "expediency"

movement.

He even criticized Buell's decision to allow

Mitchel to act as a "corps d' observation,"
"on the diverging line to Stevenson
strong

...

of Mitchel's

for the column

if made very

. . . divides your forces too much.

It seems to me

better to threaten Decatur by way of Pulaski.

Your columns

would then be near enough together to co-operate.
[the enemy stands at CorinthJ,

...

If

your eastern column would be

too distant to render us any a s s i s t a n c e . " ^

Halleck

predicted there would be no counter threat upon Nashville
from Decatur or Stevenson and therefore no need for
diverting any of Buell's troops who were meant for Grant's
„ 41
support.
Halleck similarly failed

to anticipate any

opportunities that lay before Mitchel.

After Mitchel
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departed M u r freesborough, separated

from the main army,

he

would confront the enemy as a semi-independent commander
with 9,000 men.

Buell gave General Mitchel one last set of

instructions before Mitchel endeavored to sever the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad.
dispositions,
command,

Buell telegraphed the Union

Mitchel's responsibilities,

his area of

and finally his part in the campaign commencing in

southwest Tennessee.
In the March 27th telegram,

a concerned Buell stressed

Mitchel's deployment as a "corps d' observation."

This was

the last order to General Mitchel before his movement south
and it underscored the fact that the Third Division would be
"semi-independent."

He would not receive another

telegram from his superiors until the first of May.
Buell's defensive positions placed
at Fayetteville,

the Third Division

midway between the two railroads radiating

south from Nashville.

The Nashville and Chattanooga

Railroad ran southeast from Nashville through the Cumberland
Plateau and joined the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at
Stevenson.

A distance of 116 miles separated Stevenson

from

Nashville.

Fayetteville was connected to the Nashville and

Chattanooga Railroad at Decherd by the Winchester and
Alabama Railroad.

The Nashville and Decatur Railroad ran

west of Fayetteville and connected
southwest line.

It ran

Nashville to Decatur in a

120 miles and likewise intersected

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Decatur.

The base of

this railroad triangle was the Memphis and Charleston
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Railroad linking Stevenson to Decatur by eighty miles of
track.

The entire circuit consisted of uniform five foot

track gauge.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad paralleled

the Tennessee River and crossed it at only two points along
its entire length.

These strategically important points

were at Bridgeport,

Tennessee,

ten miles east of Stevenson,

and Decatur,

Alabama,

eighty miles to the west of

Bridgeport.

The two bridges were both constructed with very

large spans across the Tennessee River and if destroyed
would have crippled

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad

supply link for several months while awaiting
reconstruction.

Destroying the two bridges would also

protect an invading Union force north of the Tennessee
43
River.
Mitchel's position at Fayetteville was
thirty miles north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
and approximately equidistant between the Nashville and
Chattanooga and Nashville and Decatur Railroads.

From that

central point he could command either route north to
Nashville.
In justifying Mitchel's
Tennessee,

line of deployment in central

Buell informed Halleck that "Fayetteville is on

as good a line for Decatur as Columbia is; and at the same
time guards the route to Nashville from the east."

Buell's

guidance to Mitchel added that "This force can be
concentrated
necessary.

either

for an advance or for defense,

if

It can by marches of from 25 to 35 miles over

good turnpikes concentrate at Shelbyville or at Columbia or
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Pulaski;
Decatur.

or,

still farther in advance,

at Huntsville or

These points are of more or less importance in

consequence of the routes they command,

and some of them are

on streams--Duck River and Elk River--which in high water
would have some strength as defensive lines,

though in the

dry seasons they are fordable at many points.
is also important,

Fayetteville

as affording by the branch railroad from

Decherd a good depot for operations against any position
south of it on your line."

Buell informed Mitchel that it

was only necessary to suggest these general features of the
strategic situation in central Tennessee and left the final
arrangements to his subordinate,

whose confidence emanated

from Mitchel's military understanding of how well "to take
advantage of them or guard against them,
circumstances.
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In Buell's mind,

Fayetteville was the pivotal strategic

point in central Tennessee.
Mitchel's

according to

Therefore,

he supported

deployment with Duffield's brigade and a battery

of artillery and squadron of cavalry

situated at

Murfreesborough and with a detachment posted at Lebanon,
while Negley's brigade,

a battery of artillery,

squadron of cavalry covered Franklin.

Columbia would be

protected by a division detached from Buell's
at or in front of that city.
the left in conjunction with

and a

force placed

These units were "to act. to
[Mitchel],

or to the right,

according to circumstances.
Mitchel did not expect to get command of his line of

communications,
request,
division,

and when finally acknowledging Mitchel's

Buell vaguely indicated that "excepting your own
the troops

[those guarding the railroads]

strictly under your command,
otherwise

are not

but they will become so,

. . . any advance of the enemy

unless

toward Nashville

renders their concentration or united action necessary,
they will be so instructed."

Therefore,

and

only under threat

of attack towards Nashville would Buell relinquish control
of the troops guarding Mitchel's line of communications.
Rightly so,

for Buell was ultimately responsible

for the

defense of Nashville and therefore commanded the reserve,
but— compounded by inaccurate information and communication
delays due to his distance from Mitchel's line — Buell's
decision contributed

to missed opportunities in northern

A l a b a m a .^
After deferring to General Mitchel's
moving the Third Division forward,

Buell specifically

ordered him to move one of his brigades,
the principal part of his cavalry,
Shelbyville,

with a battery and

immediately to

from which point Mitchel

railroad transportation.

judgment for

was to complete his

Once the Murfreesborough bridges

were capable of sustaining communications,

Mitchel was to

forward "the principal part of [his] division to
[Shelbyville],

and throw a brigade and strong force of

cavalry forward to F a y e t t e v i l l e . " ^
Under specific orders to march,
instructions

but with only general

for deployment and action,

Mitchel departed
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Murfreesborough on the 3rd of April.

Getting a late start,

the Third Division marched south fifteen miles and
bivouacked around Fosterville among "handsome
and large

. . . plantations.

On the 4th,

. . . houses
the

division resumed the march at 7 a.m. with the Third Ohio in
the lead,

and reached Shelbyville at noon.

The division

left the rail route and marched by way of the
Murfreesborough and Shelbyville Pike,

which paralleled

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to Fosterville,
two diverged,

where the

the pike continuing due south and the railroad

veering southeast to Wartrace through Bellbuckle.
Wartrace

the

At

the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad branched

west eight miles to Shelbyville.

This railroad link was to

suffice as Mitchel's supply line until he reached
Fayetteville.
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At Shelbyville,

the men spent their time in camp one

mile from town on the Duck River,

while Mitchel had to

endure a delay of four more days waiting for the bridges
near Nashville to be completed,

making his railroad

communications i n t a c t .^
Mitchel did not want lose momentum because of someone
else's delay,

and thus ordered a "lightning" raid to be made

to the Tennessee River on the 7th.

Three hundred cavalry

and one gun were to dash towards the bridge at Bridgeport,
"surprise the bridge guard,
and retire."

drive it away,

The raid was intended

burn the bridge,

to sever the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad and deny the east-west link to the
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rebels.

By using cavalry,

which depended less on supply

lines and was not slowed down by wagons or infantry,
expedition had a chance of surprise,

the

but it meant that the

expedition was limited in scope and that territory could not
be occupied and held against a large enemy force.
cavalry raid,

nevertheless,

results if successful.
situation,

could have profound

The

strategic

While not creating a permanent

it would temporarily delay any further enemy

movements by rail from the east towards Corinth,
Union concentration at Savannah,
concentration at Corinth.

protect the

and disrupt the Confederate

Conversely,

the use of the

cavalry could adversely affect Mitchel's major objective of
capturing Huntsville

by alerting the enemy of his intentions

and by keeping the horsemen occupied and unable to provide
reconnaissance or act as a covering force.

While the raid

was a risky decision when deep in enemy territory,

it had

great potential for severing the enemy's line of
communications,

a situation Mitchel confronted in keeping

his own line of communications intact and in feeding his
division while at Hu n t s v i l l e .^

The results were not

in line with Mitchel's expectations.

Even though the

cavalry captured and destroyed a train on the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad and netted fifteen prisoners,

the raid

proved unsuccessful because the bridge was heavily defended
by infantry.

Still intact,

and troop link remained,
attacked Huntsville.
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the bridge and the enemy supply

a condition Mitchel feared when he
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Mitchel knew that he had tipped his hand;

he must move

his division forward promptly after this initial attempt at
severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Bridgeport
failed.
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With a small force under his command and

the Confederates'

ability to use the railroads and move

rapidly against him, Mitchel nevertheless risked undertaking
the venture to Huntsville

because Confederates were

necessarily preoccupied with the main Union force at
Pittsburg Landing.

Situated at Shelbyville,

Buell to move to Fayetteville,
position,

orders,

and ordered by

Mitchel analyzed his

and options for capturing Huntsville and

severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
by rail either

to Stevenson or to Decatur,

His movement

with the

Confederate communication link still intact meant
Division could be cut off from Nashville
moving on the opposite rail line.

the Third

by enemy forces

However,

surprise was on

the side of Mitchel because the enemy expected the Third
Division to take a month to six weeks to rebuild the
destroyed bridges at Murfrees b o r o u g h , whereas Mitchel
rebuilt them in ten days and completely upset the enemy's
delaying tactics.
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With his line of communications

finally completed from Nashville to Shelbyville,
could make Shelbyville his supply depot.

Mitchel

From that point he

could haul supplies the final fifty-seven miles by road to
Huntsville,

which required the use of both regimental and

division w a g o n s . ^

Mitchel weighed the strategic

possibilities against the risks of failure and concluded
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that severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was well
worth the gamble.
by superiors,

He had not come all this way to be halted

repulsed by the enemy,

or turned away because

of a lack of nerve.
This strategic objective,

cutting the east-west

railroad link of the Confederacy,

which

Mitchel had long

thought of as his contribution to the war effort,
a distinct possibility.

now became

He was within striking distance of

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and had the potential to
attack Chattanooga and capture that vital rail
c e n„
t e r .56
For this strategy to succeed it needed a tactician's
viewpoint,

as well as planning and implementation.

the preparation for the departure
Fayetteville,

During

from Shelbyville to

Turchin presented Mitchel with an

independently conceived plan to seize Huntsville and follow
up the occupation by attacking the enemy concentration at
Corinth.

Intrigued by the idea,

on the eve of the final

march Mitchel charged the Russian with arranging the details
of the plan.
Turchin proposed to send his brigade and Kennett's
cavalry first from Shelbyville,
another brigade.

followed the next day by

Returned from the Bridgeport raid,

the

cavalry would act as a covering force "on a wide front on
all roads leading

. . . from Fayetteville and Huntsville."

As a screening force,

the cavalry would gain information

first about the strengths and deployments of the enemy in
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and around Fayetteville,
Memphis and Charleston

then around Huntsville.

Since the

Railroad was still operating and

capable of transporting troops through Huntsville,

it was

necessary to determine if troops were concentrated

there

waiting to be transferred.

From the gathered

a decision could then be made about movement
places.

intelligence,
upon both

If the information turned out to be favorable,

then

the brigades could rapidly move on Fayetteville and finally
upon Huntsville.

In the final phase,

the cavalry would be

detached and employed east and west of Huntsville to cut
railroad and telegraph wires and "to seize the post-office
and telegraph office,

railroad yard,

round-house,

and

buildings where Confederate property might be stored."
Turchin captured Huntsville,

Once

he planned to have part of his

brigade transported by train toward Decatur,

while Mitchel

with a part of the other brigade would execute the same plan
east toward Bridgeport,

and "in two or three days

[they]

could be in possession of the whole railroad on [the north]
side of the

[Tennessee]

river."

Mitchel

questioned

the

possibility of finding the enemy in strength at Huntsville.
According to his recollection,

Turchin answered,

attacking the town we found the enemy
would fall back and be re-inforced

that "if by

too strong for us, we

by the brigade

us, and then act according to circumstances.

following

We might lose

some men, it is seldom that a military expedition of that
kind is not attended with losses.

Yet the enterprise was of

such magnitude that we might well afford

to risk some lives
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for the sake of achieving an important r e s u l t .
On April 8th, Mitchel approved T u r c h i n 's plan and
ordered him to move the Eighth Brigade toward Fayetteville
on the next day,
proposed.

5 S

while the cavalry screened the advance as

The advance started at 6 a .m ., but

moved slowly moving because the Fayetteville Pike was
"sloppy,
rain.
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10th,

and in many places overflowed,"

due to a drenching

Sill's brigade departed Shelbyville on the

following Turchin's brigade,

while Lytle's brigade

remained in Shelbyville as a reserve
After sixteen miles,
miles from Fayetteville,
morning.

force.

0

the march was halted five to six

to be continued at 6 a.m.

the next

By noon it had reached Fayetteville with Mitchel

riding at the head cf his staff into the public square.
men crossed the Elk River
bank.

The

bridge and camped on the south

Cavalry outposts were ordered "to the front on all

the roads leading from the direction of Huntsville,

[again]

with orders not to pass anybody out toward that
town."^

Kennett's cavalry performed

its duty as a

covering screen and captured many people routinely
north on business.

traveling

These detentions netted important

information on which Mitchel based his decision to continue
south.
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Some of that information concerned
Shiloh,

the outcome at

for results there would directly affect the

practicality of the move to Huntsville.

At first,

information gathered from civilian prisoners indicated

that
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Grant's army was defeated

by Beauregard,

rebels were at Huntsville "aware of
approach and prepared

to receive

and that 5,000

[the Third Division's]

[them]."

6 3

With

only 4,000 "effective" men in the initial advance against a
force of 5,000,

further movement would be suicidal.

Mitchel

believed the information regarding the number of enemy
troops at Huntsville was correct,

but rejected the notion

that the enemy knew of his approach because his cavalry had
arrested "every person through whom news of [their] approach
could be c o n v e y e d . " ^

And on the

10th of April,

Mitchel received a dispatch which dispelled the enemy rumors
of a Union defeat at C o r i n t h . ^

His movement on

Huntsville immediately became more feasible.
However, Mitchel's
original

division formed only a part of the

force that had started south in December.

depleted by illness,

absentees,

death,

It was

and the "necessity

for leaving several regiments at Shelbyville and several
others at Fayetteville,

the latter of which places was

thoroughly and venomously disloyal."

6 (5

Mitchel was

concerned about his tenuous line of communications,

now

tethered by road through enemy territory secured neither
from rebel raiders nor nature.
to guard against the former,

He depleted his small force

but was unable to protect his

line of communications against nature's effect upon road
conditions and bridge structures.

6 7

With indefatigable courage and unswerving perseverance,
Mitchel nevertheless elected to move at once upon
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Huntsville.

One hour after getting word of the results of

the Battle of Shiloh,
Cavalry,

Turchin's brigade,

the 4th Ohio

and Simonson's battery departed Fayetteville.

Mitchel again used the shuttle system of moving forward one
brigade at a time,
reserve.

keeping a brigade at Fayetteville in

After marching twenty miles in ten hours,

and

"wading over one of the branches of the Flint River,
deep,

[Turchin's brigade]

grove of timber about

stopped to bivouac

waist

. . . in a

10 miles from Huntsville."
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General Mitchel knew the utmost importance of proper
execution of a military plan.

His intelligence and personal

drive had formed the Third Division into an efficient
marching force capable of overcoming natural and manmade
hinderances on the road.
allowed to move south.

It had made remarkable

The march had started in December

from Elizabethtown and now camped undetected
from glory.
Mitchel

time when

just ten miles

But on the night before the final phase,

felt obliged to place the success of the mission

ahead of his personal ambition.
combat experience,

Considering his own lack of

Mitchel conferred command of the

immediate advance on Huntsville upon a battle hardened
veteran.

He gave Turchin the task of leading the expedition

into Huntsville.
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If there was to be a battle and

there were odds that there might be, with 5,000 rebels in
transit at Huntsville,
reliable,

Mitchel wanted his command in

experienced hands.

Without specific orders

authorizing the m o v e , the success or failure would rest
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squarely upon Ormsby Mitchel.

Turchin would command only

the cavalry and two cannons in order to expedite the fall
upon Huntsville,

followed immediately by Mitchel with the

remainder of the brigade's infantry.
After only four or five hours rest,
without the sound of trumpet or drum.
marching forty miles in forty hours.

the men were roused

They were tired after
The spent force moved

out along the Meridianville Pike from its bivouac and passed
unnoticed through sleepy Meridianvil1e seven miles from
Huntsville.

At Meridianville , according to plan,

three

details of cavalry equipped with picks and crowbars and the
horse artillery

split from Mitchel and the infantry to dash

upon their respective assignments.

Mitchel hoped to catch

all of the rolling stock still remaining in the train yard
by tearing up the track on either side of town and sealing
off the t o w n . ^
The mission was accomplished without any major
problems.

The western cavalry detachment cut the railroad

and telegraph wires,

although the eastern detail was unable

to rip up the track before two engines moved toward
Stevenson.

Driving off the enemy cavalry,

the center column

of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment entered the town at 7 a.m.
and took possession of the "railroad yard and all the
railroad

rolling stock,

supplies.
office,

offices and buildings,

with

They also captured the telegraph office,

post

and the railroad depot," making prisoners of several

hundred Confederate troops who

[were] caught passing through
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the city."

The anticipated 5,000 rebels had already passed

Huntsville and luckily,

the Third Division attacked between

enemy troop movements heading west.

The Third Division had

marched fifty-seven miles in forty-eight hours and by their
rapid movements

gained complete surprise and severed the

coveted Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

The townspeople

were awakened by the sound of cannon echoing from east of
town and before breakfast they were in the hands of Union
soldiers.^
Two hundred military prisoners,
and eighty "passenger,

fifteen locomotives,

box, and platform cars," along with

the undestroyed machine shops and tool apparatus in the rail
yard were captured without casualties tc the Third Division.
Led by General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel,
of the Army of the Ohio,

the Third Division

"succeeded in cutting the great

artery of railway intercommunications between the southern
States."
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CHAPTER V

SECURING HUNTSVILLE:
A POSSIBLE TURNING MOVEMENT

The Battle of Shiloh was over.

The bloody affair left

the Union in possession of the field.
retreated south toward Corinth,

While Confederates

the Union army— under the

field command of Halleck since April
The march on Corinth took a month,

llth--slowly pursued.

for Beauregard did not

evacuate until May 30.
Mitchel was interested
own sake,

in a move on Huntsville

for its

because cutting the Memphis and Charleston

Railroad could have far-reaching effects in all theatres of
war.

But the events in northern Mississippi were never far

from Mithcel's mind,

end it was obvious to him that his

movements after the fall of Huntsville might have an
extremely beneficial effect on Union fortunes before Corinth
if he was allowed to develop his plans.
Apparently Mitchel

was thinking in terms of a turning

movement,

or at least a raid,

Corinth.

Mitchel realized

communications

to break the stalemate at

that any movement, on Beauregard's

did not necessarily depend solely on troops

under Halleck's immediate control.

He could supply

manpower over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to
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the
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Tuscumbia.

If more troops were needed to accomplish the

turning movement,

they could be sent from Pittsburg Landing

on the Tennessee River.
forthcoming,

retreat,

troops were not

however, Mitchel's operation could be a raid

conducted by infantry,
Railroad.

If additional

breaking the Mobile and Ohio

This probably would have forced Eeauregard to
for he lacked field transportation and had to keep

his army concentrated

thus relying on that railroad for

supplies.
In strategic terms,

the capture of Huntsville on April

11 by the Third Division meant a disruption of Confederate
commerce,

logistics,

and strategic mobility.

Specifically,

it hindered the transfer of men and supplies between
theaters of operation.

For rail communications between

Virginia and Mississippi,

the Confederacy was now forced to

resort to the indirect route
south by way of Mobile,
Railroad to Corinth.
which had demonstrated

from the east through Atlanta,

then north along the Mobile and Ohio

The Memphis and Charleston

Railroad,

its usefulness when it brought

together troops from throughout the Confederacy at Corinth,
had been severed

at Huntsville.

railroad to render it useless,

Instead
however,

of destroying that
Mitchel captured

road intact and found that by keeping it intact,
turn it to Federal advantage.
locomotives,
condition.

the

he could

There were plenty of cars and

and the shops and depots were in good
It made sense to use the road now for the

benefit of the Union.

The railroad

continued to operate as
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it had before,
On April

but under new management.
11,

1862, Mitchel's Third Division,

minus two

regiments protecting its line of communications to
Nashville,

entered Huntsville

tactical surprise.

undetected,

having achieved

But it would not take long fcr news of

the occupation of the town and the loss cf the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad

to reach Confederate ears.

Therefore,

the Third Division immediately began the duties of an
occupation army, and attempted tc secure its flanks
5).

According to a prearranged

dispatched Turchin's Brigade
evening of April

11th.

fixed on a flat car,
departed Huntsville
away.

2

promptly

by railroad tc Decatur on the

At 6 p. m ., the 24th Illinois,

part of the 19th Illinois,
the railroad track,

plan, Mitchel

(see map

a

and a working party fcr repairing

boarded railroad cars and with a "gun
placed in front of the locomotive,"
for Decatur,

roughly twenty-five miles

The force advanced slowly westward cut of

Huntsville,

following on the heels of Confederate Brigadier

General Benjamin H. Helm's cavalry,

v'hich tried

to destroy

track and bridges over intervening culverts in order to
3
hinder Turchin s movement.
Ccming to the near side
cf the Decatur Bridge over
morning of the
guards,

the Tennessee River on the

12th, T u r c h i n 's men surprised

the rebel

who quickly fired bales of cottcn that had been used

as makeshift fortifications.
extinguished

the fire and

Turchin's men easily

salvaged the bridge work,

but the

citizens cf Decatur raised the drawbridge in hopes of
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preventing the Federate from crossing.

After Union

troops

prodded the citizens to lower the bridge by threatening that
"if you do not close the bridge at once your town will be
shelled to pieces, n the citizens acquiesced. 4
Turchin's move to Decatur was successful in securing the
division's right flank by capturing the Tennessee River
bridge.

Any counter move by the Confederates would have to

come over the bridge and through Turchin's brigade.
securing the north side of the Tennessee,
bridge also gave possibilities

the capture of the

for the division to link up

with the main Union army at Corinth.

Meanwhile,

Turchin's Brigade had moved on Decatur

as part of

to the west,

regiment of Sill's Ninth Brigade advanced
Bridgeport,

a

towards

to the east.

On the morning of April

12th,

1862,

Sill and

1,000 men

boarded a train and headed tc the east in an effort
capture the bridge at Bridgeport,
left flank.

Mitchel accompanied

beyond Stevenson,

to

and thus secure Mitchel's
the expedition

to a point

where the Memphis and Charleston Railroad

crossed Widow Creek.

Finding the Confederate

the Howe Bridge at Bridgeport
attack,

Besides

Sill's force fell

too large

force guarding

for an immediate

back to Stevenson.

However , to

keep the enemy from using the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad and slipping in behind his position at Huntsville,
Mitchel ordered
approximately

that the Widow Creek

[Widden]

four miles from Bridgeport,

destroyed bridge temporarily

bridge

be burned.

prevented the Confederate

The
force

at Bridgeport

from advancing to Stevenson Junction and

denied them the use c f the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad.

Mitchel left Sill and his meager

the left flank.

Though not as spectacular as destroying the

Tennessee River bridge at Bridgeport,
had intended,

force to defend

as Buell and Mitchel

destruction of the Widow Creek bridge

nevertheless accomplished the same results,

for it refused

access to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Confederates,

to the

and secured the Third Division's left

flank.'*
On the 13th of April,

1862, Mitchel reported he had

three regiments of infantry and ore squadron of cavalry at
Decatur,

v/ith its bridge over the Tennessee River intact.

Halleck reported to Stanton on the 16th of April that
Mitchel had captured both Huntsville and Decatur,
moved cn Tuscumbia.

and had

But Halleck did not comprehend

the possibilities created by Mitchel 's possess i.on of a land
avenue via Decatur or Tuscumbia for offensive operations
across

the Tennessee River into the rear of the enemy

Corinth.

at

Almost to the point of obsession, Halleck

concentrated on Corinth as the objective
combined army,

for his own

based on his belief that the primary

strategic point existed "where several lines of
communications either intersect or meet."
to attack "the centre of [a line]
enemy,

Halleck planned

. . . occupied

by the

which he had indicated was at Corinth Junction in the

middle of the Confederate line,

extending from Decatur to

M e m p h i s ."
To guard against a threat

to his left flank at Corinth,

Halleck had instructed Grant on April
regiments by steamer

12th to send t v.o

"to Florence and destroy a portion of
g

the bridge there and return"

to Savannah.

Cutting

the bridge connection would have blocked one Confederate
route of retreat from Corinth and would also have blocked a.
suitable line of advance that might have been used
gamble to turn Halleck's force at Shiloh.
the Decatur bridge and T u s c u m b i a , Mitchel

But,

in a

by capturing

eliminated any

such possibility and provided an opportunity

for Halleck to

fall upon the Confederate position at Corinth.
captured the bridge for another reason besides

Mitchel
just securing

his position in northern Alabama.
Realizing the advantage to Union communications that
the Memphis and Charleston

Railroad provided, Mitchel

defended his left flank at Stevenson by blocking the enemy
with a destroyed bridge,

and pushed his other

flank to

Tuscumbia to link with the force fighting at Shiloh.

With

his position secured

behir.c the defensive barrier

the Tennessee River,

Mitchel sent a reconnaissance in force

towards Tuscumbia,
Florence

expecting "to capture Tuscumbia

formed by

and

. . . [and] open communications with the main body

of the army under

[Buell's]

command."^

With a

distance of only forty-two miles separating Savannah and
Florence,
overland

part of the main army could have moved by an
route cn good

roads or could have been transported
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on the river and reinforced Mitchel's troops at Tuscumbia.
Beauregard's central position at Corinth,

presented a flank

position to Mitchel as he created a gap in the Confederate
front and the Confederate army's right retreated towards
Corinth.

The constricted rebel front be:came more

concentrated,

and hence more powerful,

but it also became a

vulnerable position susceptible to a turning movement.
concentrating at Corinth,

the enemy withdrew

up the Memphis and Charleston

Railroad,

By

his front,

gave

and became more

logistically dependent on the Mobile and Olio Railroad.
Mitchel did not plan to attack the position at Corinth,
to inflict a turning movement, upon the Confederate
communications,

the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,

but

line of

below Corinth.

While the main Federal army occupied the attention of the
Confederates in front of Corinth,
troops from Halleck,

could have threatened or severed the

enemy's line of communications.
reinforcements,

Mitchel

would have damaged
However,

Mitchel with additional

could

Even without

threaten a serious raid that

Beauregard's communications.

Halleck feared the enemy,

situated

at Corinth

between Halleck's army and Mitchel's column at Tuscumbia,
would utilize his interior
strike at the other,

lines to hold one army at bay and

a classic Napoleon gambit.

A turning

movement was inconsistent with Halleck's belief in operating
on the enemy's central position.

Halleck thought in

strategic terms of attacking the enemy's center to sever
"the enemy's means of resistance,

and

. . . [enable]

the
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assailant

to strike,

with

the mass of his force,

upon the

dissevered and partially paralyzed members cf the hostile
body."^

In the Trans-Mississippi campaign,

he

indicated that "to operate on exterior lines against an
enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always
has failed,

in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.

condemned by every military authority,

It is

. . . unless each of

the exterior columns is superior to the e n e m y T h e
two Union columns v«/ere separated by the bend of the
Tennessee River,

but with superior river transport the river

provided a convenient

link.

Hal.leek could have used his

river transportation to transfer men
to Tuscumbia,

from Pittsburg landing

as had been planned and taken place on

numerous occasions to sever the Tennessee Ri.ver bridges.
Joined at Florence,

a combined movement by the Union

armies could have been accomplished unhindered by the
Confederates.

From a "bridge head" at Tuscumbia,

cperatiers

could have been directed upon the rear of the enemy at
Corinth.

Supported

by rail from Nashville

via Decatur,

by water via the Tennessee River to Tuscumbia,

a turning

movement, aimed at the enemy's line of communications
Mobi.le and Ohio Railroad)
capitulation,

retreat,

or placed them in a situation of

the capture cf Corinth,

successfully

(the

would have forced Confederate

having to attack to protect their co mimuni, cations.
objective,

and

Balleck's

would have been

completed, and forced an attack by the

Confederates to keep from being encircled and to prevent
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t.heir line of communications from being cut off.
Ordered to communicate

directly

Edwin M . Stanton in Washington,
plan for such a movement.
than 7,000 men,

1 2

Mi t che1 sent him a

he would advance promptly upon Tuscumbia

[at] Jacinto,

force and attack "the tear

on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,"

forty miles from Tuscumbia.

13

Including the detached

regiments at Fayetteville and Shelbyville
of communications,
effectives.

the Third

guarding his line

Division only had 8,782

Mitchel misjudged his superiors'

driving the enemy from Decatur and Tuscumbia.
"those places

of War

If his command consisted of more

with more than a reconnaissance
of the enemy

to Secretary

. . . would be promptly

force from the main army.

. . ."

reaction to
He had felt

occupied by a large

He complained to both

Stanton and Buell that the occupation of the two towns gave
the Union "the opportunity

of striking a fatal blow at the

Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the enemy's rear."
After the Federal army and navy

14

had failed for months

either to destroy or capture the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad

bridges over the Tennessee,

Mitchel captured and

held one of the two remaining bridges with the connecting
rail line.

He thought that the Memphis and Charleston

Railroad could provide a solution to the stalemate
the: Federal armies after Shiloh,

but both Ha 11 eck and Buell

only thought about direct attacks against
positions i.ri their front.
from the battlefield

facing

the enemy-

When the Confederates retreated

to entrenched positions around Corinth,
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Union armies cautiously and sluggishly moving towards
Corinth applied unsuccessful

flanking movements within the

confined area near the bend of the Tennessee River.
With Memphis and Charleston Railroad operational in his
rear, Mitchel proposed to use the road as his line of
communications
movement.

from Decatur to Tuscumbia to support the

With the bridge intact at Decatur,

his line of

communications radiated northward via the Nashville and
Decatur and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroads.

Gaps

in these could be repaired and provisions supplemented by
transport up the Tennessee River to Tuscumbia.
Tennessee River could have supplied a large

The

force sent in

support to impliment Mitchel's turning movement.

The waters

normally were deep enough to allow river traffic up to
Tuscumbia,

where Buell had transported

100,000 rations

Mitchel's division on the 22nd of April.
was planned later in May,
advance

depot,

for

When the move east

Eastport had been designated an

so there was adequate water transport and the

river was high enough to permit supplying a large army near
Tuscumbia for Mitchel's turning movement.
"opening

. . . [overland]

communications

General Buell," were delayed,

however,

His hopes of
directly with

when Turchin found

that the Confederates had destroyed the bridge at
Florence.^

However,

this only eliminated

the most

expedient means of moving reinforcements across the
Tennessee River

from Columbia and Savannah to Tuscumbia.

There were still operational ferries and river transports
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available until the bridge could be repaired.

Troops could

also be transported from Nashville by the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad and the Nashville ard Decatur Railroad
and cross at Decatur.
Apprehensive about

the enterprise to take Tuscumbia,

Buell bid cautionary words of advice to Mitchel.
explained that with the Florence

Buell

bridge destroyed,

Mitchel's

only avenue of retreat if attacked was to fall back toward
Decatur,

where the bridge was still intact,

and employ the

Memphis and Charleston Railroad to move further east.

Even

with the possibility of Mitchel's extended force being cut
off,

Buell deferred

judgement,

permitting Mitchel to hold

the position at Tuscumbia as an outpost.
to regulations,

16

According

outpost duty was designed to provide advance

warning of the approach of an enemy.

However,

not only secure an army against surprise,

it "should

but also be so

arranged as to enable the outposts t.o avoid an engagement
and not be enveloped by an e n e m y . " * /
capture Huntsville,

Decatur,

Mitchel did not

and Tuscumbia in order to

devote his energy to sit on the defense.
the war to the enemy,
rescue

[the]

destruction."

with

He wanted to take

"the only object

. . . [to]

unhappy country from threatened
18

Halleck agreed

hold Tuscumbia as an outpost,

to allow Mitchel

but stipulated

to

that Mitchel

maintain his main force north of the Tennessee
d •
R
i v e r .19

No doubt the instruction to have the Third Division
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remain on the north bank was a precautionary measure against
any enemy counter move that might have cut the division off
from its escape route.

As an outpost position,

Tuscumbia

could give invaluable advance warning to both Hal leek, and
Mitchel.

Such an outpost could

indicate the route of a

retreating enemy from Corinth,

warn of a rebel turning

movement upon Halleck's

or inform Halleck of an enemy

movement on Nashville

force,

from south of the river.

similarly used the outpost to warn of enemy

Mitchel

threats against

his vulnerable position south of the river and to detect any
attempt to retake control of the strategic bridge at
Decatur.

However,

by delegating only a defensive role for

the Third Division,

Buell confused the situation for

Mitchel,

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as a

eliminated

line for offensive operations,
advantage

and removed

for defensive concentration.

In the second week in April,

the railroad's

20

1862, Mitchel provided the

opening for an indirect attack upon the enemy at Corinth by
moving troops to Tuscumbia,
But Mitchel received

only forty miles from Jacinto.

contradictory

to destroy the bri.dge at Decatur,

orders,

first from Buell

and then from Buell and

Halleck to hold the position at Tuscumbia.

The Decatur and

Florence bridges had been treated in previous communiques as
primary

strategic objectives for disrupting the enemy's line

of communications or for preventing an enemy

retreat from

Tennessee.

Mitchel did disrupt the Confederate trunk line

rail route,

not temporarily by destroying one or more
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bridges,

as the Federal navy had failed to do,

but

permanently by occupation of the land between Tuscumbia and
Stevenson.

Mitchel acknowledged Buell's order to burn the

Decatur bridge on the 20th of April,

but argued that he

should maintain his position from Tuscumbia to Decatur in
order to use the bridge in future offensive operations or to
keep a line of communications open with the main army.

"I

have seized and hold the railroad from Decatur to Tuscumbia
in the hope of opening communication with the main body
under your command

. . . but with so small a force no amount

of vigilance or activity is sufficient to protect so long a
line."

However,

"if the enemy retreat from Corinth I deem

it a matter of the utmost moment that I should hold my
present position,

which commands this whole section of the

.
M 21
country.

Buell's order

for the destruction of the bridge was

contrary to Halleck's wishes.

Answering an inquiry as to

why Mitchel was ordered to destroy the bridge, Halleck told
Lincoln that he knew of no such order,
[Mitchel]
enemy."

22

has saved some

[bridges]

"on the contrary,

which were

fired by the

Mitchel expessed to Chase his concern and

confusion about the burning of the bridges.

"I now hold

[the] Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Tuscumbia to
Stevenson," he wrote,
bridges.

"but am now ordered

I do not comprehend the order,

early as I can."

to burn the
but must obey it as

Mitchel felt that the "entire line ought

to be occupied," instead of abandoned.

23
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Still at Shiloh,

Buell inquired of Mitchel about the

status of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad,
looked to it as his line of operations
on Chattanooga.

for he

for a possible move

Buell discounted an advance by the Federal

forces along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

insisting

that Mitchel destroy "the Decatur bridge as soon as
should leave it."

2 A

However,

[he]

Mitchel realized the

strategic importance of the Decatur bridge.
of two crossings of the Tennessee River,

It provided one

and was part of the

only Union-controlled continuous railroad link between the
west and as far as Bridgeport on the east.

Any move by

Halleck's army east towards Chattanooga could only be
mounted along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
served as a direct line of operations.

which

The success or

failure of a Union advance through northern Alabama hinged
upon the maintenance and control of the Decatur Bridge.

The

Tennessee River could not act as a line of communication
that far east because of the Muscle Shoals obstruction to
river traffic.

The advantage of concentration along the

Memphis and Charleston Railroad and those railroads linked
to it,

belonged to the Union army,

but it depended on the

condition of the two bridges over the Tennessee River to
provide a continuous line of communications.

Damage to the

Howe Bridge at Bridgeport meant the Union concentration
aimed at splitting the Confederacy must stop short of
Chattanooga.

The Federal

line of communications still

existed in a disjointed fashion via the Nashville and
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Chattanooga Railroad,
and

the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,

the limited access up the Tennessee River.
However,

the destruction of the Decatur Bridge meant

that the Union armies could not move east expeditiously.

It

also meant that the main army could be cut off from central
Tennessee and be isolated south of the river.

The advantage

of interior lines that Mitchel gained for the Union armies
by capturing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad would also
be negated.
this point,

The river,

which was eight hundred feet wide at

impeded any north-south movement without the

intact railroad bridge at Decatur.
Mitchel analyzed his predicament and knew all of the
advantages of keeping the bridge intact and under Union
control,

but he also understood the devastating impact the

bridge would have on Union fortunes if it reverted intact to
the Confederates.

Intact,

the Decatur Bridge opened Middle

Tennessee and Kentucky to reoccupation by the South,

with

the potential of following the rail line almost unopposed,
except for Mitchel's
Louisville,

forces,

all the way to Nashville,

and the Ohio River.

intact bridge to change hands.

Mitchel could not allow the
If his superiors did not

want the advantage of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
he was prepared to destroy it if he had to withdraw.
Not only was his position secured in northern Alabama,
but Mitchel had trains running regularly along the section
of track between Bellefonte and J o nesborough.

After

capturing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

complete with
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the means to operate it, Mitchel gained the advantage of
concentration over his front of operations.

Controlling a

line of 120 miles would have been impossible without the
railroad,

for with it the Third Division possessed

capability to shift its meager
Decatur,

Huntsville,

the

force between Tuscumbia,

and Bridgeport.

With sixteen engines

and a proportional number of cars, Mitchel enjoyed the means
of operating on internal lines even over such an extended
position as northern Alabama.
the railroad,

Mitchel admitted that without

it would have been impossible to hold the

region for one d a y .^ ^

It would have been difficult to

extend throughout northern Alabama so quickly,
secure the area;

by the same token,

and later to

Mitchel could not have

successfully resisted a determined Confederate attack on
either of his flanks if the intact Memphis and Charleston
Railroad had not given him interior lines.
railroad,

Mitchel had the capability

Because of the

for defensive

concentration and therefore the ability to reinforce a
threatened flank.
To bolster his forward position,
regiments,

Mitchel ordered two

one at Shelbyville and the other at Fayetteville,

to reinforce the bridge guard at Decatur and to provide
support to Turchin at Tuscumbia. 2 6)
Mitchel's request for additional
conditional

Upon receiving

troops,

Buell gave

permission to "call together all the force that

can possibly be spared from the roads and the neighborhood
of Nashville,"

but only if he had to fall back on
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Shelbyville.

The two cavalry regiments between Columbia and

Savannah and the two infantry regiments at Columbia were not
to be removed,

while the force near Murfreesborough was to

be reduced only after the enemy had committed itself to
attacking Mitchel's defenses in middle Tennessee.
Buell would not be able to send reinforcements

27

from Corinth

because of the lack of transportation and because the route
over which the men would travel would expose them to
interception.

Since Buell felt that sending Mitchel troops

from Halleck's position in front of Corinth would weaken
Halleck,

he promised Mitchel three other regiments from Ohio

and one from Louisville,

which were to replace the older

regiments for needed r e s t . ^
The men promised Mitchel came too late,

as the

Confederates applied pressure on Turchin's Brigade at
Tuscumbia and forced Mitchel to withdraw his outpost back
towards Decatur.

Mitchel did not receive any reinforcements

for his proposed turning maneuver,
own position south of the river.

or even for holding his
He was compelled to defend

his position by retiring behind the Tennessee River barrier,
and that required him to destroy the Decatur bridge.

The

advantage Mitchel had realized by capturing the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad intact went unused by his superiors,
resulting in a loss of interior lines of communications
between the main army central Tennessee.
destroyed the Decatur bridge,

Mitchel therefore

constricted his lines,

turned his attention from the west and to the east.

t

and
Perhaps
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Chattanooga would offer Mitchel the same opportunity to
disrupt enemy communications that Corinth had provided.
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CHAPTER VI

MITCHEL'S LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

By not receiving any supporting encouragement to hold
his position south of the Tennessee River,

nor to enter a

joint operation from the main army at Corinth for a turning
movement,
bridge.

Mitchel had no option but to destroy the Decatur
After securing his right flank by eliminating the

bridge, Mitchel attempted an unsupported advance towards
Chattanooga through his position at Stevenson.

Mitchel

found that his difficulties in the offensive eastward were
derived from the neglect of his superiors,
moves of the enemy,

the threatening

and the difficulty in maintaining an

adequate supply of provisions and forage for his division.
Nevertheless,

Mitchel's unsuccessful operation illustrates

the problem of an army that relies on rail communications
when those lines are disrupted,
water transport.

and must revert to wagon and

The contrast between traditional military

communications and rail communications underscores the
limitations of wagon and water in supporting a large,
concentrated force.
The lesson may be applied to Mitchel,

for his logistics

did not adequately translate his well conceived strategy
into a viable turning movement on Chattanooga.
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The notion
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of disrupting the Western and Atlantic Railroad was sound,
but could not be implemented successfully without more
complete rail communications.

Mitchel displayed ingenuity

in supplying the forces at hand with limited means,
could not have supported

but he

the additional manpower needed to

interrupt Confederate communications

south of Chattanooga.

After occupying northern Alabama,

the Third Division

experienced a supply problem which resulted from a number of
factors.

While actual starvation never confronted the

division because of Mitchel's successful efforts to maintain
its line of communications,

the logistical

question

complicated the occupation and limited future operations.
Until a greater emphasis was placed on Mitchel's operations
by his superiors,

his role became religated

to a holding

action due to his small force and inadequate communications.
The Third Division's route of march from Nashville to
Huntsville was through the richest agricultural area of the
Confederacy,

but as it moved south the land was increasingly

oriented toward cotton production.^

The natural

invasion corridor had provided some of the best pasture and
grain fields in Tennessee.

While past harvests had

indicated the potential of the fertile fields of Tennessee
and had prompted Union army occupation to deny that source
to the Confederacy,

the immediate concern to Mitchel was in

getting food for his troops and animals.
At Nashville,

the division obtained its last sufficient

supply of provisions from captured stores,

the Louisville

t
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and Nashville Railroad,

and the Cumberland River.

occurred at the end of February 1862,

That

but when the division

departed for Murfreesborough on the 18th of March without
establishing its communications across the Cumberland River
at Nashville,

the Third Division hauled supplies forward by

wagon from Nashville

for ten days,

while delayed at

Murfreesborough reconstructing the Stones River bridges.
Beginning on April third,

the final route of

seventy-eight miles from Murfreesborough to Huntsville
passed over rugged terrain and crossed numerous creeks and
rivers.
hills,

The terrain consisted of flat ground to rolling
interspersed with broken and rocky country.

For

twenty-five miles the route from Shelbyville to Fayetteville
became curvy and rugged,

with rapidly rising terrain as it

cut through narrow pasture lands isolated by heavy woods and
meadows.

The last twenty-eight miles,

Huntsville,

from Fayetteville to

showed more intensive cultivation on either side

of the road for one or two miles as the terrain flattened.
Closer to Huntsville,
while to the east,
town,
d
•
River

farm lands continued west to Decatur,

beginning with a small hill north of

a ridge line ran north-south to the Tennessee
.2
For his plan to succeed, Mitchel had to force march his

men to ensure tactical surprise.
Division moved on Huntsville

the Third

from Fayetteville without the

usual cumbersome supply train.
march,

Therefore,

To speed the pace of the

the men fed from their haversacks and confiscated

163

provisions along their route of inarch.
middle Tennessee in early spring,
harvest season,

Marching through

however,

prior to the

the Third Division found the region lacking

abundant food or fodder.

The

1861 harvest was already

consumed by the populace and by the Confederates

during

their occupation, and when the enemy army retreated its
troops attempted to destroy their accumulated stores
they had done at Bowling Green,

Nashville,

just as

and

Murfreesborough.
Mitchel needed those stocks of provisions and forage to
keep his army moving and to maintain its ability to fight,
or he had to ensure that his line of communications could
make up the difference.

In order to keep the soldier

healthy,

the 1862 U. S. Army ration provided the required
3
3,000 calories per day.
Meat and bread supplied

almost all of the nutrition,

as three-quarter pounds of pork

or one and one-quarter pounds of salted or fresh beef gave
the soldier approximately

1,200 calories while twenty-two

ounces of fresh baked bread or sixteen ounces of "hard tack"
supplied another
sugar,

vinegar,

1,600 calories.
molasses,

Beans,

rice,

coffee,

and salt rounded out the soldier's

ration and together with the meat and bread totalled
4
calories.
Marching rations were even more bland.
In addition to a normal ration of meat,
salt,

coffee,

it included ten pieces of "hard tack."

two and one-quarter

pounds,

three and one-eighth pounds,

compared

3,200

sugar,

and

While weighing

to a normal ration of

the marching ration still
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provided the daily caloric requirement.
Horses and mules required a daily forage ration of hay
and grain.

Horses were authorized

and twelve pounds of oats,

corn,

fourteen pounds of hay

or barley and mules

normally received fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of
assorted

grains.As

previously mentioned,

a U. S.

Army wagon carried Various commodities weighing an average
of 2,000 pounds over most common dirt roads.
To supply that essential

3,000 calories,

original line of communication

Mitchel's

followed his route of march

from Murfreesborough to Huntsville.

He also employed part

of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from Nashville to
Wartrace over the bridges he reconstructed

at

Murfreesborough in March,

1862.

connected to Shelbyville,

which Mitchel intended using as a

depot,

From Wartrace a rail line

sending accumulated supplies from there

road through Fayetteville to Hu n t s v i l l e .^

by the pike

In order

to keep his line of communications intact, Mitchel

left a

regiment at Fayetteville and one at Shelbyville to protect
the turnpike bridges over the Duck and Elk Rivers.
Mitchel's earlier prediction that he could "laugh at
railroad communication

. . . and supply my army with my

regimental teams," became more difficult to fulfill than he
expected due to rainy weather and the rough terrain.

The

fifty-seven mile journey from Shelbyville to Huntsville
required one hundred and ten wagons per day to feed the
Third Division.

There were seventy-five to eighty wagons in
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the division train,

and by using the regimental wagons this

method of transporting supplies appeared practicable in good
weather.

However,

provisions,

if he used most of the wagons to haul

then wagons

for hauling forage around Huntsville

or for other contingencies,
baggage,

cooking gear,

such as transport for regimental

ammunition,

for the expeditions to Tuscumbia,

or medical supplies,
Decatur,

or

and Stevenson,

would be unavailable or in limited number.^
As noted,

the rugged terrain with steep inclines

between Shelbyville and Fayetteville strained the draft
animals and limited the weight of the cargo.

Rain also

hindered wagon transportation as it muddied or washed out
the roads, which in turn burdened the movement and
necessitated a lighter load for the animals to pull.
Mitchel feared "the heavy rains now falling will render the
streams between

[Huntsville]

and Fayetteville impassable,"

and a fortnight after the occupation of Huntsville,
found "it impossible to feed

[the]

Mitchel

division from Shelbyville
g

without the aid of all

[the] regimental trains."

As the Third Division's line of communications
disruption due to natural causes,
trains from Fayetteville

faced

Mitchel rerouted the wagon

via Madison Cross Roads to Athens

and arranged the transfer of their cargo to railroad cars
9
for the rest of the trip to Huntsville.
Mitchel had attained his objective of severing the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

not by destroying the

Bridgeport bridge as he had planned,

but by capturing intact
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the entire length of the road from Tuscumbia to Stevenson.
He had been successful in reaching his goal with such a
limited force because his division did not have to fight its
way forward and simply moved into the void left by the
evacuation of Confederate forces for concentration at
Corinth.

In assuming a position from which to disrupt or

threaten the Confederate line of communications
and Ohio Railroad)

he had provided an attainable solution to

the stalemate at Corinth.
receiving reinforcements
Corinth,

(the Mobile

But,

without any prospects of

from the combined armies around

the Third Division's advance reverted to a

defensive deployment.
Unable to destroy the Howe Bridge at Bridgeport,
on the left flank,

had prevented the Confederates

Sill,

from

gaining access to the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and
threatening Mitchel's rear.
Decatur,

In conjunction with the move to

that temporary diversion allowed Mitchel to shift

additional force to the division's right flank and advance
on Tuscumbia with the intention of threatening Corinth,
in the hope of receiving support from the main army.

and

The

necessity for protecting key places along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad gave the division the ability to forage
as a deployed f o r c e . ^ The division held the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad without any support for an
uncontested two weeks in April,

but after Shiloh the

Confederates put pressure on that part of the line from
Tuscumbia to Decatur,

which altered the Third Division's
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position.

Mitchel had a two-fold purpose when he ordered Turchin
forward to Tuscumbia.

Besides proposing a turning movement,

Mitchel opened an alternate line of communications based on
river transportation.

12

Because the Tennessee River

could not be navigated by boats of deep draft above the
Muscle Shoals,

Tuscumbia became an important link between

water and railroad communications.

If the river fell below

normal levels then transports were kept below Eastport,
approximately thirty miles downstream from
Tuscumbia.

13

On the twenty-second

of April,

1862,

Buell responded to

a request for supplies by Colonel Turchin,
transports loaded with
Tuscumbia.

14

and sent two

100,000 rations up river to

These rations apparently presented a

strong temptation to the concentrated Confederate army at
Corinth,

which was also having subsistence problems.

Turchin's command had been threatened with encirclement at
Tuscumbia due to the Confederate attempt to intercept the
rations before they could be transported to
Huntsville.^

Mitchel ordered that the stores be

unloaded at Florence on the north side of the river,
order was not r e c e i v e d . I n s t e a d ,

but the

Turchin had

already transported the provisions on an abandoned
locomotive and two flat cars to Town Creek.

Meanwhile

Mitchel sent part of his reserve from Decatur to strengthen
the force guarding the road from Decatur to the burnt bridge
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and to protect

the transfer of those r a t i o n s . ^

the destroyed bridge,

At

the rations were loaded onto "wagons

levied from the citizens,

[carried]

to the terminus of our

railroad on the other side," then reloaded onto railroad
cars from Huntsville and sent by rail to the commissary at
Camp J a c k s o n . ^
Realizing that Turchin's predicament resulted

from lack

of adequate manpower to cover his entire line, Mitchel
pleaded for more troops,

arguing that the line occupied by

the Third Division was "one of vast importance,
heavier

force is required for its defense and

protection."

19

reported that
Memphis.

and a

20

On the 25th of April,

Turchin

10,000 Confederates were advancing from

Mitchel echoed that warning and relayed

his decision to Buell.

"The enemy threatening to surround us

at Tuscumbia," Mitchel

wrote,

"we have fallen

Jones b o r o u g h , on the hither side of

back to

[Town Creek]

...

as

you attach little importance to the occupying of Tuscumbia
and the south side of the river beyond Decatur I have
decided quietly to withdraw my troops to the north side of
the river,
bridge."

21

and will then destroy the [Decatur]
Buell had ordered Mitchel to burn the

bridge on the 19th of April,

but Mitchel disagreed with the

order and ignored it until he had exhausted means to obtain
support for his forward movement from both his immediate
commanders and from civilian leaders in Washington.
27th of April,

however,

after repeated appeals for

On the
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reinforcements to hold the Decatur to Tuscumbia line and
secure the Decatur Bridge in order to provide a continuous
line of communications across the Tennessee River, Mitchel
reported to Buell that "the bridge at Decatur is
d e stroyed."

22

Mitchel lost his possible railroad communications with
the main army by destroying the Decatur bridge,
left with no other option.

but he was

The division was isolated and

had to fend for itself since Buell offered no
re-enforcements and granted no cooperation from the
regiments guarding Mitchel's line of communications,

and

Mitchel was threatened by the Confederates on the Memphis
and Charleston line.

As mentioned,

Mitchel had kept such a

disproportionate part of his force to guard the Decatur
bridge in order to prevent it from reverting to Confederate
control.

Without any other alternative,

he was forced to

withdraw his command to the north bank of the Tennessee
River and protect his right flank by destroying the bridge.
He feared the effect of the abandonment of his line because
he knew the importance of his position,

if ever a

contemplated move east towards Chattanooga was to take
place.

23

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad

provided a favorable line of operations
offensive against Chattanooga,

for such an

for it permitted transfer of

men and supplies from Halleck's army to Stevenson and supply
by the feeder routes via the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad,

and the Tennessee
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River.

The two railroads had gaps due to downed bridges,

but Mitchel expected
days.

that they would be closed in a few

Mitchel accepted the limited loss of territory south

of the river as a defensive move placing the river
between his forces and the enemy,

barrier

while keeping the

important Memphis and Charleston Railroad as a line of
operations for the main army and as an internal line of
communications

for his division.

Division became more secure,
a constricted

In withdrawing,

but confronted

the Third

the problems of

stationary force in consuming the limited

resources of the area around Huntsville and in maintaining
the logistical connection from Nashville

(see map 6).

Still searching for a complete and secure line of
communications,

Mitchel suggested that supplies could be

transported by steamer to Florence as had the 100,000
rations,

but then transferred to wagons and hauled in two

days to Athens over roads north of the river by way of
Rogerville and then by rail to Huntsville.

24

He

pointed out that his "line now extends westward by rail to
Athens and

. . . my communication with the main army remains

unchanged,

while I am relieved from any apprehensions on my

right."

25

Having to keep north of the river

Athens and Florence,
railroad

between

Mitchel only lost the advantage of the

from Tuscumbia to Decatur.

With intact railroad

communications from Athens along the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad,
train.

the supplies could still come into Huntsville

by
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Map 6.
Lines of communications and plan for Chattanooga.
Source. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas, 2 vols
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Maps 74 and 75.
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In anticipation of the new link through Athens, Mitchel
sent the Eighteenth Ohio to secure the railroad terminus and
positioned cavalry scouts along the road north of the river
to Florence.

He posted men on the river at Bainbridge and

Lambs Ferry to watch for Confederates troops or cavalry
attempting to cross.

26

In an attempt to reopen the

link to the main army, Mitchel subtly offered the support of
his division,

which could have marched back along the same

roads over which he hoped to be resupplied.

Remembering the

100,000 rations sent to Tuscumbia in mid-April,
indicated on June 3rd,

Buell

that Mitchel could again receive

supplies by that route,

since the Army of the Ohio was

moving in Mitchel's direction and likewise needed
supplies.

27

Most of the supplies of the Army of the

Ohio were coming by the Tennessee River,

and were delivered

at Eastport and Tuscumbia.
Having his interior lines "made as perfect as
practicable" along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
between Decatur and Stevenson,
a printed time-table;
action,

with "regular trains running,

a splendid machine-shop in full

and all the railroad offices in complete order,"

Mitchel did not fear the enemy,

either

Decatur.

locomotives,

With his "very swift"

from Chattanooga or
Mitchel had the

ability to shift men and supplies from one threatened flank
to the other after being notified of danger over his
completed telegraph lines.

28

Instead, Mitchel

worried about control of that "long railroad line,

. . . the
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great distances separating
provisions and forage,

[his]

troops,

the scarcity of

. . . the immense distance to haul,

and the rains and floods."

29

Mitchel retreated above the river to a position where
the land produced marginal subsistence crops.

In a cotton

growing region an abundant supply of corn or grasses was not
expected.
[and]

30

There was "little surplus of corn

planters

forage,

fodder,

consumption."
which,

31

[were]

.

satisfied if they raise[d]

corn,

and hay for their own
The

1861 harvest

had been poor,

combined with the retreating Confederate army

transversing the area and "levying upon the people,
supplies less than normal."

As Judge G. W. Lane,

pro-Union citizen of Huntsville,
later,

made the

a

revealed just a few months

"the Confederate army passed right through the

valley,

and levied contributions during the two weeks they

were there."

32

However,

advancing Federal army,

under pressure from the
and attempting to concentrate at

Corinth in March and early April,

the retreating

Confederates had failed to gather in all the available
forage or subsistence when they moved through the area.
many places
corn,
1861."

. . . [were]

and sometimes hay,
33

"In

found the greatest abundance of
sometimes oats,

of the crop of

Rather than a deficiency of forage,

"the

corn crop seemed to be pretty good around the country about
Huntsville,
found]

and

. . . more corn than

. . . expected

in portions of Tennessee and Alabama."

3A

[was

Generally,
fodder

the Third Division found more stored grain and

from the 1861 crop than anticipated,

which supplied

their needs because the 1862 crop would not be harvested
until late summer.
For human consumption,

little wheat had been grown in

the area and most breadstuffs and meat products were
imported from Kentucky and Tennessee
commencement of hostilities.
because,

35

prior to the

Cattle were scarce

"the preparation of cotton required that the land

should be well pulverized,

and if stock is allowed to run

upon the land in the winter and in the spring the ground
breaks up into clods."

Plantation owners therefore avoided

raising more stock than required for self-sufficiency,
as working oxen and milk cows.

36

However,

such

during

the last ten years the farmers raised more hogs and had
decreased their dependency on outside sources for bacon.
"They used to raise cotton to buy bacon
Tennessee]," Lane noted,
upon their plantations."

[from Kentucky and

"but now they raise other supplies
37

Mitchel made the decision to lessen the impact of his
occupation upon the population by limiting requistion of
consumable commodities

from the inhabitants,

but this

practice made him dependent on his line of communications
for provisions

for his men,

while subsisting on the country

and requisitioning from the populace to supply the necessary
forage.
February,

General Order
1862,

#13a,

issued by Buell on the 26th of

set guidelines for the behavior of Union
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soldiers and their relationship to the citizens of the
invaded states.

It forbade soldiers plundering for food and

stipulated that "if the necessities of the public service
should require the use of private property for public
purposes fair compensation is to be allowed."

38

Mitchel reiterated the order by issuing his own General
Order #81, which forbade "all plundering or pillaging or
depredation upon property of any kind."

39

Mitchel

directed that supplies were to be "derived partly from the
Government headquarters at Nashville;

partly by foraging

upon the country and pressing supplies,"
populace.^

Mitchel insisted

provisions or forage
properly made out,

that "whenever

[had] been taken,

[were]

from the

and the accounts,

certified by the proper officer,

these accounts will be paid promptly by the
qu a r t e r m a s t e r .
Huntsville

Accordingly,

the inhabitants of

did not suffer from wanton destruction committed

under Mitchel's command except in isolated cases.
Destitution was avoided,
complained constantly.

although the civilian population
Supplies of forage were also

procured from the inhabitants with restitution made in Union
money,

but Mitchel did not "draw supplies

if [he] could help it."

from the country

In fact even though the forage

trains were out gathering supplies daily,
did not draw all it could.

A2

the Third

Division

Forage parties and

wagon trains did travel up to seventeen miles

from

Huntsville to gather enough feed for the division's animals
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because the cultivated land around Huntsville was oriented
towards the west,

between Huntsville and Decatur.

Following Buell's dictate,

A3

Mitchel primarily

requisitioned forage for his animals from the citizens.
Under advice from Judge George W. Lane,
aquaintance and Union sympathizer,
heavy "contributions,"

a personal

Mitchel did not levy very

but obtained "his supplies as well as

he could from the army stores in Tennessee
contributions

for the forage entirely."

confiscate provisions
•
great scarcity of . .

. . . He levied

He did not

from the people because "there was a
meat.

11A A

Mitchel worried about maintaining his line of
communications because he could refrain from imposing heavy
food levies upon the local people only so long as the line
remained open.
Shelbyville,

Swollen rivers and streams had closed the

Fayetteville,

and Huntsville route,

and without

a permanent connection with the main army at Corinth or
promise of any detached support to aid in holding the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

the two railroads trailing

from the division's flanks and intersecting at Nashville
were his last two possibilities.
Tennessee River

fell in May,

The waters of the

which limited the access of

boats to Eastport and forced a road trip by wagon of
seventy-five miles from Athens to Waterloo across from
Eastport,

an unrealistic endeavor since the forage consumed

by the draft animals would displace much of the net cargo
and a great many wagons would have to be employed to keep a
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constant and adequate supply of provisions available.

The

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad was not a reliable line
of supply because the Confederates had occupied Stevenson
and even when driven out they still applied pressure upon
the line.

In addition,

the Confederates had cavalry forces

in the Cumberland Mountains in support of their infantry
from Bridgeport to McMinnville,

and there threatened the

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and destroyed numerous
bridges which disrupted it as a line of
communications.^

The line had to be cleared of any

menacing guerrilla activity before it could be secured.
Therefore,

the

Nashville and Decatur Railroad became

the only maintainable link with the Nashville depot.
a single tracked road operating on a line
Nashville to Decatur,
east to west,

It was

120 miles from

and crossing two major rivers flowing

the Duck and Elk,

which intersected the

railroad at Columbia and near Elkton.

Some of the bridges

on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad had been put out of
commission when the rebels retreated toward Corinth in
March.

As a result,

before Mitchel's occupation a

forty-five mile gap in the line already existed because of
downed bridges at Columbia and near Elkton.

Because Mitchel

did not have control of the rear echelon forces at Columbia,
insufficient
bridges,

guards were posted to protect other minor

the destruction of which further inhibited a

continuous line of communications.

Up to the middle of May,

Buell kept tight control of the troops in Mitchel's rear
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through James Negley's command at Columbia,

where two

infantry and two cavalry regiments protected the Nashville
and Decatur Railroad to Pulaski.

Colonel Henry M. Duffield

held Murfreesborough with the Ninth Michigan,
Kentucky,

Hewett's Artillery,

Eighth

and parts of the Seventh

Pennsylvania and Fourth Kentucky cavalry.

Buell held in

reserve the Sixty-ninth Ohio and Third Minnesota at
Nashville and promised Mitchel that four other regiments
were being sent from Ohio and Lou i s v i l l e .
Buell restricted the use of those troops to the
contingency of an enemy break through at Stevenson.
Likewise,

the cavalry posted between Savannah and Columbia

"should not be removed from there if it can be
avoided."^

Buell's subordinates guarding Mitchel's

rear line of communications were indecisive and naturally
looked to Buell for guidance.

Asked by Mitchel to complete

telegraph communications from Decatur to Columbia and to
send a regiment to Shelbyville and one to Murfreesborough to
release his own regiment for duty at Tuscumbia and
Stevenson,

Negley requested Buell to "advise

troops to guard the road;
please."

48

instruct me fully,

[him] as to the
if you

When Mitchel indicated to Duffield at

Murfreesborough that "I must depend upon you to send forward
troops immediately to hold Wartrace and Shelbyville.
regiment must come forward,
supplies," Duffield

My

even if I give up my line of

sent off a dispatch to Buell

to confirm

the verbal orders that he was "to reinforce Mitchel promptly
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if attacked.
done?" 4 9

No orders to relieve him.

What shall be

Buell was under the impression that his

disposition of troops in Middle Tennessee was "absolutely
necessary for its defense and to support Mitchel,"

but by

directing his entire command from the Shiloh battlefield he
became out of touch with Mitchel's command in northern
Alabama and was not aware of the s i t u a t i o n . ^
Mitchel finally received control of the troops
line of communications on the 7th of May,

guarding his

but by that time

he had already constricted his line to Decatur,

and

destroyed the b r i d g e . ^
Because of the failure to establish any other secure
line of communications,

however,

week of occupation in April,

Mitchel had by his first

1862,

planned on using his

wagons to bridge the railroad gap between Columbia and
Elkton.

When the Third Division fell back to the north side

of the river, Mitchel posted the Eighteenth Ohio to secure
Athens and cover any movement by the Confederates across the
river south of Decatur.

By maintaining control of the

Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

Mitchel had communications

established to its junction with the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad at Decatur.

To haul supplies and provisions

between the ends of the gap in the railroad,

Mitchel

employed his division's transportation to move from Elkton
to Columbia over the turnpike.

52

Using a

combination of rail and wagon, Mitchel established this line
as a very realistic and suitable alternative to the
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Shelbyville,

Fayetteville,

and Huntsville route until such

time as the entire Nashville and Decatur Railroad could be
put back in working order.

In hopes of making the

Elkton-Columbia turnpike his makeshift line of
communications,

he reminded to Negley at Columbia that a

loaded wagon train could carry about five days'

rations for

10,000 men and that he requested rations be forwarded to
Columbia.

53

Mitchel expected that seventy-eight

wagons would be required and thus set in motion this
temporary measure,

but "wish[ed]

it were possible to open

the railway by rebuilding the bridges" between Columbia and
Elk River,

which "would enable me to feed my troops without

difficulty." ^ ^
Considering

that a wagon carried approximately 2,000

pounds of supplies,

including forage rations for the trip,

and that the horses pulled the wagons about two and one half
miles per hour,
were delivered
Elkton.^"*

then approximately

118,600 pounds of rations

by each wagon train from Columbia to

Transferred to box and flat cars,

the

rations were then carried on the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to
Huntsville and S t e v e n s o n . ^

The delay in initiating

a wagon train relay would have been around six days,
time it took to get the wagons to Columbia,
returned to Elkton,

the

loaded, and

but the Turchin expedition to Tuscumbia

and the temporary line of communications with the main army
by river had delivered

100,000 rations that arrived at
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Huntsville on April

24th and filled the d e f i ciency . ^

On reaching Huntsville, Mitchel initially demanded that
the mayor persuade the local citizens to supply provisions
for the troops temporarily because the wagon train had not
kept pace with the division from Shelbyville.

5 8

Then the provision train hauled rations from Shelbyville
until the rains and the terrain forced the discontinuance of
that route.

The ten days'

worth of rations delivered by

boat at Florence provided an interim supply,

until Mitchel

started the wagon trains hauling rations between railheads
at Columbia and Elkton.

Each wagon train load could deliver

roughly 37,950 full rations,

good for almost four days,

eight days on half rations.

But, as the bridges were

or

reconstructed along the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,
first at Columbia,
provisions

the distance the wagons had to haul

decreased,

and with the decrease less forage was

needed to feed the draft animals on the route of
march.

59

The distance shrank from forty-five to

thirty-five miles between Lynnville and Elkton and the
number of rations

delivered increased to 40,615.

Lynnville bridge closed the gap,
two days,

Once the

the mules made the trip in

covering the twenty-three mile distance

from

Reynold's Station to Elkton and delivering approximately
81,230 r a t i o n s . ^
However,

there were times when the Third Division had

to subsist on half rations due to failure of supplies to
reach Columbia,

or to roving bands of Confederate cavalry
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who intercepted a ladened wagon train,
to tough it out.

but the men appeared

While plundering was a punishable offense

and officers were held accountable

for their men,

some

unauthorized confiscation of provisions took place.
Other

factors also alleviated the food situation,

which

might have forced the army to withdraw from the region,
might have led to wholesale pillaging.

or

Because the

Confederates were committed to the defense of the junction
at Corinth,

they were unable to release the large

force that

would have been necessary to position it across the Third
Division's

line of communications,

which would have required

Mitchel's troops to fight on the tactical offensive to
extricate themselves

from their position,

for they were

totally dependent on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad for
their subsistence.

The situation was also ameliorated by

the fact that at three and one-eighth pounds,

the ordinary

army ration was not normally totally consumed by a "soldier
in full health," which permitted half-rations to be endured.
Most soldiers did not show evidence of "pinching hunger"
when on half-r a t i o n s , even though they complained about not
getting their

full s h a r e . ^

The men also got along

with a sufficient supply of "green corn and a few
vegetables,"

obtained by means of requisition.

62

Mitchel's subsistence problems were reduced further by
his intact interior lines.

Besides giving a strategic

benefit in permitting movement of a regiment rapidly from
one point to another,

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
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was a distinct advantage for each man because he could ride
the distance rather than march.

6 3

Since marching

troops "require more sustenance" and energy
transported,

than those being

the amount of transportation for subsistence

need be proportionately less;

therefore the provisions

hauled by wagon transport supplied more troops and
half-rations sustained more men for longer periods.
Engineers,

foragers,

men who did fatigue duty,

or the like,

were sustained on full rations because they had "hard work
at daily labor .
Mitchel had managed the movement of the wagon train so
successfully

that he was hauling the 1861 cotton crop for

northern cotton dealers over the gap in the Nashville and
Decatur Railroad and shipping the bales northbound on rail.
By charging the established government carrying charges,
Mitchel was able to operate the extensive Memphis and
Charleston Railroad,

pay the local workers,

and feed the

division's animals by paying for instead of confiscating the
forage received from the local f a r m e r s . ^

He was also

able to calm somewhat the antagonism of the local
inhabitants;

presumably

this would help to keep his

communications intact by minimizing local guerilla activity,
as well as encouraging farmers to engage in commerce with
the Y a n k e e s .
*

*

si

ll/i t h o u t any cooperation from Buell or Halleck in
joining forces

for an attack on Corinth in the west,

or in
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holding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

Mitchel had

shifted his forces to Stevenson for an advance on
Chattanooga in the east.

He had originally destroyed the

bridge over Widden's Creek to shut off the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad from the Confederates at Bridgeport,
but he kept the route open from Huntsville to Stevenson in
order to attack Chattanooga and to forage about the area.
While Buell wanted the Howe Bridge destroyed,
planned earlier in the year,

as had been

and Mitchel had attempted to

destroy it with his raid in March,

the bridge,

still intact,

opened an avenue towards Chattanooga and provided another
opportunity

,
,
66
to shorten the war.

After destroying the bridge over Widden's Creek,
miles east of Stevenson,

six

the enemy destroyed one bridge at

Stevenson and another eight miles west of Stevenson;

the

Confederates had the same objective as Mitchel--each wished
to keep the other from using the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad.

Concerned

that Mitchel might be overrun at

Stevenson and lose middle Tennessee,

Buell warned him that

he might have to fall back to Shelbyville if his position
was not secured.

This warning had provided the pretext for

the order to destroy the Bridgeport Bridge in April.
Mitchel acknowledged Buell's order and warning,
Buell,

but unlike

who felt that "the railroad would hardly be a proper

line of communications for us against
Chattanooga,"

67

Mitchel considered using it to

supply and to transport a large enough force "to strike a
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blow" at that city.

68

Too late, Halleck would come

to the same conclusion for the defense of Middle Tennessee.
Throughout April,
bridge

1862, Mitchel reported that "the

[over Widden's Creek]

destroyed by me between

Stevenson and Bridgeport still intervenes between my troops
and the enemy.

The heavy rains and high waters have thus

far prevented me from destroying the Tennessee
bridge."

69

Told that no re-enforcements were

available to support his position on his right,

Mitchel

concluded that after his troops had crossed the Tennessee
and the Decatur bridge was fired,

he could devote all his

attention to the advance on Bridgeport and
C h a t t a n o o g a .^

In the meantime,

before Mitchel was

prepared to advance the Confederates rebuilt the bridge that
Mitchel had dest r o y e d .^ ^

Mitchel then ordered a

small steamer to be adapted
an artillery piece,
bridge. ^

to carry a number of troops and

in the hope of taking the Bridgeport

Able to support the regiment of infantry

at Bellefonte and cavalry scouts at Stevenson with part of
Turchin 's brigade,
that not more than

Mitchel moved on Stevenson and learned
1,000 troops occupied Chattanooga,

with

an outpost at Bridgeport consisting of a regiment of
infantry and one of cavalry.

Mitchel promised that should

the rains subside and the roads became usable,
force the enemy to abandon Bridgeport,
either hold or destroy the bridge.

7 3

he would

and then he would
To reach

Stevenson required the rebuilding of two bridges,

each
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approximately

300 feet long, which had been destroyed by the

Confederates.
Stevenson,
captured
of April,

The first,

across Mud Creek,

was built as a floating bridge,

from the enemy.

seven miles from
upon cotton bales

Within the afternoon of the 27th

two regiments of infantry,

one company of cavalry,

and a piece of artillery of the Third Division had passed
the bridge.

The second bridge was completed on the next

Within four days of securing his right flank, Mitchel
launched an expedition from Bridgeport toward Chattanooga
and progressed within twelve miles of the city.

On the way,

the army captured supplies and a southern mail carrier,
more important,

it created panic among the soldiers and

citizens at Chattanooga.

Simultaneously,

under Negley penetrated to Jasper,
Union support.

but

another expedition

where it found strong

Since the garrison at Chattanooga was

undermanned and in a state of confusion,
removing property towards Atlanta,
larger force he could
march against Rome

and was seen

Mitchel felt that with a

"cross the Osage at Grates'

[Georgia].

. . .

Ferry and

That entire region is

now comparatively unprotected and very much
alarmed."
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By striking at Rome, Mitchel perhaps

could conduct a raid or even a turning movement against an
enemy's line of communication,
and Atlantic Railroad,
South.^

hoping to disrupt the Western

another strategic blow to the deep

This was a natural strategic move that

followed the Nashville-Chattanooga-Atlanta geographic
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corridor.

Besides severing the main railroad artery into

the southeastern Confederate States,

the expedition might

even have reached Atlanta while the two major Confederate
armies were occupied at Corinth and in front of Richmond.
Mitchel even expected that a "great struggle" would occur
"for the mastery of the railroad from Richmond south to
Atlanta."

This could only occur if the Western and Atlantic

Railroad were cut.

With the only guidance from Buell being

to relieve the Confederate threat to a small Union
contingent at the Cumberland Gap by making a diversion
towards Chattanooga,

Mitchel continued to probe around

Chattanooga with his limited force.

Sill's brigade had

advanced to Jasper and united with Negley's force,
time Mitchel

gave Negley "authority

case he deem[ed]

to take

at which

[Chattanooga]

in

it p r u d e n t . " ^

Relieved from the engagement around Corinth,

however,

the Confederates had re-enforced the 1,000 man garrison at
Chattanooga to 10-12,000 men to stem Mitchel's advance and
to concentrate and prepare

for an invasion of Kentucky and

Tennessee by General Braxton Bragg.

With his meager force,

Mitchel was forced to discontinue his offensive and revert
to a holding action.

7 8

Awaiting the slow arrival of

Buell over the now disrupted Memphis and Charleston
Railroad,

Mitchel decided that "As there is no [hope]

immediate advance upon Chattanooga,
line."

79

of an

X will now contract my

Mitchel had to be content to report that

"my force is totally insufficient to do anything more than
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to guard the extensive region over which they are spread
from hostile citizens and small bands of the
,.80
enemy.
While Mitchel's advance toward Chattanooga,
first week in May,
assistance

in the

was unsupported and received little

from his commanders,

it could not have achieved

more than a holding action without a complete railroad to
provide the necessary
reinforcements,

supplies.

If he had been given

Mitchel could not have supplied them so far

from their base at Nashville by way of Decatur.
planned move from Tuscumbia,

Unlike his

he was now far from

supplemental river transportation.
Mitchel's supply problem was not insurmountable when
feeding only his own division.
of communications,

Even with an incomplete line

his management was successful in

provisioning his troops and supplying enough forage
animals.

Because Mitchel's

for his

force was relatively small,

it

was able to subsist by living off the land and by hauling
supplies over the gap in the railroad.
line of communications was not intact,

However,

because his

he would not have

been able to supply a much larger

force,

required to capture Chattanooga.

The contemplated offensive

would have required more men and animals,

such as that

not just for the

seige of the city or for the action against Rome,

but to

guard the 400 miles of railway from
Nashville-Athens-Decatur-Huntsville-Stevenson against
guerrilla raiders.

That this line of
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communications was inadequate may be illustrated by the
attempt to supply Buell's Army of the Ohio as it moved from
Corinth to Stevenson,

while trying to cut off Bragg's

invasion of Middle Tennessee
On the 3rd of June,

from Chattanooga in June,

1862,

1862.

Buell ordered the Nashville

depot to accumulate supplies in order to feed his army of
five divisions,
Mitchel's
Alabama.

approximately 40,000 troops exclusive of

force,

82

as it moved across northern

While the Army of the Ohio operated as

part of the Department of the Mississippi,

it moved very

slowly over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

which

Mitchel had controlled from Tuscumbia to Decatur only two
months earlier.

8 3

Buell's mission was to conform

the movements of his army with those of the Confederates,
portion of which were already in Chattanooga.

a

84

Learning of the hitherto undetected Confederate move east to
Chattanooga,

Halleck insisted that "no time should be lost

in reestablishing our connection with Mitchel.

. . .

The

first thing now to be done is to open the railroad to
Decatur .
After
Baldwin,

giving up the pursuit of the enemy south to

the Army of the Ohio changed direction,

east towards Stevenson.

and moved

But because it had to rebuild many

bridges which the enemy had destroyed and to cross the
Tennessee River by ferry,
burned down,

since the Decatur bridge had been

the advance was made with great difficulty.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

which Mitchel had
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controlled and which had provided easy access over the
Tennessee,

now became a hinderance.

Mitchel was ordered to

ferry across locomotives and cars at Decatur to expedite
Buell's move,

but due to Muscle Shoals,

ferries large enough

to accommodate engines could not be moved above
Florence.^
As the Army of the Ohio marched east along the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad,

it received supplies from temporary

depots at Eastport and Tuscumbia.
however,

8 7

On June

1st,

Buell was already considering how he was to supply

his army once it crossed over to the north bank.

He ordered

200,000 rations and 120,000 forage rations to be accumulated
at Athens and another

50,000 rations and 25,000 of forage to

meet the troops at Decatur.

88

In order to move

those rations over the gap in the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad between Reynold's Station and Elkton,

Buell

supplemented Mitchel's one hundred wagons.
In total,
detached

Buell sent over

500 baggage and supply wagons

from his divisions to Reynold's Station to carry

supplies.

89

Immediately

they were organized into

supply trains and began hauling provisions and forage.

An

elaborate system was created to keep the trains shuttling
between the rail heads.

In order to minimize the forage

carried on the round robin trip from Reynold's Station to
Elkton,

the quartermasters established facilities for

shoeing and resting the animals and repairing the wagons at
Reynold s Station instead of at Elkton.

90

Just one
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days'

less forage to carry on the wagons to feed the draft

animals during the layover,

permitted

138 pounds more of

provisions to be carried per wagon forward to Elkton.
trains of 200 wagons were common,
cargo or 8,500 full rations,

Since

26,400 more pounds of

could be transported per trip,

by avoiding the lay over at Elkton.

The first wagon train

of 200 wagons accompanied by two cavalry companies departed
Reynold's Station on the 20th of June and arrived in Elkton
on the same day.
twenty-two miles.

The distance had by that time narrowed to
91

number of wagons,

However,

including

even with the great

100 supplied by Mitchel,

the

trains could barely meet the demands of 40,000 men and
thousands of animals in providing the minimum required
subsistence.
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On July 11th,
the Decatur road,
supplies,

Buell stated that "the gap of 22 miles on
the one we are dependent upon for

. . . requires every wagon that can be possibly

spared to keep the troops from starving,
living from day to day.

...

and at that we are

We cannot advance beyond

Stevenson until the road is completed so as to release the
wagons not absolutely

required in rear."

9 3

It was

only after the gap in the Nashville and Decatur Railroad was
bridged and the 1862 crop was harvested that Buell's army
began to accumulate enough supplies for an advance on
Chattanooga.

As one officer recalled,

"There was but a

limited supply of forage up to the 20th of August,

when the

new crop of corn came in, when there was plenty of forage."
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And another noted that "on the resumption of communication
by rail,

stores came through regularly."

With his division transportation,

9 A

Mitchel had indicated

that he could supply 20,000 troops at Stevenson,
four days later,

on the 16th of June,

but only

he believed that his

division train "will not be sufficient to do the work
required,

but will suffice to feed 10,000 troops."

he could keep his own troops fed,

Although

he had failed to

accumulate provision and forage at Decatur or Huntsville to
feed Buell's men crossing the river at Florence and Decatur.
From the 3rd of June,

the date he was ordered to begin

supplying Buell's army and while continuing to supply his
own from Nashville,

to the end of the month,

accumulated any stores,

Mitchel had not

even when he used Buell's wagons.

That he was unable to provide adequate supply for Buell's
army proved his inability to supply the larger army he had
planned to use the previous month for his projected
expedition to Chattanooga.
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The significance of an

absence of rail communications in translating strategy into
viable operations was demonstrated.

Photo
4. One of the reasons for the gap in Mitchel's line of
communications,
the
Elk
River
bridge
near
Pulaski,
Tennessee,
which
was
destroyed
by
the
Confederates
and
disrupted
the
flow
of
supplies
over
the
Nashville
and
Decatur Railroad.

Footnotes

to Chapter VI

Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in
the Southern United States to 186 0 , 2 Vols. (Washington:
Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1933), 2:811-30.
2

Davis, Perry, and Kirkley, Atlas to Accompany
The Official Recor d s , Plate 149.
In April 1984 I drove
Mitchel's route of march from Murfreesborough to Huntsville,
as well as to the Bridgeport Bridge and to the Decatur
Bridge.
Most of the terrain information about the area was
based on that drive.
3
Van Creveld, Supplying W a r , p. 1.
4
Billings, Hardtack and C o f f e e , p . Ill;
Coggins, Arms and Equipment , p . 122;
Revised Regulations
18 6 1 , p. 243, Regulation #1191.
^ Revised Regulations
Regulation #1121.
^Gatch,

186 1 , p . 166,

"General 0. M. Mitchel,"

p. 122.

^Mitchel, Ormsby Macknight M i t c h e l , p. 277;
Chandler Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry,
December 26, 1862, Official R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. XVI,
pt. 1, p. 281; Nathaniel S. Dodge, Hints on Army
Transportation (Albany:
Charles Van Benthuvsen, 1863), pp.
5-12, 18.
The Buell Commission of Inquiry was convened in
November 1862 to investigate Buell's actions as commander of
the Army of the Ohio.
Most of the deliberations concerned
the period following Mitchel's departure from the Third
Division.
^Mitchel to Buell,
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol.

April 20, 1862, Official
X, pt. 2, p. 618.

^Mitchel to Buell, April 20, 1862,p. 618;
Davis, Perry, and Kirkley, Atlas to Accompany The Official
Records , Plate 149.
^ T h e area around Stevenson lacked forage,
which placed great demand on Mitchel to supply enough
provisions and fodder by the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad.
Smith Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, January 30, 1863, Official Records , Series I,
Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 389; Lane Testimony during Buell
Commission of Inquiry, February 21, 1863,. ibid., p. 473.
^ M i t c h e l to Buell,
134; Mitchel to Stanton,

April 27, 1862, ibid., p.
May 2, 1862, ibid., p. 162.

193

194
^Mitchel

to Buell,

April

20,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

to Mitchel,

April

23,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

618.
^Buell
118.
^ M i t c h e l to Stanton, April 24, 1862, ibid., p.
124; Mitchel to Buell, April 24, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to
Buell, April 25, 1862, ibid., p. 620.
'''^Mitchel to Buell, April 27, 1862, ibid., p.
133; Mitchel to Stanton, April 25, 1862, ibid., p.
Mitchel to Buell, April 25, 1862, ibid.; Turchin,
"Huntsville, Ala.," pp. 179-187.

125;

^ M i t c h e l to Buell, April 24, 1862, Of ficial
Records , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 124.
^ M i t c h e l to Stanton, April 24, 1862, ibid.;
Mitchel to Buell, April 24, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to Buell,
April 25, 1862, ibid., p. 620.
1 O

turchin, "Huntsville, Ala.," p. 183; Mitchel
to Stanton, April 25, 1862, Official R e c o r d s , Series I,
Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 125.
^ M i t c h e l to Stanton, April 17, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. Ill; Mitchel to
Chase, April 19, 1862, ibid., p. 115; Mitchel to Buell,
April 20, 1862, ibid., p. 618.
20

Beatty, Citizen Soldier , p. 134; Mitchel to
Stanton, April 24, 1862, Official R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol.
X, pt. 2, p. 124; Mitchel to Buell, April 24, 1862, ibid.
The Confederate troops were allegedly from Sterling Price's
command.
But Price was not in the area.
Any troops coming
from Memphis would probably have been interdicted by
Halleck.
That leaves the alternative of the troops coming
directly from Beauregard's forces near Corinth, and not from
Memphis at all.
The only thing that is certain was that a
Confederate force was pressuring Turchin's outposts, and
that he and Mitchel were both convinced that they must
protect the rations, Middle Tennessee, and the Third
Division.
^ Mitchel to Stanton, April 24, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 124; Mitchel to
Buell, April 24, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to Buell, April 25,
1862, ibid., p. 620; Mitchel to Buell, April 25, 1862,
ibid., p. 125; Mitchel to Stanton, April 25, 1862, ibid.;
Mitchel to Buell, April 27, 1862, ibid., p. 133; Turchin,
"Huntsville, Ala.," p. 187.
^Buell

to Mitchel,

April

19,

1862,

Official

195

Records, Series I, Vol. X , p t . 2, P . 114; Mitchel to
Stanton, April 27, 1862, i b i d ., P- 137; Mitchel to Buell,
April 27, 1862, ibid . , p . 134.
23
JMitchel

to Chase,

April

19,

1862,

i b i d ., P-

115.
^ M i t c h e l to Buell , April 25,
620 ; Mi tc he 1 to Stanton , April 25,
^Mitchel

to Stanton,

April

1862, ibid . , P1862, ibid., p.

25,

1862,

125.

ibid . , p .

137 .
^ M i t c h e l to Buell , April 27, 1862, ibid . , P134 ; Mitchel to S t a n t o n , April 27, 1862, ibid., p.
Mitchel to Buell, June 6, 1862, ibid., p. 265.

137;

137;

^ M i t c h e l to Buell, April 25, 1862, ibid., p.
Buell to Mitchel, June 3, 1862, ibid., p. 627.

^^Mitchel letter of May 22, 1862, Mitchel,
Ormsby Macknight M i t c h e l , p. 323; Mitchel to Buell, April
20, 1862, Official R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p.
618; Mitchel to Negley, April 21, 1862, ibid., p. 620.
^ M i t c h e l letter of April 22,
Ormsby Macknight M i t c h e l , p. 322.

1862, Mitchel,

30 Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, Official Records , Series I,
Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 473.
31

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid.
32

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid., p. 474; Fry Testimony
during Buell Commission of Inquiry, December 2, 1862, ibid.,
p. 227.
33

Fry Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, December 2, 1862, ibid.
3A
^Rousseau Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, January 20, 1863, ibid., p. 358; Chandler Testimony
during Buell Commission of Inquiry, December 26, 1862,
i b i d ., p . 280.
35

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid., p. 475.
36

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid.

196

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid.
^ G e n e r a l Order No. 13a, February 26, 1862,
ibid., p. 497; Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid., p. 479.
39
’General Order No.
V o l . X, pt. 2, p. 292.

81, March 15,

1862,

ibid.,

40

Slocum Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 24, 1863, ibid., Vol. XVI, p t . 1, p. 492.

X,

4 1
Mitchel to Hunter, May 24,
pt. 2, p. 212.

1862,

ibid.,

Vol.

4 2
Slocum Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 24, 1862, ibid., Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 492.
43

Mitchel to Buell, June 16, 1862, ibid., pt.
2, p. 30; Chandler Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, December 26, 1862, ibid., pt. 1, p. 280.
44

Lane Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 21, 1863, ibid., pt. 1, p. 474.
^^Mitchel to Buell, June 8, 1862, Vol. X, pt.
2, p. 275; Mitchel to Buell, June 8, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to
Buell, June 10, 1862, ibid., p. 287.
46

Duffield to Greene, April 25, 1862, ibid., p.
127; Johnson to Halleck, April 27, 1862, ibid., p. 132;
Stanton to Halleck, April 25, 1862, ibid., p. 126; Buell to
Mitchel, April 23, 1862, ibid., p. 118; Mitchel to Buell,
April 13, 1862, ibid., p. 617; Turchin, "Huntsville, Ala.,"
p. 179-84; Beatty, Citizen Soldier , p. 130-35.
^ B u e l l to Mitchel, April 23, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt . 2, p. 118.
48

Negley to Buell,

April 23,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

620.
49

Duffield to Greene,

April 25,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

127 .
^^Buell to Halleck,

April

26,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

129.
Mitchel to Stanton, May 9, 1862, ibid., p.
178; Mitchel to Stanton, May 10, 1862, ibid., p. 180;
Mitchel to Stanton, May 4, 1862, ibid., p. 162; Fry to
Mitchel, May 7, 1862, ibid., p. 624.

197
"^Mitchel

to Buell,

April

20,

1862,

ibid.,

“^ M i t c h e l

to Negley,

April 23,

1862,

ibid.,

^Mitchel

to Negley,

April

1862,

ibid.

p.

618.
p.

620.
23,

^ D o d g e , Army T ransportation, p . 7.
~^Third D i v i s o n 1s Returns for the Month of
April, 1862, Official R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, p t . 2, p.
148; Third Division's Returns for the Month of May, 1862,
ibid., p. 235; McCook to Fry, July 10, 1862, ibid., Vol.
XVI, pt. 2, p. 117; Chandler Testimony during Buell
Commission of Inquiry, December 26, 1862, ibid., pt. 1, p.
281; Fry to Messinger, June 11, 1862, ibid., pt. 2, p. 11;
Yates Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry, February
24, 1863, ibid., p t . 1, p. 490.
"^Mitchel to Buell,
X, pt. 2, p. 124.

April

^ T u r c h i n , "Huntsville,

24,

Ala.,"

1862,

p.

ibid.,

Vol.

176.

59 Innes Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, December 24, 1862, Of ficial R e c o r d s , Series I,
Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 248.
^ M i t c h e l to Buell, June 10, 1862, ibid., Vol.
X, p t . 2, p. 288; Mitchel to Buell, June 12, 1862, ibid.,
Vol. XVI, pt. 2, p. 17; Mitchel to Buell, June 20, 1862,
ibid., p. 41; Greene to Fry, June 21, 1862, ibid., p. 45.
/:I
chandler Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, December 26, 1862, ibid., p t . 1, p. 280; Yates
Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry, February 24,
1863, ibid., p. 489; Darr Testimony during Buell Commission
of Inquiry, March 24, 1863, ibid., p. 617.
°^Chandler Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, December 26, 1862, ibid., p., 281.
63

Smith Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 10, 1862, ibid., p. 416; Mitchel to Buell,
June 20, 1862, ibid., pt. 2, p. 41.
^ M a c F e e l y Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, January 16, 1863, ibid., pt. 1, p. 335; Yates
Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry, February
1863, ibid., p. 489.
°^Mitchel to Stanton, May 8, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 174; Mitchel to

24,

198

Stanton, May 13, 1862, ibid., p. 188; Mitchel to Stanton,
June 5, 1862, ibid., p. 262; Mitchel to Stanton, July 19,
1862, ibid., p. 290; Mitchel to Stanton, May 7, 1862, ibid.,
p. 293; Mitchel to Stanton, May 4 , 1862, ibid., p. 162;
Mitchel to Comstock, May 5, 1862, ibid., p. 640; Mitchel to
Hook, May 5, 1862, ibid.; General Order No. 31, June 6,
1862, ibid., p. 632; Paul to Sharp, May 4, 1862, ibid., p.
637; Paul to Paul, May 4, 1862, ibid., p. 638; Clark to
Comstock, May 5, 1862, ibid., p. 639; Clark to Goodhue, May
5, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to Hook, May 5, 1862, ibid., p. 640;
General Order No. 28, June 30, 1862, ibid., Vol. XVI, pt. 2,
p. 80; Turchin to Fry, July 5, 1862, ibid., p. 98.
Buell to Mitchel, April 19, 1862, ibid., Vol.
X, p t . 2, p. 114; Mitchel to Chase, April 19, 1862, ibid.,
p. 115; Mitchel to Buell, April 20, 1862, ibid., p. 618.
^Buell

to Mitchel , April

23,

1862 , i b i d ., p .

to Buell , April

20,

1862,

118.
^Mitchel

ibid . , p .

618.
69
° mitchel to Stanton, April 24, 1862, ibid.,
124; Mitchel to Buell, April 24, 1862, ibid.
^Mitchel

to B u e l l , April 25,

1862 , ibid.,

^ ^Mitchel

to B u e l l , April

20,

1862,

72
Mitchel

to Buell , April

25,

1862 , ibid.,

p.

p.

620.
ibid . , p .

618.
p.

125.
Mitchel to Stanton, April 25, 1862, ibid.;
Mitchel to Buell, April 25, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to Buell,
April 27, 1862, ibid., p. 133.
^ M i t c h e 1 to B u e l l , April 27,
134; Mitchel to S t a n t o n , April 27,
^ M i t c he 1 to Stanton , May 5,

1862 , ibid . , p .
1862, i b i d ., p . 137.
1862 , ibid.,

p.

165.
7 6r
The Great Locomotive Chase, undertaken to
coincide with Mitchel's capture of Huntsville, was to
disrupt the Western and Atlantic Railroad from Marietta,
Georgia, to Chattanooga and link up with Mitchel in Alabama.
Mitchel to Buell, June 7, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 271; Mitchel to Fry,
June 7, 1862, i b i d .

199
Mitchel to Buell.
XVI , p t . 2, p . 10.

June

11.

1862.

ibid..

Vol.

Mitchel to S t a n t o n , May 4,
x , pt . 2, p . 161.

1862,

ibid.,

Vol.

79

8 0 „ . , ..
Mitchel to H a l l e c k , June 9,

1862,

ibid.,

p.

^Mitchel

1862,

ibid.,

p.

282 .
t o S t a n t o n , May 19,

204.
8 ^Fry to MacFeely, June 3, 1862, ibid., p. 628;
Fry to Greene, June 14, 1862, ibid., Vol. XVI, p t . 2, p. 23.
^General
p. 20.

Order No.

33, June

12,

1862,

ibid.,

84

Sherman to Kelton, May 30, 1862, Official
R e c o r d s , Series I, Vol. X, pt . 2, p. 228; Judah to
McClernand, May 30, 1862, ibid.; Thomas to Halleck, May 30,
1862, ibid., p. 229; Halleck to Meigs, May 31, 1862, ibid.,
p. 232.
8 5
Lincoln to Halleck, June 8, 1862, ibid., p.
277; Halleck to Pope, June 9, 1862, ibid., p. 278; Halleck
to Buell, May 31, 1862, ibid., p. 232; Halleck to Buell,
June 2, 1862, ibid., p. 243; Halleck to Buell, June 1, 1862,
ibid., p. 236; Halleck to Pope, June 4, 1862, ibid., p. 252;
Halleck to Buell, June 4, 1862, ibid., p. 254; Halleck to
Buell, June 6, 1862, ibid., p. 264; Halleck to Buell, June
9, 1862, ibid., p. 280; Halleck to Buell, June 4, 1862,
ibid., p. 629.
^ H a l l e c k to Buell, May 31, 1862, ibid., p.
232; Halleck to Buell, June 1, 1862, ibid., p. 236; Buell to
Halleck, June 1, 1862, ibid.; Fry to Wood, June 1, 1862,
ibid.; Stanton to Halleck, June 2, 1862, ibid., p. 243;
Halleck to Buell, June 2, 1862, ibid.; Mitchel to Buell,
June 6, 1862, ibid., p. 265; Buell to Mitchel, June 3, 1862,
ibid., p. 627; Halleck to Buell, June 8, 1862, ibid., p.
633; B u e l 1 to Halleck , June 8, 1862, ibid. ; Halleck to
Buell, July 3 , 1862, ibid . , Vol. XVI , p t . 2 , P . 93; Buell to
Halleck , July 4, 1862, ibid •
87 V

Fry to N e l s o n , June 3, 1862, i b i d . , Vol . x ,
p t . 2, p . 250 ; Fry to Wood , June 3, 1862 , ibid • » P • 251 ;
Thomas to Fry , June 24 , 1862, ibid., V o l . XVI , pt . 2 , p . 59;
Buell to Thomas, June 24, 1862, ibid •
88P
fry to Greene , June
Buell to Mitchel, June 19,
89B ue11 to W o o d , June

16, 1862, ibid. . P- 23;
1862 , ibid . , p . 39.
16,

1862,

ibid. , P- 29;

♦
200

Fry to Smith, June 19, 1862, ibid.,
July 11, 1862, ibid., p. 122.

p. 39; Buell to Halleck,

90

Fry to Smith, June 19, 1862, ibid., p. 39;
Fry to McCook, July 19, 1862, ibid., p. 38; Bingham to
Buell, June 22, 1862, ibid., p. 52; Fry to Gaubert, June 27,
1862, ibid., p. 68; Fry to McCook, June 29, 1862, ibid., p.
71; Fry to Sinton, June 28, 1862, ibid., p. 70; Fry to
Norton, June 28, 1862, ibid.
91
Buell to Bingham, June 20, 1862, ibid., p.
42; Buell to Mitchel, June 20, 1862, ibid.; Fry to McCook,
June 25, 1862, ibid., p. 64; Fry to McCook, June 29, 1862,

ibid., p . 71.
92

Buell to Swords, July 7, 1862, ibid., p. 104;
Wood to Fry, July 10, 1862, ibid., p. 117; Fry to Greene,
July 14, 1862, ibid., p. 146; Fry to Thomas, July 14, 1862,
ibid., p. 148.
^ B u e l l to Halleck, July 11, 1862, ibid., p.
122; Fry Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry,
December 2, 1862, ibid., Vol. XVI, p t . 1, p. 706.
94

Slocum Testimony during Buell Commission of
Inquiry, February 24, 1863, ibid., Vol. XVI, p t . 1, p. 492;
MacFeely Testimony during Buell Commission of Inquiry,
January 16, 1863, ibid., p. 333; Chandler Testimony during
Buell Commission of Inquiry, December 26, 1862, ibid., p.
279.
95

Mitchel to Buell, June 12, 1862, ibid., pt.
2, p. 17; Mitchel to Buell, June 16, 1862, ibid., p. 30;
to Bingham, June 29, 1862, ibid., p. 73.

Fry

CONCLUSION

General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel succeeded in a notable
achievement early in the Civil War by severing the vital
Confederate Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
he captured

In April

1862

all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River and

the rail line operating through that state from Stevenson to
Decatur.

He bisected the line at Huntsville and proceeded

to secure his Third Division's flanks by operating the
captured railway to Stevenson and Decatur.
expedition,

In a follow-up

he had Turchin move west along the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad to Tuscumbia in an attempt to join
forces with the combined armies of Halleck and Buell,

which

were stalemated at Corinth forty-two miles away.
In occupying northern Alabama,

Mitchel sought to

inflict more permanent damage to the Confederate east-west
supply line than he could have done with a mere raid to
disrupt Confederate communications.

By holding the

territory along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

he

obtained more decisive results than Assistant Secretary of
War,

Thomas A. Scott,

Huntsville,

believed,

Confederate

for after the capture of

forces moving by rail from Virginia

to the Mississippi line had to come via Montgomery,
Meridian, and Mobile,

then to Corinth.^

In effect,

Mitchel did more than delay the arrival of Confederate
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reinforcements at Corinth,

for he initiated an

action— perhaps a turning movement,

perhaps a raid— on the

Confederate line of communications,

the Mobile and Ohio

Railroad.

Because of Mitchel's blocking action on the

Memphis and Charleston Railroad,

the Confederate army was

forced to depend on Mobile for supplies,

provisions,

and

r einforcements.
Mitchel understood the vulnerability of railroads to
disruption and the effect that cutting supply lines would
have on an army that was concentrated.

From the experience

he gained in planning the preempted expedition to Cumberland
Gap in October

1861,

and by his practical knowledge of

engineering and management,

Mitchel realized the importance

of the railroad as a line of communications.
had once concentrated

An army that

by rail that was now denied

to it,

could be forced to live off a land not suited for a
concentrated field army,
by rail,

although that same army,

would have adequate supply.

supplied

This form of strategy

discarded the direct attack on an entrenched enemy,
instead provoked
animals of food.
communications,

and

the adversary by depriving the men and
A break in an enemy's line of
or even the threat of one,

forced that army

to retreat or to turn to the tactical offensive in order to
extricate itself from its dangerous position.

Mitchel knew

that an enemy was not susceptible to indirect attack or
threatening pressure if "he has neither
rear;

front,

nor line of communications to cut";

flanks,

however,

the

nor

203

concentrated Confederate army at Corinth was in a vulnerable
position.

2

With a complete railroad to his rear and

river transport as an alternate supply line, Mitchel,
anticipated support from the main Union army,

with

proposed to

cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad near Jacinto.

A united

Federal army would have departed from Tuscumbia to threaten
or sever the Confederate line of communications.

The

turning maneuver or raiding action had a genuine possibility
of ending the stalemate at Corinth,

forcing the enemy to

retreat or to attack the Union lines in a tactical
offensive.
Mitchel's effort was not appreciated by his superiors,
whose systematic and laborious attempt to take Corinth
occupied their total attention.

If the Union commanders had

modified their strategy to employ Mitchel's column as a
turning movement,

even a raid,

the Confederates would have

been forced to surrender their defensive strategy and go on
the tactical offensive.

The resulting assault against

rifled muskets would have had a high cost in Confederate
lives.

But after repeated requests for reinforcements to

support his movement were ignored,

Mitchel withdrew

Turchin's brigade to the north bank of the Tennessee and
destroyed the Decatur bridge.

Under threat of encirclement,

Mitchel destroyed the only connection that the main army had
with central Tennessee rather than let the bridge be
recaptured

by the Confederates.

Having the Memphis and Charleston Railroad for interior
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lines,

Mitchel shifted his force of 8,700 men to Stevenson

in an attempt to capture Bridgeport,

hoping to use it as a

crossing point over the Tennessee River to Chattanooga.

In

this move, Mitchel was encouraged by his commanders only
because it diverted Confederate attention from Morgan's
front around Cumberland Gap.

However,

the plan to turn

Chattanooga by cutting the Winchester and Alabama Railroad
at Rome was grandious,

premature,

and not likely to succeed,

not because the strategic plan was flawed,

but because

Mitchel required more men and an intact railroad for his
line of communications to accomplish the task.
400 miles of railroad communications,
Stevenson to Nashville,

Mitchel's

stretching from

from Decatur to Nashville,

and from

Decatur to Stevenson were not complete and forced Mitchel to
haul provisions by wagon between the gaps.

When Buell

attempted to supply the 40-50,000 men in his Army of the
Ohio over the same broken line,

it required all of the

army's wagon transport to close the gap in its rear,

leaving

none available to support the expedition from Stevenson to
Chattanooga.

It was only after the Nashville and Decatur

Railroad was reconstructed,
harvested,

and after the 1862 crop was

that Buell's force could have gone on the

offensive towards Chattanooga.
conditions,

Mitchel faced similar

but did not have the means to ensure a secure

line of communications,

while at the same time keeping

enough men to deliver the attack on Chattanooga.
Mitchel's success was that he cut the Confederate line

*
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of communications,

and then held his position with limited

means in order to keep the prized Memphis and Charleston
Railroad under Federal control.
importance when he ordered

Halleck later realized this

Buell's army to move east from

Corinth to Chattanooga in early June,

1862.

Mitchel held

the Memphis and Charleston Railroad for almost three months
with an independent command,

and turned over to his

superiors the opportunity employ interior lines.

From

Decatur to Stevenson "the Memphis and Charleston Railroad

.

. . was of incalculable advantage to the army as a means of
transportation.
land carriage."

It was the only possible means except by
3

Since the direct link between

Nashville and Stevenson,
Railroad,

the Nashville and Chattanooga

was contested and made unusable,

the Memphis and

Charleston Railroad provided the only means of hauling men
and supplies from Nashville.
limited,

The Tennessee River was

for boats could proceed no farther

up river than

Florence.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad enabled the
shipment of supplies from Nashville to Stevenson and gave
the Federal army

the ability

to "transport

by rail

and their horses and 1,500 men at each trip."
time from Athens to Stevenson was approximately

18 wagons

The running
six hours,

compared to marching the same eighty-five miles in about six
days.

Had Mitchel's superiors realized the importance of

his initial achievement,

and provided the means to guard the

entire line from Tuscumbia

to Stevenson,

then the road would
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have been intact when Halleck needed it.

The move over the

Tennessee River would have been made much more
r a p i d l y .^
Mitchel summarized the Third Division's endeavors in
northern Alabama in a congratulatory communique to his men,
dated April

16th:

So1d i e r s ,--Your march upon Bowling Green won
the thanks and confidence of our commanding
general.
With engines and cars captured from the
enemy, our advance guard precipitated itself upon
Nashville.
It was now made your duty to seize and
destroy the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, the
great military road of the enemy.
With a supply
train only sufficient to feed you at a distance of
two days' march from your depot, you undertook the
Herculean task of rebuilding 1,200 feet of heavy
bridging, which, by your untiring energy, was
accomplished in ten days.
Thus, by a railway of
your own construction, your depot of supplies was
removed from Nashville to Shelbyville, nearly
sixty miles in the direction of the object of your
attack.
The blow now became practicable.
Marching with a celerity such as to outstrip any
messenger who might have attempted to announce
your coming, you fell upon Huntsville, taking your
enemy completely by surprise, and capturing not
only his great military road, but all his machine
shops, engines and rolling stock.
Thus, providing
yourselves with ample transportation, you have
struck blow after blow with a rapidity
unparalleled.
Stevenson fell sixty miles to the
east of Huntsville.
Decatur and Tuscumbia have
been in a like manner seized, and are now
occupied.
In three days you have extended your
front of operations more than 120 miles, and your
morning gun at Tuscumbia may be heard by your
comrades on the battlefields made glorious by
their victory before Corinth.
The communication
of these facts to headquarters has not only won
the thanks of our commanding general, but those of
the department of war, which I announce to you
with proud satisfaction.
Accept the thanks of our
commander, and let your future dgeds demonstrate
that you can surpass yourselves.
M i t c h e l 's achievements as a commander were similarly
recognized

by the leaders in Washington on April

11,

1862,
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when they promoted him to Major-General of Volunteers "for
gallant and meritorious service," in capturing Huntsville
and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad without a

,
T 6
battle.
By capturing and using the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad as an interior line of communications
position in northern Alabama,

for his

and in his conception of a

strategy for disrupting the Confederate lines of
communications

by turning movements,

Mitchel proved himself

an exception to the old adage that generals are always
prepared to fight the previous war.
army for a generation,
doctrine.

Having been out of the

he was not influenced by obsolete

Appreciating the significance of the railroad as

few other generals did,

Ormsby Macknight Mitchel was better

prepared for the Civil War than some of his contemporaries
who had remained in the army.
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